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The present research article focuses on public participation in the environmental policy-making 
process in post-Mao China. It is a well-known fact that public administration in socialist China is 
highly centralised, and that public policies are initiated at the center and then locally administered 
under the one-party rule. In this monist political system, main stakeholders in the policy process 
are mainly Chinese Communist Party cadres, together with the ‘authorised’ groups of societies; 
so far participation from autonomous interest groups and society has been limited at best. In 
general, the ‘western model’ of civil society, which is characterised by a plurality of interest 
groups participating in public policymaking, implementation and evaluation, has – so far – been 
absent in China. This study aims to use environmental protection as a platform to examine the 
transformations that have been taking place in the environmental policy process and use it as a 
piece of references to revisit the current academic literature on China. 
 
Specifically this article will compare two anti-incinerator protests in Guangzhou (Canton) and 
Beijing, to illustrate the dynamics surrounding the emergence of public participation in China’s 
environmental policy process. This study plans to analyse why Guangzhou and Beijing Municipal 
governments have had different responses and attitudes to address citizens’ grievances. 
Furthermore, the research will dwell on the establishment up of a Public Consultative and 
Supervision Committee for Urban Waste Management in Guangzhou City, a public consultative 
mechanism on waste management, which certainly represents a major novelty and a breakthrough 
for the policy making process of China. This research project demonstrates how policy 
adjustment is not determined solely by protests’ outcomes but is also greatly affected by the 
response of local governments and the development of civil society. Consequently, the discussion 
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Chapter 1.  
Introduction  
 
Beijing and Guangzhou have experienced considerable controversy over the construction of 
incinerators in 2006 and 2009, respectively. In 2006, the citizens of Beijing launched several 
demonstrations against the plan to build an incinerator in Liulitun district. Three years later, the 
citizens of Panyu district in Guangzhou protested against plans to construct an incinerator near 
their homes. The protesters in both cases expressed concerns about the environmental and health 
effects of incinerators, in addition to voicing their dissatisfaction with being excluded from the 
decision-making process. They protested, contacted the media and sought help from experts – all 
to influence the government. Eventually, both municipal governments suspended the plans and 
relocated the incinerators, marking victories for the protesters while revealing the increasing 
influence of citizens’ involvement in the Chinese environmental policy process. Through 
comparing two anti-incinerator protests in Guangzhou and Beijing, this thesis examines the 
linkage between environmental activism and the change of environmental policy at local level of 
China. More broadly, the governments’ responses to these protests have changed gradually, 
making an understanding of the recent developments in civil society and social activism 
particularly important in China. 
 
Since the economic reforms of the late 1970s, Chinese society has experienced unprecedented 
economic growth, becoming one of the largest economies in the twenty-first century. The 
crackdown following the Tiananmen Uprising leading up to the 4 June 1989 Massacre did not 
interrupt the country’s overall development, and the economic boom of the last 25 years has 
improved the standard of living among the Chinese people. One of the consequences of improved 
material conditions and extensive urbanisation has been the pluralisation of interests and a rising 
consciousness in relation to human and political rights, including land acquisition, labour rights, 
social welfare and environmental protection. The aforementioned developments have increased 
China’s societal complexity, creating social conflicts in urban communities. However, political 
reform lags behind economic development, prompting increasingly frequent protests across the 
country that threaten the rule of local governments and challenge the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). Due to concerns over legitimacy, building a harmonious society (和諧社會) has become 
the top priority of the national agenda (Chung, Lai and Xia 2006:2).  
Social activism (or collective resistance) has been encouraged by a lack of consideration for 
citizens’ rights (Cai 2010:1) and the rise of rights consciousness (Selden and Perry 2009:20) over 
the past decade. According to one report entitled ‘Annual Report on China’s Rule of Law No. 12 
(2014)’ (中國法治報告 No.12 (2014)), there were 871 collective incidents1 (群體性事件) such 
as protests, demonstrations, marches, sit-ins and group complaints – all of which involved 100 
people or more – between 1 January 2000 and 30 September 2013 (‘Annual Report on China’s 
Rule of Law’ 2014:271). State control over non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil 
society’s weakness in mediating between governments and citizens also explain the emergence of 
widespread social activism in China. After the Tiananmen Massacre, the dramatic growth of 
NGOs was a revolutionary development in socialist Chinese society. Domestic NGOs must 
register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and they typically work on service delivery, 
community development, education and policy advocacy while very rarely taking political risks. 
These ‘depoliticised’ NGOs are thus constrained in their ability to defend citizens’ rights or 
mobilise social activism.  
 
Partially due to the scale of economic growth and the consequent environmental degradation, 
environmental activism has become increasingly popular in contemporary China. Thirty-seven 
pollution-related protests took place between 1 January 2000 and 3 September 2013, 5 of which 
involved 10,000 or more participants (‘Annual Report on China’s Rule of Law’ 2014:280). 
Pursuing economic growth at all costs exploits natural resources and increases the damaging 
effects of pollution on human health. Hence, the effects of development are difficult to ignore. 
Acute environmental degradation, weak ENGOs and the poor enforcement of environmental laws 
have spurred environmental activism across the country, threatening social stability and 
challenging the CCP’s legitimacy. Cities are suffering under increased air and water pollution 
while the continued construction of polluting structures such as petrochemical plants and 
incinerators in urban and suburban areas has angered citizens and led to protests. Citizens willing 
to protest against environmental pollution are astonishingly numerous, as indicated by the 
protests against the anti-paraxylene (PX) project in Xiamen (2007), the anti-incinerator project in 
Guangzhou (2009), the copper factory protests in Shifang, Sichuan, movements against the 
waste-water pipeline from the paper plant in Qidong, Jiangsu and the anti-PX project in Ningbo 
City (2012). Such incidents have not been limited to major cities, but have also occurred as part 
of China’s provincial and local politics (Wu 2013:89). Increased environmental awareness has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This refers to the number of collective incidents counted by news reports. Source: “Annual Report on 
China’s Rule of Law” No. 12, 2014:271.  
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encouraged citizens to voice their disagreements with governmental decisions, forcing the 
government to bring public participation into political thought (Chang 2012). By protesting, 
citizens question the low transparency levels in the environmental policy-making process and 
highlight the poor enforcement of environmental laws.  
 
Protests also call attention to the lack of public participation in environmental policy-making 
processes. Currently, the Chinese government uses environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and 
public hearings to encourage citizens’ involvement in environmental decision-making processes, 
but opportunities for public participation to really affect environmental policy are limited. Not 
surprisingly, public participation in public policy processes are also limited, or completely 
excluded because the ruling elite monopolises policy-making processes in the authoritarian 
regime. In China, there is a general consensus amongst scholars that public administration is 
highly centralised, and that public policies are bureaucratically initiated and administered under 
the one-party dictatorship. In this monist political system, the stakeholders in the policy process 
are typically CCP cadres and ‘authorised’ social groups with little or no participation from 
autonomous interested groups. In general, the Western model of civil society, which is 
characterised by the plurality of interested groups’ participation in public policy making, 
implementation and evaluation, is absent from China’s public policy processes. However, given 
the growing number of environmental challenges that China faces, society – particularly its 
members involved in environmental groups – is calling for more awareness of environmental 
problems, including issues such as infrastructural over-development and conservation. Yet public 
participation in environmental policy-making processes remains limited. The growth of 
environmental activism across this authoritarian country sheds light on local governments’ 
responses. The decentralised political structure gives conditional authority to local governments 
to make public policies, enact local laws and regulations and draft the budget to boost local 
development. However, the close relationship between local government and business groups 
means that local officials tend to favour economic growth over implementing the central 
government goal of environmental protection. In addition, the local environmental protection 
bureaus (EPBs) are supposed to enforce environmental laws and regulations, but their personnel 
decisions, leadership and financial resources are still decided by local governments (Shapiro 
2012:69). Thus, the EPBs are placed in a weak structural position that renders them unable to 
effectively enforce environmental regulations.   
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In summary, this backdrop of environmental activism outcomes in China and the research 
covered in this work provide an analytical model to explain the behavioural patterns and 
dynamics between state and non-state actors in anti-incinerator campaigns in Beijing and 
Guangzhou. The significance of environmental degradation as an issue that provokes activism, 
and whether such activism affects environmental policy, provided the motivation for this work 
and raised the following questions: 1) How, in the context of an authoritarian regime committed 
to economic growth, can non-state actors influence policies related to incinerator construction? 2) 
Why and how did municipal governments respond to the protests studied in this work? 3) How 
did societally based environmental coalitions affect the overall municipal solid waste 
management in Beijing and Guangzhou? This work aims to answer these questions and promote 
an understanding of how environmental protests operate in authoritarian China. It explores an 
explanatory link between environmental activism and policy change at the local level in China 
and explains why and how local governments respond to protests while examining the conditions 
of concession making. As stated, protests usually target local governments rather than the central 
government, because the former are responsible for daily life and thus may be directly violating 
citizens’ rights (Cai 2010:4). In the face of emerging social activism, local governments change 
policies to minimise political and economic costs, thus policy-abolishment or policy-innovation 
(Ibid) is often the response to environmental activism. When choosing their mode of policy 
adjustment, local governments are concerned with political and social openness at the local level. 
Competing groups of protesters and governmental agencies also play a role in shaping public 
policy, which influences local governments’ policy adjustment choices.  
 
Similar to other forms of social protest, the growing environmental activism threatens social 
stability, and as such the Chinese authoritarian regime is paying increasing attention to it. Unlike 
in democratic countries, where governments are generally more tolerant of peaceful protests, 
authoritarian governments usually suppress opposition. Yet evidence has indicated that the 
Chinese government, particularly at the local level, is becoming more tolerant and less 
centralised, with more diversified interests. This has made it much more difficult to control 
protests, unless the scale of resistance is broad and widespread across the country (Tarrow 
2008:7). Protecting the legitimacy of the CCP regime is one of the central government’s main 
concerns, as the latter represents the former’s rule, and protecting the interests of the ruling party 
is a major responsibility. Thus, scholars are beginning to examine the relationships between 
governments and protesters, along with the policy responses to protests (Cai 2010; O’Brien 
2008). This work also explores policy responses to environmental activism, in which protesters 
	   5	  
seek short-term influence and maximise interests in neighbourhoods by doing such things as 
relocating polluting factories away from communities. In addition, governments’ responses to 
protesters and the post-protest interactions between citizens and local governments are also 
discussed. Above all, the conflicts between and formation of competing coalitions on this policy 
issue suggest that the old Chinese policy-making models do not apply. The diversified non-state 
actors who wield bottom-up pressure in the policy-making process have become a new force 
challenging the fragmented authoritarianism (FA) model.  
 
1.1 Background  
The existing scholarly studies mainly focus on two arenas in the sphere of environmentalism in 
China: environmental policymaking and environmental activism. However, an explanatory link 
between environmental activism and environmental policy change has not been identified. 
Studies of environmental policy making in China frequently use the FA model to explain policy 
as an outcome of negotiations and compromises among the conflicting state agencies (Lieberthal 
1997; Sinkule and Ortolano 1995). The FA model conceptualises the structural distribution of 
authority between central and local levels of government; and the public policy-making process 
(Lieberthal 1997: 6). In addition, the fragmented vertical and horizontal bureaucratic systems 
(tiao/kuai) demonstrate the complex features of the relationship between central and local 
relationships and how that affects the policy process. Vertical bureaucracies (the hierarchy from 
central to local) and horizontal bureaucracies (the horizontal level of authority within local levels) 
create challenges in policy decision-making because different levels of officials have different 
expectations. For example, in the field of environmental management, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) has produced a situation where agreement has to be made, but it 
is unable to rule over the decisions made by other ministries on environmental issues. In addition, 
the decentralisation of budgetary authority has enabled local bureaucrats to obtain external funds 
for their own policy preferences. Thus, local bureaucrats are subject to limited policy demands 
from higher levels. In addition, local bureaucratic enterprises are encouraged to compete and 
bargain to serve and promote their own interests or preferences in the policy-making process 
(Lieberthal 1992:8; Lam 2013: 146; Mertha 2009:996).  
 
The ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ model reveals the ‘cellular’ socioeconomic structure in 
central-provincial relations in the Post-Mao era, due to the fact that the central government does 
not have the capability to effectively control the vast Chinese nation (Li 1997:55). Through FA 
the cenre can only contral aggregate outcomes.  Hence economic growth is the indicator by which 
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local leaders have their career advancement assessed. This explains why researchers argue that 
the current environmental policy has strong support at the central level, but weak capacity for 
policy implementation at the local level (Mol and Carter 2007:8; Shapiro 2012:60; Beyer 
2006:207).  
 
This fragmented state, with different priorities across government hierarchy, has given rise to 
multiple interests and has provided space for resistance in society. As such, the FA model may no 
longer explain the complicated dynamics between state and non-state actors over the decision-
making process. It also stimulates a discussion in this thesis: the complicated interactions among 
the policy actors within the FA model on one hand; to the extent the decentralised governing 
structure in FA model provides autonomous governance at local level on the other hand.  
 
Apart from the environmental policy-making process, research on social activism in China 
focuses on the patterns and limitations of activism and the evolution of Chinese civil society and 
democratisation (Mertha 2010; Yang 2008; Pei 2009; MacKinnon 2011). Regarding the study of 
environmental protests in China, the scholarly literature mainly focuses on the survival of ‘green 
groups’, the rise of environmental protests among citizens, environmental activism’s limitations 
under the political constraints of authoritarian China and the inferior status of environmental 
authorities in the decentralised political structure (Wu 2009; Ho 2007; Shapiro 2012; Johnson 
2013; Deng and Yang 2013). However, few studies address local governments’ responses to 
environmental activism, and its consequent effects on the development of civil society in China. 
The focus should not be limited to the national level. Indeed, the governments’ perceptions of 
protests differ based on the level. For example, in China, local governments offer concessions 
when responding to protests to minimise political and economic costs, whereas the central 
government aims to protect the CCP regime’s legitimacy. In addition, local governments are the 
protesters’ primary targets (Cai 2010:4; O’Brien and Stern 2008:12). All levels of local 
governments may directly violate citizens’ rights, and thus are often held responsible for citizens’ 
grievances (Cai 2010:4). In China’s decentralised political structure, local governments enjoy 
conditional autonomy in legislation, policy making and local daily rule. Thus, maintaining social 
stability becomes their mission and concessions prove to be the ideal response to protests.  
 
In a pioneering study examining the relationships between various governments’ responses and 
the outcomes of collective actions in China, Cai (2010) notes that local governments react to 
protests in a number of ways, such as 1) providing concessions to meet citizens’ grievances, 2) 
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providing concessions in addition to punishing the protesters, 3) tolerating the resistance but 
ignoring the citizens’ demands and 4) suppression (Cai 2010:5). Additional reactions include 
policy adjustment-related concessions, such as revising or abolishing policy, or policy innovation, 
to meet citizens’ demands (Cai 2010:13). Cai’s (2010) research provides a useful analytical 
framework for understanding the influence that citizens’ protests have on policy implementation. 
Precisely how the governments and protesters interacted in the face of social activism, and how 
that led to policy changes were not covered in his study. Thus, in this work I borrow Cai’s 
framework to examine the relationship between protests and policy change, looking specifically 
at the conditions driving policy changes.  
 
In the context of China, one way to understand policy change is through the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF). Although the ACF was developed in the context of a pluralist conception of 
policy making, it is relevant in the Chinese context because it addresses the emergence of a 
variety of actors and the bottom-up pressure from non-state actors, such as individual citizens and 
ENGOs, in the policy-making process (Han et al. 2014:314). The ACF shows the dynamics 
between policy actors who have sought to participate and influence public policy in a specific 
domain. These policy actors not only include the ‘iron triangle’ of government officials, 
lawmakers and interest groups, but also researchers and journalists (Sabatier and Weible 
2007:192; Weible et al. 2009:122). In addition, both scientific and technical information play a 
role in the policy process (Sabatier and Weible 2007:189; Weible et al. 2009:122). The ACF 
indicates that public policy be changed through the interactions between policy actors and the use 
of scientific and technical information. What is particularly interesting is the focus on policy 
subsystems as the primary unit of analysis (Weible et al. 2009:122); that is, the broader political 
environment as context, stable parameters and external events all affect the behaviour of policy 
actors within policy subsystems (Sabatier and Weible 2007:200; Weible et al. 2009:123). The 
ACF suggests a basic constitutional structure, and sociocultural values and social structure, for 
example, are stable parameters. External events refer to changes in socio-economic conditions, 
such as changes in public opinion. Finally, a coalition opportunity structure mediates between 
stable parameters and external events to reach consensus on policy change (Sabatier and Weible 
2007:199; Weible et al. 2009:123). Sabatier and Weible (2007) argue that the degree of consensus 
needed for major policy change is low in an authoritarian regime due to relatively low political 
openness (Sabatier and Weible 2007:201). The cases in Guangzhou and Beijing, however, offer a 
different interpretation of reaching consensus in policy change under an authoritarian regime. 
Thus, in this work I look at political openness and the changes in socio-economic conditions and 
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sociocultural values that led to the relocation of two planned incinerator plants. The ACF and its 
applicability in the Chinese context are clarified in Chapter 4. 
 
Scholars have deployed coalition opportunity structures to explain how factors such as resources, 
institutional arrangements and historical precedents shape interactions among policy actors and 
variations in policy change outcomes. Although coalition opportunity structures may change over 
time in different policy contexts, they provide insight into the various interactions between 
structure and agency during the policy-making process. The interweaving of political openness 
and social-cultural structures is also relevant in examining policy change conditions. Political 
openness refers to ‘the possibility for organisations to participate formally in political procedures’ 
(Lewis 2000:108), such that a variety of actors are available to engage in policy-making 
processes without constraint. A fundamental socio-cultural structure reflects economic 
development and political culture, including countries’ histories (Sabatier 2007:204; Gamson and 
Meyer 1996:279), identities and ideologies – all of which are formulated in society (Swidler 
1995:30). As such, special attention is paid to how the ACF is applied locally under the 
decentralised political structure of authoritarian China by studying the responses to the examples 
of anti-incinerator activism that occurred in Guangzhou and Beijing.  
 
In China, a decentralised political structure refers to a situation in which institutional 
arrangements at the provincial level are replicated from the central level. In addition, the local 
levels of government have certain degrees of autonomy for developing their economies, and they 
use national principles as a basis for making and amending local legislation within their 
jurisdictions. The degree of openness exhibited by local political systems varies in a decentralised 
structure. Moreover, the fundamental socio-cultural values also influence policy changes. The 
instances of spatial and historical divergence across the country, and the variations in social and 
economic developments affect the formation of advocacy coalitions and policy changes in the 
decision-making process. 
 
1.2 Anti-incinerator Protests in Beijing and Guangzhou  
China’s unprecedented economic growth and the consequent increasing amount of solid waste 
appearing in cities has become a significant challenge for local governments, and while they 
perceive incineration technology as the most effective solution to waste accumulation, its safety 
remains controversial. Members of society, particularly the affected citizens, worry about the 
environmental impact and health effects of incineration; thus, a series of campaigns opposing the 
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construction of incinerators has stretched across the country. In this work, I examine two 
examples of environmental activism, one in Guangzhou and the other in Beijing, to investigate 
the emergence of public participation in Chinese environmental policy-making processes, and to 
review and analyse the Guangzhou and Beijing municipal governments’ responses to the protests 
against incinerator projects. I analyse anti-incinerator activism in Beijing and Guangzhou for the 
following reasons. First, the activism in Liulitun, Beijing marked the first instance of an anti-
incinerator protest nationwide (Greening-China.com; Hsu 2010). Other places such as Jiangsu, 
Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou have since launched similar protests. In addition, Beijing’s 
policies mirror national trends to some extent because it is the national capital. For example, the 
interactions between registered NGOs and the municipal government would reflect a country-
level focus (Spires, Tao and Chan 2014:68). Second, Guangdong province is a forerunner in 
economic reform, as it is perceived as the seat for China’s reform experiments. For instance, 
municipal governments implemented some of the earliest administrative reforms in Guangdong 
province, such as not making enterprises accountable to the CCP (1988). Third, Beijing and 
Guangzhou are the wealthiest cities in China (GDPs ranked second and third, respectively, in 
2013), and thus they reflect the rise of environmental awareness among the new, well-off class 
and have become a driving force challenging the rule of government. Although protests have 
occurred in numerous urban areas, the different political atmospheres have been shown to 
influence the outcomes.  
 
In this work, I compare the anti-incinerator protests in Beijing and Guangzhou and analyse the 
local governments’ responses. Beijing’s municipal government suspended and relocated the 
proposed incinerator project after the protest in 2007, in addition to organising activities 
promoting solid waste recycling. However, Beijing’s public continue to be excluded from the 
environmental decision-making processes. In contrast, the outbreak of anti-incinerator activism in 
Guangzhou in 2009 not only resulted in the suspension of the proposed incinerator project in 
Panyu, but also prompted Guangzhou to set a goal of being a ‘zero-waste city’. Guangzhou’s 
municipal government has supported the zero-waste city movement by implementing a public 
consultative committee for solid municipal waste under the Guangzhou Municipal Bureau of City 
Administration and Law Enforcement. The focus has been to encourage the public to engage in 
municipal waste management. The activism in Guangzhou has proven to be a breakthrough in 
China’s decision-making processes. Case studies have revealed that the power wielded by the 
public has influenced the monistic state’s policy-making processes in this authoritarian country, 
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such that a more inclusive decision-making process could represent a means of strengthening the 
CCP regime’s resilience. 
 
Anti-incinerator activism has aroused an extensive nationwide discussion on and wider public 
participation in solid municipal waste treatment (SMW), providing momentum to the growth of 
new environmental movement sectors. For instance, the green groups in Guangzhou extend 
networking to peer organisations, governmental agencies within Guangdong province and trans-
provincial connections with other green groups. The state is no longer the only dominant actor in 
environmental protection in authoritarian China, and this new dynamic between green groups and 
governmental agencies is addressed in the civil society literature. Although it is impossible make 
any generalisations about wider environmental policy or protests in China from findings based on 
two cases of one discrete form of environmental protest, this work does shed light on this topic 
and raises questions to be explored in other policy areas.   
 
1.3 Research Strategies and Significance  
   After the reform at the end of 1970s, the Chinese government was in a transitional period. It faced 
the challenges of globalisation, but the transformation of society also created numerous social 
problems that influenced its legitimacy. The ruling elite faced increasing demands from citizens 
and thus had to implement more participatory channels to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP. 
The activism in Guangdong is undoubtedly relevant to other parts of China. The literature 
discusses environmental activism in China, largely through case studies, to explain the causes (Li, 
Liu and Li 2012; Johnson 2010), but it does not examine the interactions between state and non-
state actors or review the post-protest changes. Thus, this work is the first to investigate the 
development, major features and subsequent changes related to China’s policy making, with a 
focus on the absence of public participation in the environmental policy-making processes and on 
explaining the causes driving such protests. In addition, the fragmented and decentralised political 
structure is highlighted, providing a framework for examining the policy changes generated in 
response to the protests, and for exploring the conditions of public participation in the decision-
making process at the local level. 
 
There are two observations from these cases that inspired the research questions guiding this 
work. First, municipal waste management is a controversial issue for both industrialising and 
industrialised societies due to increasing amounts of waste generation and insufficient space for 
waste disposal and landfills. The construction of incinerators is widely regarded as the most 
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effective waste management solution, but the incineration process has provoked public concerns 
about the technology’s environmental impact and health effects, prompting a global wave of anti-
incinerator protests. Similar to other countries, China is facing waste proliferation and 
incineration is used to manage waste across the country, but anti-incinerator protests have 
mushroomed in response. In addition to the environmental and health risks, and the grievances 
raised by protesters, there has continued to be non-transparency of information and a lack of 
public participation in the decision-making processes. Thus, China’s decision-making process for 
the implementation of incinerator projects, and the dynamics among the stakeholders involved are 
the focus of this work. The bureaucratic structures influencing environmental protection are 
discussed, along with the weakness of the governing structures in the environmental sphere, 
which has limited public involvement. Infrastructure projects such as incinerators often provoke 
public opposition due to an implicit belief that greater public involvement might result in superior 
environmental decisions or outcomes. In such cases, these people are challenging the current 
policy-making model in China.  
In this work, I explore coalition opportunity structures, particularly political and socio-cultural 
openness, to determine how they shape policy change. Exploring the variations in policy changes 
and the possibility of public participation in decision-making processes in authoritarian China 
allows me to re-examine our understanding of China’s environmental policies.  
 
1.4 Organisation and Anticipated Problems 
In Chapter 2, I review the politico-economic development in the Post-Mao era and China’s policy 
process. Then, I explain the environmental situation and its management in China, focusing on 
public participation in environmental policymaking. I refer to the contributions of scholars, which 
are further discussed in Chapter 3. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the background for the anti-
incinerator activism discussed in this work. Specifically, these chapters provide the foundation 
needed to understand why the Chinese citizens studied were against the incinerators, what their 
political limitations were and how the dynamic between the protesters and their local 
governments influenced the resultant waste management policies.  
 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the use of the ACF in environmental policy-making processes to outline 
the constraints of public participation in the decision-making processes of China’s fragmented 
and decentralised political structures. I also highlight the features of coalition opportunity 
structures, particularly political openness and socio-cultural values, to illustrate the conditions 
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supporting policy change. The applicability of these theories to China’s practices is also 
examined.  
 
Chapter 5 introduces my methodology. I state why I chose an in-depth qualitative research 
method, discuss the processes of selecting the cases and the interviewees and provide details 
about the fieldwork. In this way, the relationship between protests and policy adjustment is 
explored through empirical case studies.  
 
In Chapters 6 and 7, I present the detailed findings from the field trips and in-depth qualitative 
interviews, which also serve as a review of the incinerator projects in Guangzhou and Beijing. I 
outline how patterns of public involvement in environmental issues have emerged in China, and 
identify the dynamic driving the public interactions between state and sub-national actors, which 
pave the way for models of public participation in environmental policy-making processes. I also 
evaluate change and continuality in provincial government (the relationship with NGOs), the 
organisational transformation of NGOs and the governing structures in environmental areas. 
 
In Chapter 8, change and continuity in public participation in China’s environmental governance 
are treated in the case comparison. This chapter also provides a discussion of the theoretical 
implications of this work that highlights the use of the ACF in China’s decentralised political 
structure. Two municipal governments adopted policy changes in response to the protests in 
Guangzhou and Beijing, and the Guangzhou case, wherein environmental activists participated in 
anti-incinerator demonstrations, is also discussed. These governments changed their strategies 
from contentious politics, establishing an ENGO for policy advocacy and environmental 
education, all supported by Guangzhou’s government, to the implementation of a public 
consultation committee – a significant breakthrough in the Chinese policy-making process. The 
changing patterns of environmental activism, the dynamics of the various parties’ interactions 
with their governments and the networks supporting social organisations in other areas, the media 
and cross-border ENGOs also receive attention in this work. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 revisits the key research questions and discusses how the ACF reveals the 
emergence of policy coalitions in environmental realms with diversified policy beliefs even as 
increasingly pluralised policy actors challenge a decision-making process dominated by state 
actors.   
 
	   13	  
Chapter 2.   
The Big Picture: Political-economic Development in Post-Mao China  
 
The rapid economic development in China has generated massive change and unprecedented 
environmental pollution, both of which affect domestic society and the global environment. The 
highlights of the environmental situation in China are as follows. More than 92% of China’s cities 
have fine particulate matter (PM2.5), a major air pollutant, and thus fail to meet both international 
and national standards.2 China is the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gas – the source of 
global warming – and currently emits 7-9.5 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2).3 Almost 60% of 
China’s underground water is polluted and only 3% of the underground water in urban areas is 
classified as ‘clean’.4 These figures reflect country’s rapid economic growth inevitably causes 
environmental degradation. However, the speed of political reform in China is far outpaced by that 
of economic growth, such that public participation is absent from the environmental policy-making 
processes of this authoritarian regime. Thus, environmental protests have emerged as a way of 
expressing grievances across the nation.  
 
Since the economic reforms of the late 1970s, China’s economic boom has accelerated, along with 
the living standards among the Chinese people. Likewise, the growth of diversified interests in the 
society has given rise to new forces, some of which may challenge the CCP’s rule (Selden and 
Perry 2010:27). Various social issues such as labour rights, land acquisition and environmental 
protection have led to conflict, and the expectation of public involvement in decision making has 
been increasing. Citizens are questioning the quality of government and making their voices heard 
through protests and environmental activism. Pursuing economic growth at all costs results in the 
exploitation of natural resources and damage to people’s health, and poorly enforced environmental 
laws result in dissatisfied citizens who turn to environmental activism. As such, before examining 
policy change as a response to environmental activism, China’s political-economic development in 
the Post-Mao era is provided in this chapter to clarify how economic achievement causes 
environmental exploitation, and how limited acknowledgement of public concerns about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Tan, M. (2014). “Bad to Worse: Ranking 74 Chinese Cities by Air Pollution”, Greenpeace, 19 February. 
Available at: <http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/news/blog/bad-to-worse-ranking-74-chinese-cities-by-
air/blog/48181/> (Accessed 14 August 2014).  
3 Szabo, M. (2014). “China Plans to Cap CO2 Emissions Seen Turning Point in Climate Talks”, Reuters, 3 
June, Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/03/china-climatechange-
idUSL3N0OK1VH20140603> (Accessed 14 August 2014).  
4 Kaiman, J. (2014). “China Says More Than Half of Its Groundwater is Polluted”, Guardian, 23 April, 
Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/23/china-half-groundwater-polluted> 
(Accessed 14 August 2014). 
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environmental policy has triggered the emergence of environmental protests. This chapter is divided 
into two parts: a brief introduction to China’s political-economic development, followed by a 
discussion of public participation in Post-Mao China. The aim is to show that constraints on public 
participation in policy-making processes have led directly to the recent protests in authoritarian 
China.    
 
2.1 Political-Economic Development in Post-Mao’s China 
China’s emergence has been a popular topic at the international level since mainland China 
implemented an open door policy in the late 1970s. Following the open market of the late 1970s, 
China’s steady economic growth has occupied a global spotlight as it had become the world’s 
second largest economy after the United States. In addition, China’s growing economic power 
has come to play a key part on the international stage. The rise of Socialist China can be traced 
back to the civil war between the Nationalist (Kuomingtang, KMT) and Communist (Chinese 
Communist Party, CCP) parties (1945-1949).  
The war ended with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, which 
began China’s transformation into a socialist country. Several political movements, such as the 
Great Leap Forward in the mid-1950s, resulted in starvation that left millions of people dead. 
During the Cultural Revolution, upheld by Chairman Mao Zedong from the mid-1960s to the late 
1970s, all political opponents were eliminated and society was chaotic. The country has changed 
since the implementation of the Open Door policy in 1978 after Chairman Mao’s death in 1977, 
with the mixed economic model and ‘Four Modernisations’. Under the CCP’s rule and the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, economic development has improved rapidly. In the early 1980s, 
the Chinese government implemented the ‘household responsibility system’ to de-collectivise the 
land. Households were allowed to contract land from the commune and decide on agricultural 
production independently, with surplus production exceeding national and collective quotas 
disposed of freely. Special economic zones (SEZs) were established in four cities in 1980, all in 
Southern China: Shenzhen (Guangdong province), Zhuhai (Guangdong province), Xiamen 
(Fujian province) and Shantou (Guangdong province). The development of SEZs is intended to 
promote a favourable economic environment by reducing tariffs, encouraging foreign investments 
and deploying export-oriented economies.  
 
The privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to increase managerial autonomy and 
incentives has been a significant aspect of the ‘opening up’ reforms (except for important and 
strategic SOEs, such as energy, communications, armaments and natural resources, which remain 
	   15	  
in the hands of central government). The number of large-scale SOEs (such as petroleum and 
telecom) was reduced to fewer than 150 in 2013.5 A further series of reforms was implemented in 
the late 1990s, including banking, labour markets and social security, allowing the country to be 
more market-driven. The decentralisation of political structures allows provincial governments to 
be economically efficient in the open door reform situation (Landry 2008:5). The central 
government grants conditional autonomy to provincial governments regarding economic and 
administrative power while preserving its supremacy. As such, local governments pursue GDP 
growth as the priority for maintaining the CCP’s legitimacy (Landry 2008:3; Cai 2008:411). 
Economic reform has resulted in great achievements, including GDP growth of about 10% per 
year and more than 500 million Chinese lifted from poverty.6 China joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 2011 as the second biggest economy in the world after the United States, 
and both economic and political development in this socialist country suggest that China has 
become a global hot-spot. 
 
China’s economic achievements have improved the livelihoods of its people. Civil liberty, 
however, is still constrained by the government. For instance, freedom of speech, petitions, 
associations, press and strikes are restricted by the PRC government, although all are written into 
the Constitution. The newly formed non-government organisations (NGOs) must register under 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs and an attached organisation. Thus, most grassroots organisations 
are registered with the Business and Commerce Administration to prevent a complex registration 
process.  
 
The death of former CCP General Secretary, Hu Yaobang in April 1989 accelerated the student 
movement that led to the Tiananmen Massacre on 4 June 1989. The movement not only asked for 
more anticorruption measures and political reforms, but also sought faster democratisation, which 
threatened the CCP’s rule. The Tiananmen Movement ended in tragedy and democratisation 
stagnated, replaced by further economic modernisation. Despite the re-emergence of civil 
societies in the 1990s and the blossoming of a variety of organisations in recent years, human 
rights in China are often criticised by international society. For example, 2010 Nobel Peace 
Laureate, Mr Liu Xiaobo, who was one of the founders of ‘Chapter 08’, appealed to the Chinese 
government for more liberty and freedom, and was incarcerated as a political prisoner.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “China’s Observation: Doubt of State-owned Enterprises”, Nikkei (Chinese edition), Available at: 
<http://zh.cn.nikkei.com/columnviewpoint/column/7130-20131125.html> (Accessed 25 August 2014).  
6 China Overview, World Bank. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview> 
(Accessed 25 August 2014).  
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Compared with its meaning in democratic countries, ‘civil society’ in Post-Mao China refers to 
the power relationship between state and society. State power extensively controls Chinese 
society (White 1993:65), but civil society’s intermediate role has diversified the representation of 
social interests in the changing society. Unlike the NGOs in democratic countries, which may 
launch or mobilise people in protests or monitor the government, the Chinese NGOs rarely 
directly confront the government at the central or local levels. The NGOs’ very existence is in the 
hands of the Chinese government. Thus, Chinese NGOs only play a role in education and as 
service providers, collaborating with the government and lobbying but never really confronting 
the government. As such, China’s NGOs, including environmental NGOs, are often criticised for 
being disconnected from the communities they represent. 
 
2.2 Public Participation: A New Era in Post-Mao’s China  
As noted, China’s social organisations entered a new phase of development following the 
Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. Although the Chinese government has implemented measures to 
manage social groups that require them to be registered, their legal status has been legitimated, 
which has helped fuel their expansion. This mix of social groups has played an intermediate role 
in providing society with social services such as elderly care, education and labour issue support. 
In addition, new groups have emerged in forms such as networks, centres and projects, and their 
backgrounds cross different spheres of social status (academics, professionals and ordinary 
citizens) while their interactions strengthen the development of civil society in China. The 
Chinese government has also encouraged ‘small government and big society’ by buying services, 
such as education and elderly services, from social organisations since 1995. The first such 
system emerged in Shanghai. Social services include poverty reduction, public health, disability 
support, job training and public security (Lui 2013:154). Social organisations also play a 
significant role in disaster relief. For example, hundreds of charities, activists and donors under 
an umbrella NGO coordinated the earthquake relief in Sichuan in 2008.7  
 
The Chinese government has further reformed the management of social organisations to adapt to 
the changing society. They implemented the ‘Plan for the Institutional Restructuring of the State 
Council and Transformation of Functions Thereof’ in March 2013 to simplify the registration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Boehler, P. (2013). “China NGOs Turn to WeChat to Aid Quake Rescue”, South China Morning Post, 24 
April. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1222049/china-ngos-turn-wechat-aid-quake-rescue> 
(Accessed 24 February 2014).  
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social organisations. Social organisations can no longer ‘attach’ to larger, registered 
organisations – a measure that has led to growth in social organisations.  
 
Following this brief introduction to the current development of civil society, I now focus on 
public participation in Post-Mao China. It may be difficult to understand how the public 
participates in the daily affairs of an authoritarian state with limited individual liberty, where the 
regime exercises its authority regardless of popular consent. However, with the reforms of the late 
1970s, the Chinese government recognised that opening up its affairs and promoting greater 
citizen participation were essential in maintaining the legitimacy of its rule. Thus, the government 
promulgated a policy and legal framework that would achieve this goal.  
 
Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has introduced participatory mechanisms at the village 
level to respond to the complex interests generated by rapid economic and political development 
(Cai 2004:428; Horsley 2009:3). In 1998, the Chinese government allowed the election and 
formation of villager committees designed to facilitate self-government. The villagers then had 
the right to directly elect committee members.  
 
Since the 2000s, the Chinese government has implemented a series of measures promoting public 
participation in government decisions, which was first mentioned and guaranteed by law in 2002. 
That law stipulates that local governments must listen to a wide array of public opinion, through 
written comments and public hearings, before drafting their administrative rules. In addition, the 
‘Outline for Promoting Law-Based Administration in an All-Round Way’ introduced by the State 
Council in 2004 emphasises public participation in government decisions through public hearings 
and seminars. In 2008, the Chinese government promulgated the ‘Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information’ to further promote the 
transparency of government affairs and citizens’ right to request and supervise the disclosure of 
government information. The Chinese government appeared determined to diffuse power among 
the citizens across a wide range of public policies, such as environmental protection and water 
tariffs, involving them in decision-making processes.  
 
Upon seeing that the Chinese government has implemented several laws encouraging public 
advocacy and civil society’s participation in the policy process, scholars have pointed out that the 
abovementioned measures are strategies in response to societal challenges that actually lengthen 
the CCP’s rule (Dickson 2010:24; Mannheim and Perry 2011:8). Fewsmith (2013) argues that 
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there is no evidence that these changes to ‘the rules of the game’ have made the CCP’s leadership 
more liberalised (Fewsmith 2013:6). Yet the gradual transformation of the rules shows that the 
CCP is adapting to both the domestic and external environments. Adaptation has become a ruling 
principle for CCP leaders in the Post-Mao era.  
 
China’s economic growth has been expected to lead to political transformation since the 
implementation of the economic reform. It was believed that liberalising political institutions 
would balance economic growth and social unrest (Heilmann and Perry 2011:1). However, the 
Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, ethnic riots, ‘mass incidents’ and the suppression and arrest of 
dissidents have challenged the CCP’s leadership. To ensure continuous economic success and 
societal stability, CCP leaders have initiated several measures. For example, former PRC 
President Jiang Zemin invited private entrepreneurs to be party members in 2001 and granted 
them access to policy-making processes. In addition, there has been growth in private business, 
trade and professional associations that attempt to influence policy through informal and formal 
channels (Teets et al. 2010:17). There has been a blossoming of NGOs in various areas, including 
environmental protection, poverty reduction and rural development. These groups have been 
playing the role of services collaborators with the government (Shieh and Brown-Inz 2013:16). 
Social issues such as pollution and land acquisition have received more attention as society 
diversifies, prompting more public participation in public affairs. Nevertheless, environmental 
protection remains a controversial topic in China given the outcomes of rapid economic growth in 
the last four decades, which have aroused dissatisfaction among Chinese citizens with limited 
involvement in environmental policy processes. Before the constraints on public involvement in 
such processes can be fully understood, it is important to outline the environmental deterioration 
in China and how it manages pollution.  
 
Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter provides a general background for my work by identifying the causes of social 
conflicts in Chinese society. The politico-economic development in Post-Mao China has driven 
profound changes in social structure that have created social tensions among stakeholders. 
China’s double-digit growth and rising per capita income has been the envy of the world since the 
‘reform and open’ (改革開放) policy of the late 1970s. The country joined the WTO, hosted the 
Olympics for the first time and has become one of the world’s most impressive emerging 
economies. These stunning economic achievements have improved the citizens’ livelihoods, but 
they have also generated social tensions such as growing social inequality, environmental 
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degradation, ethnic unrest and floating migrant labour, resulting in an increasing number of social 
protests. These problems are viewed as the consequence of decentralising China’s political 
structure.  
 
Political reform, however, has been outpaced by economic reform, with economic actors actively 
using their powers to influence governmental policies and maximise their own interests in this 
transitional country. This has resulted in corruption and social inequality between citizens and the 
privileged elite (Jing 2014:308). In addition, civil liberties such as the freedom to speak, assemble 
and strike have remained limited despite the government’s decision to relax NGO management 
after the Tiananmen Massacre. The emergence of non-state associations in Chinese society 
represents diversified social interests. The social groups act as educators, policy advocators and 
service providers in dimensions such as elderly care, education, poverty reduction, environmental 
protection, disaster relief and labour issues. However, the growth of non-state associations has not 
increased the opportunities for public participation in policy-making processes. The central 
government has implemented several measures for increasing transparency and public 
participation opportunities, which has saved the CCP’s image and allowed it to maintain its 
resilience. The openness of public involvement in decision making is gradually improving, but an 
independent judiciary and separation of powers are absent, which places growing pressure on the 
CCP in managing long-term social stability. When facing disputes of interests in Chinese society, 
the state does not have effective mechanisms for solving these problems under the CCP’s 
domination of and monopoly in resource allocation (Ibid:315-316). Facing governmental 
suppression, the Chinese citizens target local governments in most forms of collective resistance, 
because they are responsible for daily governance and the protestors wish to maintain their belief 
in the central government and the ruling party. In general, public participation in decision-making 
processes remains limited as they have no formal participatory mechanism for expressing their 
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Chapter 3 
Development of Environmental Management and the Rise of the Environmental State 
  
Instead, we saw half a decade of widespread disputes and protests over 
environmental interests. In 2011, the number of environmental protests 
increased 120%. Last year brought demonstrations in Ningbo, Shifang, 
and Qidong. […] Large projects that ignore environmental and social 
impacts, as well as the public’s right to participate, are the root of social 
unrest. But the MEP seems to consider this none of its business. The 
public’s right to know and participate are key to resolving conflict (Liu 
2013).  
 
The past few years have been as significant as any: new technologies 
have taken citizen engagement to new heights online while government 
action has brought public participation into mainstream political thought 
(Chang 2012). 
 
China is the second largest economy in the world, and the largest carbon emitter. Its impressive 
economic development, however, is accompanied by an inconvenient truth; that is, a set of 
nationwide environmental challenges including severe air and water pollution, soil erosion, 
desertification, overpopulation, degradation of forests and grasslands, scarcity of water, 
exploitation of energy and the extinction of species. A strong dependence on the manufacturing 
industry has increased energy-related pollution, with irreversible environmental effects such as air 
and water pollution. Hence, the Chinese government has tried to bring environmental challenges 
into the mainstream of national policy since the early 1990s. In the early reform era, 
environmental protection was one of the national policy priorities in the Five-Year Plan (FYP) 
(the sixth of its kind, spanning 1981-1986). In 1992, the government participated in the Earth 
Summit in Rio. In 1994, it implemented ‘China’s Agenda 21: White Paper on China’s Population, 
Environment, and Development’, which aimed to ‘draw up medium and long-term plans on 
economic and social development’ (The Administrative Center for China’s Agenda 21 1994). 
Hundreds of domestic environmental laws and regulations have since been enacted and 
international environmental agreements have been ratified or signed. Nevertheless, environmental 
deterioration presents a continuing challenge to the Chinese authorities.  
 
	   21	  
Some key facts illustrate the serious environmental problems associated with steady economic 
growth in modern China. Energy demands are inevitably closely linked to economic development. 
For example, the total energy consumption in China in 2000 was 1.3 billion tonnes, but this 
number rose to 3.48 billion tonnes in 2011. Coal remains the main source of energy consumption 
in the country as a whole.8 Moreover, the rapid growth of industrialisation, combined with serious 
air and water pollution, have been detrimental to both people and the ecosystem. The government 
has implemented a set of environmental laws and regulations, including Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) and public hearings, but the mentality of ‘pollute first, mitigate later’ 
remains prevalent among local government officials. Environmental indicators for assessing local 
official performance, such as the Urban Environmental Quality Examination System and the 
National Economic Model City, have been introduced. However, such mechanisms have been 
criticised because the decentralisation of power in terms of these legal and fiscal developments 
has encouraged competition between provinces, with local leaders prioritising economic 
development over environmental considerations (Beach 2001:25). Although China’s 
decentralized political structure provides conditional authority to local governments to make 
public policies, enact local laws and regulations, and draft budgets to boost local development, 
the close relationship between local government and business groups means that local officials 
tend to favour economic growth rather than achieve the central government’s goal of 
environmental protection. In addition, although local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) 
are supposed to enforce environmental laws and regulations, local governments continue to 
determine their personnel decisions, leadership, and financial resources.i Thus, the EPBs are 
placed in a weak structural position and cannot effectively enforce environmental regulations.  
Moreover, public participation in environmental policy processes is either limited or completely 
curtailed, and the ruling elites monopolize the policymaking processes of the authoritarian 
regime. The Chinese government has established an environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
system, providing public hearings for citizens involved in environmental decision-making 
processes. However, its effect on environmental policy has been limited. These protests reflect 
the persistent lack of public participation in environmental policymaking processes also 
highlights the model of “fragmented authoritarianism” no longer fully explain the growing 
diversity in this authoritarian country.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “Total Energy Consumption and Composition 2011 and Consumption of Energy by Sector 2000”, 
National Bureau of Statistics, People’s Republic of China, 
<http://219.235.129.58/reportYearQuery.do?id=1600&r=0.9558526350020105> (Accessed 20 May 2013). 
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The conflict over this policy issue shows that the model of fragmented Chinese policymaking no 
longer applies. A fragmented authoritarian (FA) model has been adopted since the economic 
reform in the late 1970s, but conflicts between the public and government over environmental 
policy have recently arisen. However, in light of China’s growing environmental challenges, 
society is calling for a greater awareness of environmental policy agendas, such as those that 
address air pollution. Thus, an increasing number of requests for higher levels of public 
participation in environmental policymaking have been made. As such, the FA model may no 
longer sufficiently explain the complicated dynamics between state and non-state actors over the 
decision-making process. Under the decentralised political structure and fragmented 
authoritarianism, local governments enjoy conditional autonomous authority and are responsible 
for managing daily local governance, such as local legislation and public policymaking. As such, 
local governments may have flexibility in adjusting public policies. 
In this section, China’s environmental management is introduced and reviewed aims to show how 
the Chinese government manages the growing diversified demands in the society; as well as to 
reveal the change of the notion about public administration and public policies are 
bureaucratically initiated and administered under the one-party dictatorship, autonomous interest 
groups are excluded from the policymaking process. Hence, the section is divided into three parts: 
First, a brief introduction of the ‘Chinese economic model’ provides a background for 
understanding the causes of environmental deterioration and the recent environmental incidents. 
An overview of environmental management in China is provided to identify the characteristics of 
its governing structures since the reforms of the late 1970s. Second, the relaxation of control over 
social organisations in the early 1990s, which encouraged the rise of civil society (particularly 
ENGOs), is discussed. In addition, the work of ENGOs, to a large extent, has inspired popular 
environmental consciousness and stimulated further action. Finally, I discuss how the economic 
actors also play an important role in environmental governance in China. Politically, the Chinese 
government has used economic instruments such as taxes and subsidies to achieve sustainable 
development. Economically, the trend of green consumerism, the pressure of ENGOs and the 
push to expand international markets have also driven companies to build ‘eco-friendly 
businesses’. This chapter sets out a key message: the change to environmental management in 
China has not halted urban environmental activism. Without reforming environmental policy, 
citizens cannot become involved in policy making, and thus the tension between state and society 
increases when environmental issues are concerned. Policy changes are local governments’ 
response to environmental protests in their effort to maintain the legitimacy of the regime, and 
thus they are discussed further in subsequent chapters. 
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3.1 Environmental Crisis in the Post-Mao’s Era 
China is the second largest economy and the largest CO2 emitter in the world.9 The economic 
miracle that is China in the post-Mao era has transformed the country into a prosperous society 
and the so-called ‘Chinese economic model’ has been praised for the current economic 
development. Credit has been given to massive labour-intensive industries for exporting cheap 
products to the world, increased domestic incomes through free trade and international flow of 
capital and pro-business policies to stimulate further foreign investments. 10  The Chinese 
government plays a dominant role in the market. Before the economic reform, the PRC highly 
prioritised heavy industry development in Mao’s era and centralised all output targets without 
paying any attention to environmental protection. As a consequence, heavily polluting steel and 
chemical industries were built across the country, and natural resources such as water and coal 
were exploited. Moreover, Mao Zedong encouraged population growth in the country, placing 
additional pressure on the environment (Lieberthal 2004:277-279; Shapiro 2012:1-3, 35-37; 
Economy 2010:46-57).  
Urbanisation has led to increasingly massive infrastructure developments such as power plants, 
highways, airports and waste water treatment plants, but the country is paying the cost. Arable 
land diminishes rapidly every year, and there is water pollution, air pollution, pollution from 
heavy metals and damaged ecosystems. More than 70% of China’s rivers and lakes are seriously 
polluted (Morton 2010:278), a third of its soil is drought-ridden and eroded and more than three 
quarters of its forests are destroyed (Kassiola and Guo 2010:4). Facing these environmental 
pressures, the Chinese government has implemented several mitigation measures and moved 
slowly towards the development of an environmental state.  
 
3.2 The Rise of the Environmental State in Fragmented, Authoritarian China 
The Chinese government began paying closer attention to environmental management after the 
Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972 (He et al. 2012:29; Zhang and Wen 
2008:1250). To understand environmental management in China, it is necessary to review the 
environmental state’s transition (Mol and Carter 2007:7) from a form of command and control 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “The Ranking of CO2 Emissions Countries in 2010”, World Bank. 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT/countries/1W?order=wbapi_data_value_2010%2
0wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc&display=default> (Accessed 15 October 2013).  
10 Schuman, M. (2010). “China: A New Economic Model?” Time, 1 March 2010, 
<http://business.time.com/2010/03/01/china-a-new-economic-model/> (Accessed 15 October 2013).  
 
	   24	  
regulation to a more integrated form of environmental management. Before the economic reforms, 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese government had implemented some environmental 
regulations related to water, soil and forestry conservation (Sinkule and Ortolano 1995:4). 
However, the central planning framework was focused on high-speed economic development 
during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1959), when the government emphasised heavy industry 
and the exploitation of natural resources. The ideology that ‘human beings must win over nature’ 
(人定勝天), advocated by Mao Zedong, resulted in natural disaster for Maoist China (Shapiro 
2001). A series of environmental policy programmes was promulgated until the 1970s (Ross, 
1992:628; Sinkule and Ortolano 1995:4). The National Environmental Protection Office was 
founded in 1974 as the first institution for environmental protection, followed by the introduction 
of various sets of environmental regulations and laws in the late 1970s. An environmental 
regulatory system was established after the promulgation of the state Environmental Protection 
Law in 1979. Environmental protection was first suggested as an element of national basic policy 
in 1984, when it was advocated that ‘prevention is the main aim, then control’, and that ‘the 
polluter is responsible for pollution control’, such that the state should strengthen environmental 
management in the context of authoritarian China.  
 
Institutionally, the environmental protection agency has changed over the years. The National 
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), established in 1988 and renamed the State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) in 1998, was upgraded in 2008 to the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP). The MEP is the central unit addressing national environmental 
issues. Both the State Development Planning Commission and the State Economic and Trade 
Commission at the national level are also involved in environmental protection under the State 
Council’s leadership. Nevertheless, there is also overlapping jurisdiction between the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and other government departments involved in environmental 
protection, including the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry 
of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the 
Ministry of Land and Resources. For example, there has been jurisdictional overlap in building 
national and provincial parks, involving the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of 
Land and Resources, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the State 
Forestry Administration (Shapiro 2012:62). Moreover, the Chinese government has increased 
financial support for environmental issues. For example, the State Council allocated the 
equivalent of US$450 billion to environmental protection spending in the Twelfth FYP (2011-
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2015), 11  compared with the US$18 billion allocated to the Ninth FYP (1995-2000). 12 
Environmental protection is also tied to the market economy. Using economic measurements, 
emissions discharges and fines for polluters are the result of rapid economic growth and 
marketisation under the open market reforms of the late 1970s. The Chinese government also 
engages in international environmental cooperation, and has signed and ratified several 
international environmental treaties, including the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (1973), the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(1987), the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal (1989), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) 
and the Kyoto Protocol (1997). Moreover, the Chinese government attends international 
conferences on environmental matters, such as The United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio (1972) and the United Nations Climate Summits.  
Domestically, bureaucratic arrangements for environmental management can be divided into four 
levels: national, provincial, county and town. The local environmental units or Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) are mainly responsible for law enforcement and environmental policy 
implementation. However, the governing structure of authoritarian China is fragmented (Shapiro 
2012:59), which partly explains the gap between the central and local levels in implementing 
environmental policy. Lieberthal (1997) provides a general picture of the governing structure that 
illustrates the distribution of authority over environmental policy processes in China. In terms of 
central government ranking, the State Council is the highest authority, followed by commissions, 
ministries and bureaus, respectively. The territorial government has a parallel arrangement. 
Provincial governments equate to ministries and provincial bureaus to their ministerial 
counterparts. Units of the same rank, however, cannot issue binding orders to each other. For 
example, the ministries cannot send binding orders to provinces (Lieberthal 1997:3; Shi and 
Zhang 2006:274). Functionally, xitong (系統 systems) with both vertical and horizontal structural 
elements are the main feature of Chinese politics. Ministries are at the top, with hierarchical 
government units placed at each territorial level. The MEP, as mentioned, is the highest authority 
in environmental issues and its jurisdiction overlaps with those of the ministries. Hierarchically, 
the MEP is the highest authority over EPBs at the township, county, city and provincial levels. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 “China Approves New Plan to Boost Green Industries”, China Daily, 26 November 2010, 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-11/26/content_11616784.htm> (Accessed 16 September 
2012).   
12 Strizzi, N. and Stranks, R.T. (2000). “Asian Influence: China’s Environmental Mess: Implications for 
Canadian Business”, Ivey Business Journal. Nov/Dec 
<http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/strategy/asian-influence-chinas-environmental-mess-
implications-for-canadian-business> (Accessed 16 September 2012). 
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The EPBs have two masters: the government at each level, and the office with the same function 
one level up. For example, the Guangzhou Municipal EPB is led by both the Guangdong 
Provincial EPB and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (Lieberthal 1997:3). There is an 
inevitable conflict between the ‘vertical’ (tiao) and ‘horizontal’ (kuai) aspects of authority. For 
instance, the EPA at each level coordinates environmental protection and the territorial 
government at each level coordinates the locals’ needs (Lieberthal 1997:4). Consequently, 
environmental officials at the territorial level often respond to local officials instead of their 
supervisors in the central environmental bureaucracy (Shapiro 2012:59), and these territorial 
governments are powerful.  
 
Given this general background for the power structures of environmental management, 
researchers have described the environmental policy-making process in China as being top-down, 
with little public participation (Harris 2004:157). The institutional arrangements and legal and 
bureaucratic frameworks that are fundamental to environmental policy-making in China are still 
strongly centralised (Shapiro 2012:60-61). Environmental management policy has a legal 
foundation in the Environmental Protection Law and a number of specific environmental 
protection and conservation laws (Beyer 2006:205).  
 
In environmental policy making at the national level, the NEPA (now the MEP) investigated 
environmental issues and proposed a draft policy change for major environmental problems. They 
proposed select regions for pilot studies, which were then conducted by the agency. The policy 
was then amended, based on advice from local and central departments. Experts reviewed the 
amended policy, and another round of discussions was held within the agency. The final draft was 
submitted to the State Environmental Protection Commission of China (SEPC) under the State 
Council or the Environmental and Resources Protection Committee (ERPC) of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) for confirmation as policy (Wang and Liu 1998:376-378).  
 
Once the NPC approves a law and formulates the general direction for the nation – such as 
through the FYPs – the MEP and the local EPBs execute the law. For example, the 
desulphurisation of coal-fired power plants was expected to reduce sulphur content to 10% by 
2010 in the Eleventh FYP (2006-2010). 13  The state agencies implemented various 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of People’s 
Republic of China”, National Development and Reform Commission People’s Republic of China, 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529_71334.htm> (Accessed 10 September 2013).  
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desulphurisation regulations for power plants, and in 2011 the MEP promulgated a new standard 
for emitted pollutants in coal-fired power plants.14 This policy was designed to take effect at the 
national level. However, the picture of the process in this case is too general to provide a 
complete understanding of institutional arrangements at the national level, as it does not allow for 
an in-depth discussion of the environmental policy-making process.  
 
Due to decentralisation and growing regional autonomy, more variety in environmental policy 
has emerged at the local level. The legal framework clearly describes the responsibilities for 
environmental planning at the local level. The Environmental Protection Law requires that local 
governments have a city plan for environmental protection as a goal (Article 22). Within their 
jurisdictions, they may also establish their own environmental standards based on the national 
plan (Articles 9 and 10). Environmental protection regulations are implemented at the provincial 
level, such as Guangdong province, which is analysed in this work. All plans must be reported to 
the upper levels of government for approval (Article 9), including public hearings for discussion 
(Article 12).  
 
As Lieberthal (1992) states, ‘FA’ is a better description of the relationship between the central 
and local governments. Lieberthal (1997) later uses this idea to elaborate on the environmental 
policy-making process, making two observations about China’s FA. First, the power of EPBs is 
weak compared to that of other departments at the local level, and thus EPBs cannot enforce 
environmental law (Mol and Carter 2007:7; Shapiro 2012:68). Second, provincial governments 
give the highest priority to economic growth in the centralised political system. The central 
government rewards the local officials based on economic performance, thus environmental 
protection efforts are neglected at local levels (Liu, Zhang and Bi 2012:107). Since the 
implementation of reform and the opening up of the political system, provincial governments 
have been perceived as ‘independent kingdoms’ because they have significant decision-making 
power, are entitled to extract financial resources and are resistant to the external influence of 
central leadership (Ross 1988:199; Shapiro 2012:69; Morton 2010:284; Heilmann 2011:63). 
Nevertheless, their ‘jurisdictional independence’ is not strong enough to allow them to control 
pollution, as they are up against the financial interests of local industries and because local-level 
environmental bureaus are weak. Local industries are powerful political actors in terms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “New Standards of Emitted Pollutants For Coal-Fired Power Plants”, Ministry of Environmental 
Protection of the People’s Republic of China, 
<http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/201109/t20110921_217529.htm> (Accessed 5 September 2013). 
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employment and financial contributions. Furthermore, local governments usually provide 
economic incentives to reduce the cost of production, such as tax abatements on pollution fees 
(Lieberthal 2004:283). Although environmental protection has been upgraded as part of the FYPs, 
and budgetary support for it has increased, its ministerial rank is still lower than those of other 
ministries, and there is a lack of power over compliance. As such, local EPBs, which are 
subordinate to higher levels of local governments (such as city and provincial governments), lack 
the financial resources to implement environmental laws and regulations. Instead, economic 
development remains provinces’ top priority (Tang and Zhan 2008:430; Shapiro 2012:69). Weak 
EPBs are frontline bureaucrats on environmental issues, but they are not effective when it comes 
to policy implementation.  
 
EPBs’ weakness in the environmental policy-making process is further verified by Wu et al. 
(2012). In the ecological compensation policy for conservation of water and soil in Yunnan and 
Shaanxi provinces, the provincial water resources department collaborates with research institutes 
on the ecological compensation policy, consulting with and obtaining support from other 
departments such as the legislative affairs office, the price bureau, the provincial environmental 
protection bureau and the national Ministry of Water Resources. Wu et al. (2012) describe an 
instance where the provincial water resources department proposed a policy agenda to the 
provincial government. In that instance, the water resources department formed a coalition with 
other provincial departments and with the ministry at the central level to convince the provincial 
government to adopt the proposed policy (Wu et al. 2012:87-92). In this example, the EPB played 
an auxiliary role by providing the water resources department with suggestions and executing a 
law on the conservation of water and soil.  
 
Alongside the weakness of EPBs in the political hierarchy, power struggles among government 
leaders also hinder the effective enforcement of environmental management. The formation of 
factions to get support from departments at the national and local levels reveals power struggles 
among leaders. Both Ross (1988) and Li (2010) note that factional politics present a major 
challenge to the CCP’s status. Regarding environmental policy making in China, Ross (1988) 
points out that agenda setting is the outcome of powerful rivalries among CCP leaders. According 
to Ross (1988), the leaders choose their alignments carefully to improve their chances of winning 
power struggles:  
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When circumstances permit, however, leaders try to purge their rivals and replace 
them with their own supporters in an unending game of factional politics. … The 
process can take a long time; actually, it never ends because new factional 
alignments are always in the process of being formed. But once an alignment’s 
opponents have been co-opted, bypassed, or replaced, changes can be rapidly 
instituted because the Communist party is the only source of legitimacy (Ross 
1988:190). 
 
The analysis above by Ross (1988) remains suitable to the current situation among the ruling 
elites. The power struggles among Communist Party leaders make policy implementation 
unstable because opponents can overthrow existing policy. Ross also noted that power struggles 
have extended to lower levels, particularly regarding pollution-control issues, providing 
opportunities for ‘bureaucracies and localities to seek endorsement of their own positions, 
especially with regard to funding and on issues that supersede organisational boundaries and thus 
require interagency coordination’ (Ross 1988:191). As such, factional politics have helped to 
shape policy-making processes in China, resulting in the unsustainable environmental policies of 
the post-Mao era.  
 
However, in the post-Mao years and in the early years of economic and political reform, the 
domination of single factions was weakened, encouraging more public competition between 
factions. Experts from different professions have been invited to assist various organisations, 
such as the Academy of Social Sciences, and several official research organisations have been 
established to give advice. This advisory function has been institutionalised to ‘increase the 
ability of factional advisers to broker ideas and mediate relations between the regime and the 
intellectual community, screening out heterodox proposals while attempting to shape their 
patron’s views’ (Xu and Xing 1983; Ross 1988:193). Professional groups are included in 
environmental issues camps to justify decisions in the power struggles, but the factions seem to 
merely use the groups rather than truly respecting them. 
 
Apparently, factional politics is not the only factor in setting policy agendas in China. Both 
bureaucracies and local governments influence agenda setting, particularly in furthering 
institutional interests (Ross 1988:199). For example, Ross pointed out that the central leaders 
have tried to control the bureaucracies by implementing regulations and by setting up the State 
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Environmental Protection Commission to define rights and responsibilities (Ross 1988:199; 
Shapiro 2012:66). Although the establishment of the MEP has shown that the PRC’s government 
is determined to protect the environment, the agency has several constraints. 
Interdepartmentalism diffuses environmental authority. For instance, the State Economic and 
Trade Commission is the organisation responsible for energy conservation policy, rather than the 
State Environmental Protection Agency (Mol and Carter 2007:9; Shapiro 2012:68-69). This 
situation was changed recently so that the Municipal Bureau of City Administration and Law 
Enforcement (rather than the MEP) is now responsible for municipal waste management and 
waste recycling. The policy-making processes behind environmental laws and regulations in 
China reflect the political interests among the ruling elite at the national and local levels, but 
public opinion is largely ignored (Alpermann 2010:130; Wu, Ma and Qi 2012:90). 
 
The weakness of environmental policy making and enforcement is the result of FA. Although 
China’s political system is a highly centralised hierarchy, decentralisation has to some extent 
provided autonomy at the local level. As mentioned above, local governments are entitled to 
determine public polices in their own jurisdictions, to approve the budgets of their administrative 
areas and to appoint or remove administrative functionaries. Likewise, local governments have 
autonomy in retaining financial resources for promoting economic efficacy, and the central 
government rewards local governments based on economic performance. Thus, environmental 
protection is never at the top of the local governments’ agendas. The EPBs’ weak position at each 
level of government is reflected in the lack of financial support received. Local governments are 
responsible for the local EPAs’ annual budgets and personnel management, but local leaders tend 
to put economic growth first and neglect environmental protection because the former is linked to 
their performance reviews and promotion prospects, in addition to benefiting local fiscal revenues 
(Chen 2009:23). Environmental protection has become an evaluation indicator for local cadres 
attempting to strengthen their environmental protection responsibilities (Lo and Tang 2007:44). 
The ‘Green GDP’ was implemented in 2004, and the government worked out the criteria, which 
focus on reducing the environmental damage cost and resource consumption of the traditional 
GDP (Chen 2009:23). However, this was withdrawn after three years due to the opposition of 
local officials (Ibid), which demonstrates the reluctance of local leaders to implement 
environmental protection and shows how their power restricted the capacity of local EPBs and 
influenced their financial revenue.  
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In facing these financial limitations, the local EPBs retained a portion of the pollution fees and 
fines to support their operations (Chen 2009:24), or established affiliations with bodies such as 
environmental research institutes, environmental monitoring stations and environmental 
engineering companies to serve both governmental agencies and the private sector (Shi and 
Zhang 2006:280). Although such arrangements have been criticised, their financial situation has 
improved. The EPBs’ credibility and neutrality in performing their duties might be greatly 
undermined by this approach (Shi and Zhang 2006:281), which might also foster corruption 
(Chen 2009:24). To prevent the latter outcome, the central government has also implemented a 
new scheme requiring all administrative departments at all levels to decouple their revenue, with 
all pollution fees and fines, for example, going to the local financial bureau so that the EPBs no 
longer receive them. In addition, the EPBs must have their own annual budgets approved by the 
local National People’s Congress. This new system cannot solve the funding shortages, 
particularly in the less-developed regions, so the local EPBs have continued to keep a proportion 
of pollution fees to pay for their operations (Chen 2009:25). Overall, the competitive pursuit of 
economic growth between local governments has encouraged them to exploit environmental 
resources. In addition, the local EPBs’ functionality is weakening, indicating that environmental 
protection is not at the top of the local governments’ agendas. In general, the domination of 
economic development overrides environmental policy institutions such that the decentralised 
local governments, local officials and business leaders ignore existing environmental regulations 
(Economy 2007:56; Liu, Zhang and Bi 2012:107). This leaves the central government unable to 
‘motivate, direct steer and control’ the local governments in making environmental protection a 
top priority (He et al. 2012:35). Furthermore, the public is excluded from the environmental 
policy-making process which, although only one factor, may be crucial in explaining the intense 
contentiousness of the recent environmental activism in China. Despite the transformation of 
environmental institutions, civil society and enterprises also play a role in environmental 
protection and thus are the focus of environmental management in post-Mao China.  
 
3.3 Integrated Environmental Management in China? 
3.3.1 Economic actors in China’s environmental management  
In the economic domain, the government and the market in China have tended to respond to 
environmental challenges in different ways. Under the economic instruments implemented by the 
central government, companies have taken on more obligations to ensure a sustainable 
environment. Measures such as tax reductions and increased environmental fees are the most 
common routes to pollution control. The ‘polluter pays’ principle has been adopted to control 
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industries or firms in terms of air and water pollution and subsidies for natural resources such as 
water and energy have been abandoned. Instead, firms are required to pay to promote efficient 
use (Economy 2007:26). Enforcement, however, is weak and ineffectively executed. As such, 
because these firms are one of the main sources of income for local government, officials have 
tended not to punish the polluting firms by allowing them to escape from making payment. In 
addition, bringing the market into environmental management embodies a shift of responsibilities 
from the state to the market. The Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Law, for example, 
requires companies to take responsibility for preventing and controlling solid waste in their 
production processes. 
   
Nevertheless, both international and domestic enterprises tend to be more actively engaged in the 
environmental policy-making process. SEPA (formerly the Ministry of Environmental Protection) 
consults with enterprises on new policies and regulations, and some new institutions have been 
formed. For instance, the China Business Council for Sustainable Development not only provides 
a platform for business exchange and cooperation among businesses, governments and 
communities on best practices in sustainable development, but also contributes input to the 
governments and assists in policy development.15 EPBs also consult with companies, and this has 
become one of their sources of income (Economy 2007:26-27).  
 
In terms of a response to environmental challenges and promoting sustainable development, one 
cannot neglect the increasing market demand for ‘green business’. Some famous Chinese 
enterprises such as Huawei (an ICT solutions provider), Geely (automobile manufacturer) and 
Wahaha Group (beverage manufacturer) have promoted corporate social responsibility and 
initiated environmentally friendly production processes. For example, Huawei advocates energy-
saving practices in its cooling process and attempts to meet international standards (such as the 
European Union Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive) in waste disposal,16 which 
helps it to access the international market (Shi and Zhang 2007:286). In addition, some large 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs) and local enterprises have cooperated with 
local NGOs to respond to environmental challenges. For example Unilever (China), a subsidiary 
of the UK company, cooperated with the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 “CBCSD Purposes and Objectives”, China Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
<http://english.cbcsd.org.cn/cbcsd/purpose/index.shtml> (Accessed 18 May 2013). 
16 “Corporate Citizenship: Environmental Protection”, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd., 
<http://www.huawei.com/en/about-huawei/corporate-citizenship/environmental-protection/index.htm> 
(Accessed 18 May 2013). 
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Chinese ENGO, in reducing polluted water discharges from its Hefei City factory in 2007. A 
third-party environmental audit was used to investigate the problem, and the volume of discharge 
eventually complied with the law.17 It is clear that corporations are developing a tendency to build 
an environmentally friendly image to enhance profit, not only in response to pressures from 
NGOs but also to gain the trust of domestic consumers (Shapiro 2012:111).  
 
Finally, Chinese companies are increasingly adopting international environmental standards since 
China’s accession to the WTO. International markets are promoting green products and 
environmentally friendly production processes in addition to pushing manufacturers towards 
higher standards. For instance, the ISO 14001 certification of environmental management is now 
extensively used in various Chinese companies (such as the China National Petroleum 
Corporation). Consequently, the Chinese government has used these international environmental 
standards as a reference and developed its own systems, such as labelling products containing 
genetically modified organisms, and the China GAP certification, which is a national standard for 
producing organic products (Shi and Zhang 2006:286; Mol and Carter 2007:10-11). The 
corporations in China may be going ‘green’, but progress towards emissions reduction remains 
insufficient among the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at the local level. Given that 
these SMEs provide tax revenue and job opportunities at the local level, they have strong 
bargaining power with the local governments, which they can use to reduce or avoid 
environmental controls.  
 
3.3.2 The Rise of Civil Society and ‘Embedded Activism’ in the Environmental Sphere 
The relaxation of control over forms of social organisation has enhanced civil society’s 
participation in environmental protection. In 2011, 462,000 social organisations were registered 
in China and 6,999 of them were environmental in nature.18 The first ENGO, Friends of Nature, 
was established in Beijing in 1994. It was founded by distinguished Chinese scholar Liang 
Congjie and was the first registered social group formed by a citizen in China. The rise of Friends 
of Nature took Chinese environmental activism into a new phase, and ENGOs ‘became the main 
organisational structure’ (Wu 2009:3). Other ENGOs such as the China Environmental Fund and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For further information, please refer to: “Case Study – Using Third Party Feedback to Break the 
‘Business as Usual’ Mind-set in an Aim to Drive Positive Change”, Unilever China (Hefei) Factory, 
Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, <http://www.ipe.org.cn/Upload/Case-Study-Unilever-China-
Hefei-Factory-EN.pdf> (Accessed 18 May 2013). 
18 Annual Report of Social Services Development, 2011 (2011 Nian Shehui Fuwu Fazhan Tongji), Ministry 
of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
<http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/tjbg/201210/20121000362598.shtml> (Accessed 13 May 2013).  
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government-based think tanks like the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences 
have participated in the environmental protection dialogue. Both types of organisation have close 
links with the state, and the experts who participate in them provide valuable knowledge of 
environmental management. Such citizen-formed ENGOs not only play a role in environmental 
education and organising environmental protection projects in the community, but also become 
increasingly involved in lobbying the government. For example, 21 ENGOs sent an open letter to 
the Ministry of Agriculture and National Fishery Management seeking information about the 
investigation of the oil leak at Bohai in 2011.19  
 
A further notable development in environmental management in China was the implementation of 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law in 2003 and Measures on Open Environmental 
Information (for Trial Implementation) in 2008. The EIA Law provides a procedure for assessing 
a project’s environmental influence and facilitates a scheme of public hearings to enable public 
involvement in the environmental assessment process. The Measures give the public rights and 
encourages public interest in obtaining environmental information and participating in 
environmental protection. For example, the public can now participate in setting water prices 
through a system of public hearings in urban areas (Zhong and Mol 2008). Theoretically, these 
laws promote public engagement in environmental issues while increasing the transparency of 
environmental management.  
 
Even though environmental regulations have been implemented in an attempt to prevent protests 
(Alpermann 2010:139), China still lacks mechanisms for public participation and the commitment 
of a responsive and accountable government (Koppenjan and Enserink 2007:469). The EIA Law, 
for example, still has a limited effect on policy decisions in some cases (Wu, Ma and Qi 2012; 
Moser 2013:96-135). Furthermore, public participation in EIAs usually happens after public 
protests (such as in the cases studied in this work), due to the lack of EIA enforcement. The close 
partnership between businesses and local governments ensures better profits for both, but it also 
means that public interests are not properly considered. In addition, the EIA Law has been 
accused of non-transparency, and of denying affected people the right to be heard and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Environmental NGOs sent a letter appealing to the authorities to assess the damage caused by the oil leak 
in Bohai (21 Jia Huanbao NGO Zhixin Nongyebu Huyu Pinggu Bohai Yiyou Sunshi), Friends of Nature, 
<http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php/index/post/id/641> (Accessed 14 August 2012).  
	   35	  
compensated.20 Zhong and Mol (2008:911) remark that the representatives in public hearings are 
directly or indirectly controlled by the state, and that public hearings are held in response to state 
initiatives, particularly the interests of local government. In the example of the high-voltage 
electric towers cited above, the speakers in the public hearing were pre-selected (Alpermann 
2010:140).  
 
The use of EIAs is necessary in today’s environmental policy-making processes, and is thus 
described as ‘the cornerstone of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in the West’ (Zhao 
2010:90). Various scholarly works have praised EIAs for their ability to provide information that 
facilitates sensible decisions, reduces environmental consequences, builds trust between the 
public and decision makers and shapes effective environmental policies (Zhao 2010:90; 
O’Faircheallaigh 2010:19-27). Nevertheless, the balance of power between the public and 
policymakers has shifted in the EIA process (O’Faircheallaigh 2010:20) because citizens now 
have more power to affect the decisions about particular projects, and power is distributed more 
equally between the governments and the public. Public participation in environmental policy-
making processes is supposed to have increased under the EIA Law, and the EIAs in turn are 
expected to improve law enforcement. As discussed above, in practice, public involvement is still 
manipulated by the government. The literature provides detailed discussions of the reasons for 
this limited participation, such as leaders’ concerns that governmental authority will be 
undermined, or that groups’ interests will be spoiled if information is disclosed (Zhao 2010). 
However, the deficiencies of participatory mechanisms should be connected to the policy-making 
process.  
 
Public participation in EIAs is shaped by the dynamics between public participation in the 
decision-making structure and process (O’Faircheallaigh 2010:25). O’Faircheallaigh (2010) 
claims that public participation in EIAs should not be studied separately from public participation 
in other public policies, but instead that it should be connected to the political nature of public 
participation (Ibid:25). Such participation involves the institutional arrangements in the 
government and is influenced by which agencies do or do not respond to the demands of the 
public, and how they respond. However, in the context of authoritarian China, the bodies granting 
the power of public participation in the EIA process, and the EPBs (and local environmental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Tang, H. (2013). “China’s ‘Nimby’ Protests Sign of Unequal Society”, ChinaDialogue, 
<https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/6051-China-s-nimby-protests-sign-of-unequal-
society> (Accessed 8 October 2013).  
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agencies) do not reflect the citizens’ opinions due to those bodies’ weak status. The local 
governments’ top priority is economic development rather than environmental concern. The 
citizens still rely on ‘power leverage’, through members of the NPC and the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), for example, to express their dissatisfaction. As 
such, the balance of power between state and citizens has not fundamentally changed, and thus 
still rests with the government.  
 
Although participatory mechanisms are implemented in environmental policy processes, 
environmental groups remain constrained in environmental activism. Tang (2013) criticises 
environmental groups’ inability to represent the public in recent ‘not in my back yard’ (NIMBY) 
campaigns in several Chinese cities such as Xiamen, Qidong and Shifang, listing several reasons. 
First, environmental groups are not allowed to represent the public in environmental litigation. 
Second, the current registration system for ENGOs obstructs a confrontational approach to 
launching any social campaign. Thus, ENGOs prefer to place themselves in a ‘safer’ role, such as 
providing environmental education and advocacy, to avoid public involvement.21 The political 
status of Chinese ENGOs is unclear, and they launch non-confrontational campaigns because – as 
Morton (2010) explains – their campaigns often challenge local vested interests, and the Chinese 
government cannot tolerate any social activism that threatens the regime or resists self-censorship 
among green groups (Morton 2010:283). Because ENGOs do not participate in public protests, 
the public initiates protests through social media, as it is the only avenue through which to 
communicate their concerns.  
 
Civil society is supposed to be a sector that is independent from the state, yet the situation is 
different in authoritarian China. Chinese ENGOs play a non-confrontational role in their 
relationship to the party-state, and are thus embedded within the state structure (Ho 2007:198), 
which means that they are seen as an example of state-centred Chinese civil society, or ‘civil 
society with Chinese characteristics’ (Alpermann 2010:125). Cai (2010) argues that protestors 
often target local governments because the latter ‘may directly violate citizens’ rights, distort the 
central government’s policies or fail to protect citizens’ rights’. In addition, local governments 
have the power and responsibility to deal with daily governance (Cai 2010:4). Thus, it cannot be 
denied that local governments play a role in limiting the growth of ENGOs and restricting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Tang, H. (2013). “China’s Street Protests Won’t Change the Failing System”, ChinaDialogue, 30 June 
2013. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5660-China-s-street-protests-won-t-change-
failing-system  (Accessed 10 October 2013).  
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involvement in environmental policy-making processes. As the antagonistic relationship between 
local governments and ENGOs is revealed in the environmental policy-making processes, the 
latter have launched a power-leverage strategy that they see as crucial to succeeding in 
environmental activism. ENGOs take advantage of the ‘loopholes’ in the political systems at the 
local level (vertical and horizontal governmental structure, tiaokuai zhidu) and the conflicts of 
interest between different administrative departments at different tiers and levels (Alpermann 
2010:125; Cai 2010:5). An increasing number of ENGOs are devoting themselves to advocating 
an environmentally friendly, open and just society. In doing so, they struggle with local 
governments because the latter still play a manipulative role when interacting with the former 
regarding environmental policy processes. Yet, local governments are concerned with legitimacy 
and stability, which might lead them to make concessions for environmental activism. 
 
Overall, the problematic participatory mechanisms and ENGOs’ inferior status mean that public 
participation in the environmental policy-making process remains weak – it is far from a form of 
environmental governance that is effective, efficient, democratic and accountable (Liu, Zhang and 
Bi 2012:108). This also explains the emergence of intensive NIMBY protests organised by local 
victims and supports the theory that such protests may become more radicalised if the 
government does not change its position.  
 
3.3.3 Mass Media Coverage of Environmental Issues in China  
The mass media also plays a role in the transition towards better environmental management. 
Outlets such as television, newspapers and the Internet increasingly focus on environmental 
problems, stimulating the rise of environmental consciousness among the people. The Internet, in 
particular, is a relatively new channel for spreading information about environmental issues. 
Online discussion forums and the Chinese microblogging site Weibo have become the most 
influential channels in promoting environmental transparency and mobilising activists. Such 
Internet-based actions enhance the capability of ENGOs and individual groups in mobilising, 
organising and coordinating environmental activism (Shi and Zhang 2006:289).  
 
Environmental journalists are good examples of the close relationship between the mass media 
and ENGOs. Feng Yongfeng, a well-known environmental journalist and the founder of the 
ENGO Green Beagle, is closely involved with environmental issues such as grasslands 
preservation and the deterioration of Beijing’s waterways, and has launched walks, talks and free-
ranging discussions intended to raise public awareness of these problems across Beijing (Geall 
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2013:16). This involvement is unlike that of the first generation of environmental journalists, who 
just investigated and wrote about the issues. Another well-known environmental journalist, Wang 
Yongchen, formed the biggest ENGO, Green Earth Volunteers, in 1996 and launched an 
influential movement against dam building in south-west China. Such writers have used their 
networks and formed ENGOs to disclose environmental problems and encourage public 
participation.22 
 
Some environmental journalists have reported on politically sensitive environmental issues and 
made waves in society as a result. Many Chinese newspapers, whether party- or non-party-run, 
have now introduced environmental sections. Unlike other politically sensitive issues, such as 
human rights and democracy, environmental news is considered relatively less sensitive. Some 
newspapers, such as Southern Weekend,23 report environmental news in terms of addressing 
rights and governance, or disclose institutional corruption and lack of transparency in policy 
making (Geall 2013:22). For example, one of the informants in this work, Feng Jie, who is also 
an environmental journalist for Southern Weekend, described her investigation to author Sam 
Geall:  
 
Feng Jie, 30, from the north-western province of Ningxia. Feng won the 
“Journalist of the Year” category at the 2012 China Environmental Press Awards 
for three stories written for Southern Weekend, including a series about the oil 
spillage and cover-up in the Bohai Sea in 2011. […] Feng Jie arrived on the 
scene of the Bohai spill on 30 June 2011, several days after the first microblog 
rumors of a leak had started to circulate and long before the State Ocean 
Administration had confirmed the accident. […] She then followed the story 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “About us”, Green Earth Volunteers, <http://eng.greensos.cn/About.aspx> (Accessed 8 May 2013).  
23 Compared to other newspapers in China, Southern Weekend, a Guangdong-based publication, ‘is one of 
the country’s most respected newspapers, known for its hard-hitting investigations and for testing the limits 
of freedom of speech’ (BBC News, 8 January 2013) and ‘a relatively liberal voice in the Chinese media 
sphere’ that has managed to ‘maintain a functional, if uneasy, coexistence with censors’ (The Atlantics, 11 
January 2013). Sources: “Support for China Censorship Row Paper Southern Weekly”, BBC News, 8 January 2013, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20942641> (Accessed 8 May 2013) and Gao, H. “A Press 
Renaissance? The Legacy of China’s Southern Weekend”, The Atlantics, 11 January 2013, 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/a-press-renaissance-the-legacy-of-chinas-
southern-weekend/267081/> (Accessed 8 May 2013).  
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closely for the next six months. When a number of media reports pointed the 
finger at the US company ConocoPhilips, one half of the joint venture that ran 
the oil platform, she suggested that Chinese state-owned company CNOOC was 
shirking responsibility. […] Her perceived professionalism seemed to earn her 
the respect and trust of the regulators (Geall 2013:30-31). 
 
Feng’s investigations have clearly tested the limits of openness in China’s current political 
environment. She has put herself at risk to give her readers the facts about mismanagement at the 
hands of corporate officials. Moreover, such investigations have served as sources of information 
for ENGOs in the realms of lobbying and environmental litigation.  
 
Such experiences illustrate the relationship between state and society regarding environmental 
issues. The relaxation of social control has accelerated the emergence of ENGOs, which promote 
public environmental awareness through education, campaigning and lobbying. Some ENGOs 
have successfully established both domestic and international partnerships with NGOs to attract 
financial and technical support. They work closely with the mass media to expose pollution and 
lack of transparency: ‘[the] green groups and journalists have acted as agents of social change and 
begun to build the notion of public participation and grassroots action in China, and contributed 
to increased accountability of government’ (Thompson and Lu 2006:29). In addition, the 
implementation of the EIA Law and Measures on Open Environmental Information has provided 
opportunities for both ENGOs and the public to participate in governmental decision making. The 
institutional arrangements, with fragmented bureaucratic structures and power struggles between 
governmental agencies and local business interests, have also created opportunities for ENGOs 
and journalists to engage in policy advocacy (Wu 2013:4). Thus, as Lu and Thompson (2006:28) 
remark, Chinese ENGOs are ‘at the forefront of true civil society development, creating an 
officially accepted and recognised nongovernmental sector in a political and social system that 
was completely government-dominated for 40 years’. Although the number of ENGOs is now 
growing rapidly, and they are actively engaged in various environmental issues, their roles in 
social mobilisation and policy advocacy remain limited in China’s current political context. Their 
non-confrontational strategy (Lu and Thompson 2006:29; Wu 2009:4; Ho and Edmonds 
2007:333; Lu 2007:61-62; Johnson 2010:432; Shapiro 2012:124; McBeath and Leng 2006:183) 
and highly localised (Ho and Edmonds 2007:333; Wu 2009:4) and fragmented (Ho and Edmonds 
2007:33; Wu 2009:4) nature are perhaps best suited to survival in the current authoritarian 
context (Yang 2005:55). In addition, no single ENGO is capable of generating and organising the 
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diffused public opinion into a powerful political campaigning force (Ho and Edmonds 2007:336; 
Wu 2009:4). Although the ENGOs actively extend their networks through environmental 
journalists, academics and professional groups to expose incidents of pollution and resolve 
environmental disputes through litigation, their work is definitely conducted within a ‘mandated 
framework’ (Thompson and Lu 2006:29). In other words, Chinese ENGOs are engaged in ‘rules-
based’ forms of activism (Johnson 2010:432). Ho and Edmonds (2007) argue that ‘embedded 
activism’ best describes environmentalism activism in authoritarian China, meaning that it is 
limited by political constraints but still empowers civil society (Ho and Edmonds 2007:334). As 
Björn Alpermann notes, Chinese ENGOs ‘co-opt’ with the system instead of promoting its 
democratisation (Alpermann 2010:146). 
 
3.4 The Emergence of Environmental Protests and Anti-Incinerator Activism in China 
The previous section shows the constraints on ENGOs and on mass public participation in 
environmental policy-making processes in the context of authoritarian China, and explains the 
rise in environmental protests in recent years. This section focuses on the evolution of 
environmental protests in urban China since the economic reform of the late 1970s. Unlike in the 
environmental campaigns (such as those against dam building at Three Gorges) launched by the 
ENGOs, mass citizen groups have taken the lead in opposing polluting projects, such as 
incinerator construction. In this section, the patterns and strategies of environmental protests and 
transformation are discussed, followed by an illustration of China’s municipal waste crisis and its 
current municipal waste management policies. The aim is not only to provide the general 
background of environmental activism in authoritarian China, but also to address how local 
governments respond to these mass protests.  
 
3.4.1 The Mass Environmental Resistance in Post-Mao’s China 
As discussed in the previous section, the civic NGOs play a limited role in policy making and 
they avoid confronting the government (Tang and Zhan 2008:426), choosing instead to educate 
and provide services. Moreover, the social groups keep their distance from the citizens and 
foreign donors to survive in the restrictive political environment (Ho 2007:189). This also 
explains why citizens have found it difficult to get help from the ENGOs in the recent 
environmental protests.  
 
ENGOs educate and lobby, launching non-confrontational, low-profile strategies in 
environmental campaigns. The three best-known environmental campaigns – save the snub-
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monkey in Yunnan (1995-1997), save the Tibetan antelope in Qinghai (1996-2000) and anti-dam 
building in the Nu River (Nujiang, 怒江 also called Salween River) (2003-2006) – have revealed 
these characteristics. All of the aforementioned campaigns were initiated by ENGOs, such as 
Friends of Nature and Global Village, and environmental journalists. Besides, well-educated 
professionals with extensive personal networks, utilise mass media coverage also are the 
characteristics of these environmental campaigns. The campaigns were mainly concerned with 
protecting wildlife and conservation. Rather than challenge the regime, the activists in the snub-
nosed monkey and Tibetan antelope campaigns used institutionalised methods such as petitions, 
and looked to the higher authorities or the central government for help. The Nu River campaign, 
however, took a more contentious approach in opposing the building of a dam in Nu River (Sun 
and Zhao 2008:151).  
The work of ENGOs has enlightened Chinese citizens and changed protest tactics. For example, 
the concepts of ‘right to know’, participation and environmental justice, along with increased 
knowledge of environmental laws, have increasingly appeared in recent protests. However, non-
confrontational and self-contained environmental activism (Ho and Edmonds 2007:332; Sun and 
Zhao 2008:160) in China has been changing in recent years due to the environmental situations 
affecting people’s livelihoods and the ENGOs’ weakness regarding governmental confrontation. 
The recent protests have mainly been led by mass citizen groups to oppose the polluting projects 
planned near their communities, such as chemical factories and incinerators. These protests have 
been local in scale, with the protesters using radical, confrontational strategies. Technology (such 
as online discussion forums and the use of the micro-blog Weibo) has been the main means of 
mobilisation. As mentioned, most ‘mass protests’ do not receive help from the ENGOs, and their 
leaders organise the action alone, contacting the mass media and upper-level government 
authorities while learning about the environment and environmental laws.   
 
3.4.2 The Rise of Anti-Incinerator Activism in China  
Increased amounts of municipal waste are becoming common in both industrialised and 
industrialising countries, and the management of such waste is a political issue that causes 
controversy between state and society. On the one hand, states are looking for the most efficient 
solution, and incineration seems to be one of the best options. On the other hand, citizens are 
concerned about the environmental and health effects of incineration. They fear that incineration 
emits dangerous and polluting substances (such as dioxins) that cause irreversible damage to 
people and the ecosystem (such as in water and soil). As such, campaigns opposing incinerator 
construction have become a global phenomenon. Anti-incineration activism is found in the 
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industrialised democracies such as the US and the UK (Johnson 2013:110), and in emerging 
economies such as China’s. Unlike anti-incinerator activism in other democracies, anti-
incinerator activism in China was launched in the context of an authoritarian regime and a 
decentralised political structure. How, then, could Chinese citizens engage in activism, and how 
did local governments respond to the protesters’ grievances? These questions are part of the focus 
of this work.  
 
Incineration, with its ‘waste-to-energy’ technology, will be widely adopted in the future, 
particularly in the European and Chinese markets. From 2012 to 2016, facilities with the capacity 
to incinerate 21 and 40 million tonnes annually will be developed in Europe and China, 
respectively.24 This incineration technology, which emphasises the reuse of waste as fuel for 
generating energy, has the benefits of reducing the emission of greenhouse gases and methane 
caused by landfills, and providing a substitute for fossil fuels.25 Thus, the Chinese government 
has turned to incineration to reduce the pressure on landfills (Lang and Xu 2013:833). The first 
incinerator power plant in China began operation in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, in 1994. It 
emphasised the deployment of moving-grate technology to meet the EU standards for emissions 
and treatment of toxic waste (Feng 1995 in Lang and Xu 2013:833).  
 
However, these incinerator projects have been criticised for the negative effects they could have 
on human health and the environment if ineffectively controlled. For instance, the incineration 
process produces ash containing hazardous elements. The toxic pollutants found in the emissions 
include heavy metals, dioxins, furans and polyvinyl chloride, all of which harm human health and 
the ecosystem. People exposed to such highly toxic environments can develop cancers and 
reproductive and respiratory damage. Water, air and soil are polluted by airborne ash, which 
further affects wildlife.26 Nevertheless, incineration is still widely deployed in various countries 
because the technology solves space shortage and energy generation issues.27  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 “Waste to Energy – The Boom Continues Led by Europe and China”, 12 July 2012). Eco-Business.com. 
<http://www.eco-business.com/news/waste-to-energy-the-boom-continues-led-by-europe-and-china/> 
(Accessed 27 October 2013). 
25 “World Bank Technical Guidance Report: Municipal Waste Report”, The World Bank, August 1999:59. 
<http://www.worldbank.org/urban/solid_wm/erm/CWG%20folder/Waste%20Incineration.pdf> (Accessed 
27 October 2013).  
26 “Negative Impacts of Incineration-based Waste-to-Energy Technology, 2008”. Alternative Energy. 
<http://www.alternative-energy-news.info/negative-impacts-waste-to-energy/> (Accessed 29 October 
2013). 
27 For the debates on incineration, please refer to: Seltenrich, N. (2013). “Incineration versus Recycling: In 
Europe, a Debate over Trash”, Environment 360: Opinion, Analysis, Reporting and Debate. 
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In China, according to the MEP, the volume of urban municipal solid waste was 50 million 
tonnes in 2011,28 and incineration and landfills are the main methods of solid waste management 
(SWM). This work only focuses on incineration in Chinese cities. There were 122 incinerators in 
China in 2012 (excluding Hong Kong and Macau), but the Chinese government is planning to use 
incineration to resolve the country’s long-term solid waste problems.29 The document ‘A Notice 
for Planning Nation-Wide Municipal Waste Facilities in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan’ (十二五全
國城鎮生活垃圾無害化處理設施建設計劃的通知) states that incineration was one of the 
strategies for managing municipal solid waste, and that national incineration was set to reach 
35%, with plans to build 300 incinerators by 2015.30 The existing incinerators in China, however, 
are poorly equipped and emit toxic pollutants. There is a lack of resources for managing 
incinerators, and most are managed by the government through staff members who have not 
received formal professional training in waste management. In addition, the governments provide 
insufficient financial resources for incinerator operation and maintenance, and the laws and 
regulations on SWM are out of date and lack enforcement.31 Thus, controversies and protests 
surrounding incinerator construction have emerged across the country.  
 
The case studies included in this work are two anti-incinerator projects, one in Beijing and the 
other in Guangzhou, that illustrate citizens’ involvement in environmental policy-making 
processes in authoritarian China. The protests in Beijing and Guangzhou were chosen for their 
similar circumstances. Both projects were approved by the municipal governments but had not 
yet been built due to mass opposition, and both were relocated, arousing new controversies. The 
two cases studied here do not represent the whole spectrum of environmental protests and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://e360.yale.edu/feature/incineration_versus_recycling__in_europe_a_debate_over_trash/2686/> 
(Accessed 29 October 2013). 
28 Wang, C.C. (2013). “One-Third of Cities are Overwhelmed by Waste in 0.75 Acres Land” (我國超三分
之一城市遭垃圾圍城 侵佔土地 75萬畝), China Youth Online (中青在線), 19 July. 
<http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2013-07/19/nw.D110000zgqnb_20130719_1-08.htm> (Accessed 29 October 
2013). 
29 Li, B. (2013). “Government Subsidises Waste Burning Projects in Different Parts of China” (政策補貼
助力各地垃圾焚燒項目大躍進), Sina.com (新浪新聞),17 July. 
<http://news.sina.com.tw/article/20130717/10162640.html> (Accessed 2 November 2013). 
30 General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (國務院辦公廳). (2012). “Plan of 
Building Municipal Waste Facilities in Nation-Wide Cities under the Twelfth Five-Year Plan” (‘十二五”全
國城鎮生活垃圾無害化處理設施建設規劃’) State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
<http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-05/04/content_2129302.htm> (Accessed 1 November 2013).  
31 “Forms and Challenges of Managing Waste” (垃圾處理面臨的形式和挑戰), solidwaste.com.cn. (中國
固廢網). <http://report.solidwaste.com.cn/lajichuli/xstz.htm> (Accessed 3 December 2013).  
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conflicts in other parts of China, but anti-incinerator protests are a major part of the 
environmental policy-making landscape with significant influence over contentious policies in 
Chinese society (Wang et al. 2012; Lang and Xu 2013:834).  
 
Similar to those in other countries, mass anti-incinerator protests in China focus not only on 
removing incinerators from the community in question, but also on fighting for the right to 
participate in decision-making processes, environmental justice and information disclosure in 
such campaigns. Unlike in other democracies, however, Chinese citizens launch their protests in a 
highly repressive political context. Dozens of anti-incinerators protests have taken place in 
various cities such as Shanghai, Suzhou, Nanjing, Beijing and Guangzhou in the last decade, and 
they have not been halted despite the protesters facing political risks at the various stages of 
activism. The human health risks and environmental impact are the main reasons for these mass 
citizen protests, in addition to non-transparent decision-making processes and a lack of trust in 
local government. Facing the pressure of protests, the local governments typically suspend 
construction or remove the incinerator projects, and their responses have raised interest among 
scholars studying social activism in China who seek to explain the protests’ successes and failures 
(Cai 2008; Cai 2010; Lang and Xu 2013).  
 
3.4.3 Anti-incineration Activism and Policy Change 
In studying protests in authoritarian China, Cai (2010) conducted a systematic quantitative survey 
to discuss the successes and failures of collective actions in recent years. He collected 266 cases 
of collective action (such as land acquisition, labour disputes, homeowners’ rights and pollution) 
in China between 1994 and 2007. He concluded that local governments’ responses to such 
collective actions can be categorised as follows: 1) concessions that meet citizens’ demands, 2) 
concessions accompanied by the punishment of citizens, 3) resistance toleration as citizens’ 
demands are ignored and 4) repression (Cai 2010:5). In his explanation, the success or failure of 
collective resistance depends on the power of the protesting group (for example, solidarity and 
tactics) and its demands versus the political and economic costs faced by the government (Cai 
2010:3,7). In addition, Cai addresses policy adjustments (either in its abolition or revision) that 
occur in concessions (Cai 2010:13), but he does not give an in-depth analysis in this survey. Lang 
and Xu (2013) attempt to explain the success of environmental activism by comparing three 
examples of anti-incinerator activism in China, in Guangzhou, Beijing and Wujiang. They agree 
with Cai (2010) that social networks with strong media connections and links to government 
affiliations are the key to success in launching protests in China, and that the concept of 
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environmental modernisation, to some extent, has changed these societies gradually in terms of 
political processes and the use of incineration technology (Lang and Xu 2013:843-845). Yet, the 
relationship between successful environmental protest and policy adjustment is not developed in 
their work. In this work, I explore the causal link between environmental protest and policy 
change.  
 
I use Cai’s (2010) explanation for the successes and failures of protests as a framework for my 
analysis of a possible causal link between protest and policy change. As Cai (2010) notes, local 
governments tend to make concessions (either policy abolition or policy innovation) as a response 
to social activism with the aim of minimising social and political costs. Thus, an additional 
question is raised: what conditions are necessary for instigating policy change through local 
government? The cases in this work do not represent the full spectrum of environmental activism 
in China, but they do highlight a broader pattern of contentious politics in Chinese society.   
 
Chapter Conclusion  
Overall, the Chinese environmental management is formed in such a way that the government is 
not the sole actor, but shares responsibility with sub-governmental agencies and non-state actors 
who are actively engaged in environmental management, it further shows the fragmented 
authoritarian model is unable to explain the complicated relationships between state and non-state 
actors nowadays. Since the economic reforms of the late 1970s, the Chinese government has 
recognised the effects of both domestic and global environmental deterioration and has 
implemented a set of nationwide regulations and laws. The integration of the global 
environmental community also increasingly affects domestic environmental policy. After more 
than 30 years, the Chinese environmental management system is still being shaped, and often 
moves in the opposite direction of the economic development agenda. In addition, the governing 
structure interrupts effective environmental policy implementation. Similar to other countries, 
economic institutions override environmental protection institutions in China, and the polluters 
(such as state-owned companies) are well protected by the economic ministries and local 
governments. Thus, the environmental protection agencies are unable to enforce the 
environmental regulations (He et al. 2012:35). Local governments often prioritise economic 
growth and neglect environmental regulations, whereas local EPBs lack the power to enforce the 
law and mobilise resources. This demonstrates the problems generated by a fragmented 
governing structure and the difficulty of promoting environmental protection at the local level in 
the context of authoritarian China.  
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The emergence of green civil society, to some extent, is a response to the weakness of the ‘top-
down’ environmental management discussed above, and an attempt to contribute to 
environmental protection in China. Alongside the effects of environmental deterioration, the 
changing of political processes towards public participation has also enhanced the rise of green 
groups. The Chinese government is relaxing control over social organisations such as ENGOs, 
enabling them to become actively involved in environmental issues. The establishment of Friends 
of Nature in Beijing in 1994 was a remarkable event in the history of environmental activism in 
China (Wu 2009:3), as it was the first civil organisation for environmental issues to be formally 
established after the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. Consequently, other ENGOs such as the 
Global Village of Beijing and Green Earth Volunteers of Beijing bloomed in other parts of China. 
Such organisations not only provide environmental education, but also policy advocacy, working 
with the mass media and professional groups (including scientists) to expose pollution and to put 
pressure on the Chinese government. The recent implementation of the EIA Law and Information 
Disclosure Regulations has also facilitated public involvement in environmental issues. As such, 
the ENGOs have launched a form of ‘rule-based’ activism against pollution.  
 
However, their non-confrontational strategy and highly localised and fragmented nature means 
they can only offer limited opposition to governmental policy (Wu 2009:4). Their hesitation also 
affects the scope of their ability to represent the public interest. Tang (2013) explains that an 
ENGO cannot litigate environmental cases on behalf of the general public, and that their role as 
mediator between the government and the public over environmental issues is inhibited by the 
social organisation registration system. The rise of street-level public campaigning, with events 
organised spontaneously by the public, is becoming the new social force against pollution (Tang 
2013).  
 
Finally, economic actors cannot be neglected when looking at environmental management in 
China. The measurements implemented by the government, the fashion of green consumerism, 
the pressure from domestic ENGOs and the international environmental standards for accessing 
the international market all push Chinese companies to be more environmentally aware. Green 
businesses, however, are still in development and most have been launched by famous enterprises 
keen to build a better image, thus their effect on environmental responsibility remains doubtful. 
For example, the China National Petroleum Corporation, one of the country’s oil giants, was 
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criticised in early 2013 for producing air pollution in Beijing.32 Its reluctance to meet tougher 
emission standards revealed the MEP’s weakness when compared with other governmental 
departments responsible for economic development, such as the National Development and 
Reform Commission. Nevertheless, smaller companies also violate environmental regulations at 
the local level, which is tolerated by local governments due to economic interests. Balancing 
economic growth and environmental protection is a challenge the Chinese government continues 
to face.  
 
This review of the change of environmental management in China shows that the state is not the 
only actor in environmental management, as both economic and civil society also play their roles. 
The limitations of the non-state actors involved in environmental policy making also explain the 
increase in public campaigning led by mass citizenry against polluting projects in their 
communities. The call has gone out for transparent and participative decision-making processes. 
The actors might form different coalitions on an environmental issue to express their grievance, 
and seek policy change. Also, this chapter also reveals that the use of radical strategies to press 
local governments is common in these mass protests, and the government made concessions in 
some of the cases for minimising both political and economic costs. Overall, the fragmented and 
decentralising governing structure allow the degree of autonomy to respond the grievance of 
coalitions at local level of government. Therefore, framework of “advocacy coalition framework” 
is deployed for explaining how do the non-state actors form coalitions and their interactions in 
environmental political making process, as well as how they reach policy change. The conditions 








 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Wee, S.L. and Li, H. (2013). “Politics of Pollution: China’s Oil Giants Take a Choke-hold on Power,” 
Reuters, 2 February 2013 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/02/us-china-pollution-oilcompanies-
idUSBRE9110F620130202> (Accessed 20 May 2013). 
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Chapter 4  
Literature Review: Advocacy Coalition Framework and Policy Change  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Many believe that public administration in China is highly centralised, and that the policy-making 
process is bureaucratically initiated and administered under a one-party dictatorship. The CCP 
cadres manipulate the entire policy process and certainly exclude the participation of autonomous 
interest groups and society at large. In general, the ‘Western model’ of civil society – which is 
characterised by the participation of a plurality of interest groups in public policy-making, 
implementation and evaluation – is absent in China’s public-policy processes. Although the 
Chinese government has implemented participatory mechanisms, such as EIAs, to enhance public 
involvement in environmental policy making, the recent spontaneous protests against pollution 
demonstrate such mechanisms’ failure and raise questions about the effectiveness of public 
participation in the policy-making processes. Moreover, the protests aim, in part, to achieve the 
possibility of policy change as an alteration of maintaining governmental legitimacy. Thus, the 
correlation between protest and policy change is the focus of this work.   
As previously mentioned, few studies have examined the above correlation. Both Cai (2010) and 
Shih (2013) highlight local governments’ decisions to change public policies, and the rationale 
behind such changes. Mertha (2009) argues that government officials act as policy entrepreneurs 
when they change policies to achieve their organisational mandates at the local level, but the 
dynamics between protesters and the local governments regarding public policy changes have not 
been analysed.  
Protests are designed to pursue public policy changes, and while the cause-effect relationship 
between them is debatable (Bennett and Howlett 1992:275-276), the pressure exerted by social 
forces definitely drives such changes (Meyer 2004:138; Nathan 1999). Policy changes can also be 
an outcome of the learning that occurs among the policy makers (Bennett and Howlett 1992:277). 
However, these studies have received little attention insofar as they relate to the mechanisms of 
policy change. Thus, the ACF is introduced as an analytical framework to explain the dynamics 
between the state and non-state actors in reaching a consensus about policy change. In this 
chapter, the ACF is introduced, including its strengths, its weaknesses and its applicability in 
explaining the environmental policy changes in China.  
 
 
4.2 Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
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The ACF is introduced and developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988), and later a set of 
hypotheses are presented to generalise the dynamics of policy actors within policy subsystems 
and the mechanisms driving public policy change. Weible et al. (2009) agree that the use of ACF 
addresses the following limitations in the policy process literature: 1) the interpretation of the 
Stages Heuristic in relation to the causal theory of the policy process, 2) the provision of system-
based theories of policy making and 3) the provision of a theory for the role played by scientific 
and technical information in the policy process (Weible et al. 2009:122; Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014:184). Unlike the traditional top-down or bottom-up approaches to analysing the policy 
process, the ACF integrates both approaches within a policy subsystem, revealing the dynamics 
between state and non-state actors striving for policy change (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014:184).  
The ACF illustrates the complexity of policy making and explicates that both state and non-state 
actors, with their specialisations, hope to influence the policy process. Hence, the ACF uses a 
policy subsystem as a primary unit of analysis, focusing on a specific policy in a specific territory 
(Weible and Sabatier 2007:192). The framework includes a set of policy actors; not just the 
‘traditional iron triangle’ members (i.e. law makers, governmental agencies and interest groups), 
but also officials from all levels of government, scientists, judiciary officials and mass media who 
specialise in that policy area and thus become involved. The ACF assumes that policy actors with 
strong beliefs can translate them into actual policy. Regarding the dynamics between policy 
actors striving for policy change, the ACF believes that scientific and technical information plays 
a role in changing the beliefs of policy actors, such that those with similar beliefs form ‘advocacy 
coalitions’ to reach a consensus about policy changes through policy-oriented learning. In 
addition, external factors, such as the broader political and socio-economic systems, affect the 
behaviour of the policy actors. Nevertheless, the ACF assumes that the beliefs among the policy 
actors have been very stable for 10 years or more, making policy change more difficult (Sabatier 
and Weible 2007:192; Weible et al. 2009:122). Since the ACF’s introduction in 1988, dozens of 
ACF case studies and publications have been applied to the environmental and energy policies in 
countries such as the US, Europe, Australia and Asia as a lens to explain policy change intended 
to solve policy disagreements among the policy actors (Weible and Sabatier 2007:123). The ACF 
has become one of the most useful public policy frameworks (Ibid).   
 
These advocacy coalitions are formed in nested patterns, and thus may overlap with other policy 
systems. For example, the municipal SWM policy in this work overlaps with local land use and 
urban planning subsystems. The ACF assumes that the outcome of policy change can be seen in 
the negotiations among the policy actors, and that their behaviour is affected by two sets of 
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exogenous factors: relatively stable parameters (geographical features, sociocultural values and 
basic constitutional structure) and dynamic external factors (changes in socioeconomic 
conditions, changes in governing coalitions and changes in public opinions) (Sabatier and Weible 
2007:193). These factors are hypothesised to be the conditions necessary for major policy 
changes. 
 
Policy actors hold different beliefs and form competing coalitions, which leads to disputes in the 
policy-making process. The ACF examines the policy actors’ belief systems that affect political 
behaviour. The framework stresses a three-tiered belief system model for the policy actors 
(Sabatier and Weible 2007:194; Weible et al. 2009:122). The highest tier of the model contains 
the deep core beliefs; specifically, those that are the broadest and most stable, involving general 
normative values such as liberty and equality, which are applicable across many subsystems and 
very difficult to change. The middle tier contains the policy core beliefs, which span the entire 
policy subsystem. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) identify eleven components of policy core 
beliefs, some of which are the preferences of policy-related values, the authority of governments 
and markets, the roles played by the public, elected officials, civil servants and experts and the 
policy system’s problems as a whole. These components are helpful in forming and coordinating 
the coalitions among the policy actors. Likewise, the policy actors at this level are reluctant to 
change, but they are still willing to apply deep core beliefs in developing policy core beliefs in 
that subsystem (Sabatier and Weible 2007:195). The lowest tier contains the secondary beliefs, 
which are narrow in scope and thus more likely to change over time.  
 
Both policy and individual belief systems are the foundation for forming advocacy coalitions. The 
ACF assumes that the policy actors with the same beliefs join informal networks in a policy 
subsystem to translate their beliefs into actual policy. They seek allies who share their policy core 
beliefs among law makers, governmental officials, interest groups and researchers with the goal 
of sharing resources and developing strategies through the coalitions. The ACF stresses that the 
coalitions reach policy changes through coalition opportunity structures. As stated, both stable 
system parameters and dynamic external events influence policy change, and coalition 
opportunity structures mediate between them, affecting the behaviour of the actors within the 
policy subsystem (Sabatier and Weible 2007:199-200).  
 
The coalition opportunity structures serve as a broader political and economic background for 
policy change, but such change depends on two more conditions: the degree of consensus needed 
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for major policy change (to change policy core beliefs) and the degree of openness exhibited by 
the political system (Sabatier and Weible 2007:200; Weible et al. 2009:124). The ACF assumes 
that pluralist coalition opportunity structures with open political systems have a high degree of 
consensus about major policy change. Accordingly, corporatist structures with less open political 
systems and fewer policy actors tend to achieve a medium degree of consensus on major policy 
change. Decision making is centralised in corporatist systems, and few social leaders have the 
power to influence decision-making processes. Authoritarian regimes make it even more unlikely 
that consensus will be reached regarding major policy change because the participation is limited 
and the minority elite dominates the entire process. The rising influence wielded by non-state 
actors and diversified social values has complicated the policy-making process among 
nondemocratic regimes, such as that in China. The policy changes surrounding the Nu River 
protest (Han et al.2014) and the cases studied in this work show that the ruling elite is not the 
dominant actor in the policy-making process, as it must reach consensus with other policy actors 
to achieve policy change. I elaborate on the ACF’s applicability in the Chinese context in Section 
4.4 of this chapter.   
 
Regarding the correlation between the degree of openness exhibited by a political system and the 
degree of consensus on major policy change, the ACF identifies four ways to achieve policy 
change. The first way is through external events, such as the changes in socioeconomic conditions, 
public opinions and governing coalitions, because they influence policy beliefs. The second way 
is through policy learning; that is, new information or experience that reinforces the thoughts and 
behaviour needed to revise policy objectives (Sabatier and Weible 2007:198). The third way is 
through internal subsystem events (Sabatier and Weible 2007:204-205), as the failure of current 
subsystem practices leads to policy change. For example, an oil spill is a disaster that affects the 
petroleum subsystem (Ibid.). The fourth way is through the disputes between coalitions, settled by 
negotiated agreements. In such cases, an institutional setting is provided to facilitate negotiations 
and agreements among the policy actors (Sabatier and Weible 2007:205-206; Weible et al. 
2009:124).  
 
In summary, the ACF helps to clarify the complexity among diversified policy actors within the 
policy-making process. These actors share similar beliefs and seek allies when forming coalitions 
to influence a specific public policy. Policy change, according to the ACF, is not only affected by 
policy actors’ behaviour, but also by the coalition opportunity structures. Nevertheless, the open 
coalition opportunity structures provide a high degree of consensus in reaching policy change. 
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The ACF identifies four ways to reach policy change, but acknowledges the difficulties involved 
in achieving policy change in authoritarian regimes.  
 
The ACF has received worldwide attention and has been widely applied to a variety of public 
policy studies. Discussions of ACF, both its application and the testing of related hypotheses, 
exist in the literature, particularly in relation to environmental/energy and social/economic 
policies (Sabatier and Weible 2007:207; Weible et al. 2009:125-126; Jenkins-Smith 2014:188; 
Weible and Sabatier 2007). The ACF’s popularity does not suggest infallibility, and its merits and 
limitations are examined in the following section.  
 
4.3 Merits and Limitations of Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The ACF provides an analytical tool for explaining public policy changes. Weible et al. (2011) 
describe the ACF as an ‘international communication of scholars – a common language of 
important concepts, basic relations among concepts, and a shared scope of inquiry’ (Weible et al. 
2011:355). It also contributes to testable theories and hypotheses for further academic discussions.  
 
STRENGTHS 
The ACF can be used to effectively understand the dynamics of policy actors in the policy-
making process. It examines the central question of policy process research; namely, how people 
mobilise and take action. It clearly outlines the formation and structure of coalitions, which 
aggregate similar interests influencing the policy-making process. It achieves this by borrowing 
theories from psychology and social psychology to model the beliefs and behaviour in the policy 
subsystems. The ACF breaks away from the classic theories on the stage heuristic policy process, 
which refers to the stages of the policy-making cycle, i.e. agenda setting, formulation, 
legitimation, implementation and evaluation. The ACF also considers the macro background, 
such as socio-political setting, public opinions and external factors affecting policy actors’ 
behaviour, which provides a more comprehensive understanding of the policy-making process. 
The framework identifies the mechanisms behind how the coalitions reach an agreement that 
spurs policy change (Weible et al. 2011:352). It also considers the significant role played by 
scientific and technological information in policy making and political disputes. The ACF studies 
have shown that scientists are key players in advocacy coalitions, fostering changes within policy 
subsystems (Weible and Sabatier 2007:132). Coalition resources also influence policy change. 
The framework suggests that political resources, including the legal authority to make policy 
decisions, public opinions, information, troop mobilisation, financial resources and skilful 
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leadership, are used by policy actors to shape public policies (Sabatier and Weible 2007:201). 
These resources are also important indicators for explaining policy changes (Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014:205). The ACF can be used across a variety of governing structures, policy areas and 
various cultural societies (Weible and Sabatier 2007:132) at the global level. For example, in 
studying the correlation between degree of consensus in making policy changes and the openness 
of political systems, the framework has provided the various policy change outcomes in pluralist, 
corporatist and authoritarian political systems.  
 
The ACF can be applied in both qualitative and quantitative studies. Weible et al. (2009:126) note 
that it can be used in different data collection approaches, such as questionnaires, content 
analyses and interviews, indicating its usefulness in multiple methodologies for analysis. It is also 
applicable in comparative studies of governing subsystems, such as education, society, welfare 
and economic policies, to enrich the theoretical inspiration.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
The ACF is not a perfect framework. It cannot overcome the free-rider problem among coalition 
participants. Although ACF research has addressed the formation of coalitions, it has not 
overcome the free-riders on coalition members, and necessary to find out what have the policy 
actors done in the process of policy change (Weible and Sabatier 2007:132). Weible and Sabatier 
(2014:133) argue that the ACF does not clearly define the coalitions within the policy subsystems, 
such as the minimum number of actors needed to form a coalition capable of affecting policy 
subsystem outcomes. It also does not explain how coalition resources support policy change. 
Several coalition resources affecting policy coalitions have been identified, but how the policy 
actors use them to influence public policy remains insufficiently analysed. 
Regarding policy-oriented learning, the ACF does not offer a clear conceptualisation and 
measurement of learning and its process (Jenkins-Smith 2014:205). The framework emphasises 
new information/experience that affects belief systems, facilitating policy change (Weible et al. 
2009:124). However, the ACF has not developed a clear typology of such information and 
experience, or the conditions for fostering learning among the coalitions (Weible et al. 2009:134). 
It identifies the importance of external events and internal shocks in explaining policy change, but 
it does not specify which condition is sufficient to explain major policy change (Nohrstedt 
2009:14). For example, Hsu’s (2005) study on Taiwan’s nuclear power policy and the 
international influences affecting the policy-making process does not identify the external or 
internal shocks influencing major policy change. Finally, the mechanisms of policy change are 
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unclear in the ACF, which assumes that a more structured coordination of coalitions can exert 
more power over policy decisions. However, the level of coordination affects policy decisions 
that have not even been mentioned. The framework has also not identified the process for 
reaching consensus on major policy changes among coalitions, or suggested alternatives, such as 
the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework (Weible et al. 2011:351). 
Nevertheless, the ACF does provide an alternative to instrumental rationality, in which the 
external environment determines policy actors’ preferences and is able to explain the process of 
policy change more comprehensively.  (Schlager 1995:253). The ACF not only shows the 
complicated dynamics between policy actors within a policy subsystem, but it also explores the 
conditions shaping the outcome of policy change. Although the ACF was developed and has 
mainly been applied in liberal democratic countries and it assumes that the multi-stakeholders are 
excluded in decision making process among nondemocratic regime (Sabatier and Weible 2007: 
200), the framework can be deployed in nondemocratic regime, such as China. As the growing 
policy actors are increasingly getting involved in  environmental policy making in China,  it is 
necessary to examine how the policy actors affect environmental policy change in this 
authoritarian country. In the next section, the ACF’s application in the context of authoritarian 
China is examined to assess how relevant the framework i is to authoritarian China. I expect it to 
lead to an enhanced understanding and refinement of the framework in non-democratic regimes.  
 
4.4 The Application of Advocacy Coalition Framework in the Chinese Context 
As I mentioned, the ACF assumes that the degree of consensus needed for major policy change is 
low in authoritarian regimes because the minority elite dominates the policy-making process. The 
ACF identifies the openness of political systems that allow actors to become involved in the 
policy process (Sabatier and Weible 2007:200), and points out a closed political system cannot 
host major policy change in an authoritarian regime. In this section, I highlight the characteristics 
of ACF, and then discuss the applicability in this authoritarian context.  
In studying environmental protests in China, in particular anti-incinerator protest, literatures 
mostly focus on the reasons for and the formation of protests, strategies adopted in the protests, 
and evaluate the effectiveness of protests in changing government policy. However, there is little 
discussion on the environmental protests led to the change of environmental policy, neither the 
reasons to policy change (Wong 2015). In addition, Han et al. argue that the advocacy coalition 
framework may suffer from ‘framework stretching’, making it either inapplicable or unable to 
explain cases accurately in a different political context such as that of China (Han et al 2014: 
314). Nevertheless, this framework has been applied to analyse a number of cases of 
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environmental activism in China. However, the variables that affect environmental policy change 
and policy change mechanisms have not been discussed in these cases. Given that the local 
governments enjoy some degrees of autonomy in local governance under decentralised governing 
structure, policy innovation or policy abolition would be the option for responding to 
environmental protests for minimising political and economic costs (Cai 2010:4). The 
decentralising governing structure also explicates that local governments focus on political and 
social openness at the local level when choosing their mode of policy adjustment, and the 
coalition opportunity structure varies in different local governments.  
 
In examining the conditions for environmental policy change, fundamental socio-cultural values 
also help us understand the interactions among the political actors in the activism and policy-
making processes (Sabatier 2007:202). The political atmosphere and socio-cultural values have 
shaped the different developments in post-Mao China. For instance, in this work, I show that the 
historical background, as the ‘forerunner’ of economic reform, has created Guangzhou’s social 
openness. The most outspoken newspaper in China, the Southern Metropolitan Daily, has played 
a significant role in addressing public policy by sympathising with environmental protesters. 
Moreover, the practice of civic engagement has blossomed in Guangzhou. Thus, the cultural 
dimension has framed the interactions between government and the protesters and those between 
government and civil society organisations. In contrast, Beijing, as China’s capital, is 
characterised by a conservative political atmosphere and the late development of civil society, 
which have limited the city’s capacity for civil development (Lu and Zhuo 2011). Furthermore, 
changes in the socio-economic conditions and public opinions also influence policy changes. 
Economic wealth creates a middle class that pursues a better quality of life, and the rise of 
environmental awareness changes public opinion on environmental protection in the society. A 
recent public poll found that 60 per cent of the Chinese people are concerned about pollution, and 
they want their government to prioritise environmental protection over economic growth33. As 
such, the grievances regarding environmental protection and the willingness to engage in policy 
change depend on both the openness of the political systems and socio-cultural values of local 
government.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Wang, Hongyi, 2014. Protecting environment tops public concerns in poll. China Daily, [online] 16 May. 
Available at <	  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/16/content_17511326.htm> [Assessed 17 July 
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The rise of multiple interests such as agencies at different levels of government, environmental 
NGOs and citizens and led to the formation of coalitions to influence the policy-making process. 
Similar policy beliefs and mobilised resources are important assets among the rival coalitions in 
environmental policy subsystems. The pro-environmental protection coalition comprises 
environmental groups, citizens with a strong sense of environmental protection, whereas the state 
actors usually form a coalition focused on economic development. Scientific and technological 
information is used in both coalitions. They might invite scientists to share knowledge and collect 
scientific data supporting their arguments in the policy-oriented learning process. Other 
information such as the knowledge of laws and regulations related to a specific environmental 
policy is an additional important asset. As such, the rise of the middle class in urbanised cities 
such as Guangzhou and Beijing prompted the protesters studied in this work to adopt a 
contentious, legal-based approach in their activism. Meanwhile, the state actors claimed legal 
authority by interpreting the laws and law enforcement to limit the rivalry coalition’s behaviour 
during the protests.  
 
In addition to laws and scientific information, other coalition resources are also used to influence 
environmental policy. Public opinion that supports a coalition’s policy position can be used as a 
resource by the policy actors. For example, the environmental protection coalition usually gets 
sympathy and support from the public during specific types of activism. Thus, the protesters 
might contact the mass media through personal networks to express their grievances.  
 
Finally, the ACF assumes that skilful leadership can be found in the Chinese context, and that its 
presence can attract more resources to the coalition, in addition to ensuring that resources are 
used effectively (Sabatier and Weible 2007:203). A group of coalition members or an individual 
member might take a leading role in the protests, such as planning strategies and attempting to 
bring about an actual change in environmental policy.  
 
As Sabatier and Weible (2007) mention, the coalition opportunity structure is borrowed from the 
concept of a ‘political opportunity structure’ (POS) (Sabatier and Weible 2007:199), in which the 
political process is shaped by resources and actors (Ibid:200). In the ACF, the coalition 
opportunity structure refers to a mediator between stable system parameters (i.e. constitutional 
and social structures, natural resources and fundamental socio-cultural values) and policy 
subsystems (Ibid:199). However, a POS has a more detailed definition. Theoretically, a POS is 
applied to a protest to explain the evolution of social movements (Meyer and Minkoff 2004:1457; 
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Gamson and Meyer 1996:275) and provide a set of variables for examining the dynamics between 
protesters and political institutions (Gamson and Meyer 1996:275). The ‘degree of political 
openness’ (Lewis 2000) is known to affect the development of social movements. Two types of 
political openness are classified: open and closed political opportunity structures. An open 
political opportunity structure explains ‘how … organisations [can] participate formally in 
political procedures’. A closed political opportunity structure ‘provides fewer institutionalised 
means for grievances to be heard’.34 Both types involve the possibility of citizens’ participation 
shaping policy change in the policy-making process. 
 
In Western theory, an ‘opened political opportunity structure’ government accommodates more 
civil society organisations in policy procedures, as noted above, and the relationships between 
institutions and state-society relations are considered (Parsons 1995:335). Although institutions 
determine policy actors’ behaviour, their constraints should not be over emphasised (Ibid:88). 
What is more, the policy actors often renegotiate, revise and reinterpret the rules, or new 
constraints (rules or structures) are made (Ibid:88). Thus, policy actors’ behaviour regarding the 
policy process changes accordingly. Hajer (2003) further explains that the context of policy 
making is changing as institutional voids are filled by the emergence of new civil societies (Hajer 
2003:175). The presence of institutional voids does not mean that the state institutions have 
suddenly faded and become obsolete, but rather that they have developed new norms and 
institutions through deliberations and negotiations (Ibid:175-176). Hence, state institutions 
become adaptive and resilient during the policy process, in which the rise of civil society and the 
participation of non-state actors play a crucial role. The core value of civil society is civic 
engagement in public affairs, such as involvement in the policy-making process for the good of 
society. The rise of civil society accumulates social capital, promotes civic engagement in public 
affairs and accelerates public participation in the policy process. Thus, institutional arrangements 
of state and civil society are interdependent in their influence over public participation in the 
policy process. Given that political and socio-cultural openness have shaped the behaviour of 
policy actors in the environmental policy subsystems, changes in socio-economic conditions and 
in public opinion are used as the indicators of conditions in this work.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Lewis, T.L., (2000). “Transnational Conservation Movement Organizations: Shaping the Protected Area 
Systems of Less Developed Countries”, In: Mobilization: An International Journal, 5(1):108. 
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Political opportunity structures have shaped the interactions between government and protesters 
in China’s environmental activism. The FA framework has created a variety of political 
opportunity structures in this regime by breaking the Chinese political system, which is 
decentralised and disjointed. In turn, the local bureaucratic enterprises are encouraged to compete 
and bargain to serve and promote their own interests or preferences in the policy process 
(Lieberthal 1992:8; Lam 2013:146). Thus, this structure provides ‘the political geography of local 
authority boundaries’ (Rootes 2009:881) and different degrees of political openness among the 
local governments. Environmental management institutions, such as district and municipal 
governments, local environmental protection authorities, the Municipal Commissions of City 
Administration and Environment and the Municipal Urban Planning Bureau, have competing 
interests and lack coordination. In this situation, the weakness of local environmental authorities 
is revealed in their inability to follow the instructions given by the central environmental 
bureaucracy. The fragmented political structure creates space for the protesters to seek the 
leverage they need to gain more support. In addition, the local governments enjoy ‘autonomy’ in 
policy making under the decentralised political system, resulting in various degrees of political 
openness shaped by the possibility of formal participation (Lewis 2000:108). The ACF notes that 
the paths of policy change are also valid in the Chinese context. Changes in public opinions and 
socio-economic conditions facilitate the environmental protection coalitions in pressuring the 
state actors to change environmental policy. For example, the rise of environmental awareness 
among the public is reflected in their support of the environmental protection coalitions. The new 
information or experience reinforces the behaviour among the policy actors within the 
environmental policy subsystem. Any information about the incineration technology, for 
example, becomes important evidence for the coalitions in persuading others to change their 
policy beliefs. Finally, there is also the possibility of negotiations and agreements among the 
policy actors in the Chinese policy-making process. In the Nu River hydropower project protest, 
for instance, the societally based environmental coalition negotiated with the state agencies and 
eventually agreed to trim the number of dams from 13 to 4 (Han et al. 2014). 
 
As the POSs change, the actors protesting must calculate their strategies accordingly (Kriesi 
1995:168; McCauley 2009:926; Gamson and Meyer 1996:278). Thus, POSs shape those 
environmental protests seeking changes in policy on building incinerators, such as the cases 
studied here. Although the all-encompassing concept of POSs is contestable, they have provided 
the factors for explaining the complexities of policy conflict and mobilisation within policy 
subsystems. The variations in response, in particular to policy innovation and environmental 
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activism among the local governments, also reflect the FA characteristic in China. As noted 
above, the governments at all levels enjoy a certain autonomy within the FA framework, as the 
decentralised powers are able to conduct different policy experiments during economic reform. 
However, in facing the rise of non-state actors and decentralised governing structures, the FA 
model does not accurately explain the policy changes in collective activism across the country. 
The conflicts between pro-incinerator entities and their societal opponents further reveal that the 
FA framework does not provide a sufficient explanation.    
 
Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter examined China’s environmental practices using the advocacy coalition framework 
(ACF), emphasising internal and exogenous factors, structural contexts and the dynamics among 
the policy actors within the policy subsystems. The ACF is not only applicable in studying policy 
change in pluralist and corporatist political systems, but also helps explain policy change in the 
context of authoritarian China with a particular focus on diversified policy actors and the bottom-
up pressure from non-state actors in the policy-making process. The ACF is a useful analytical 
tool for developing hypotheses to guide research and explain policy changes. It not only defines 
the composition of policy actors in the coalitions and their resources, but also sets the coalition 
opportunity structures for the conditions shaping the policy actors’ belief systems to reach a 
consensus on policy change. This examination of the ACF attempts to apply it to the Chinese 
context. A fragmented governing structure provides local governments with a certain degree of 
autonomy in implementing environmental policy. Poor environmental enforcement has driven the 
growth of protests in cities nationwide, challenging the local governments. Both state and non-
state actors have formed coalitions to seek policy change, and their choices are shaped by 
coalition opportunity structures. In this work, I specify governing structures, socio-cultural values 
and changes in socio-economic conditions and public opinion as the conditions in the coalition 
opportunity structures that influence environmental policy change.  
 
The decentralised governing structure is the structural background that defines actors’ interests 
and behaviour. Socio-cultural values facilitate the development of civil society, and the non-state 
actors engage in policy making and pursue their own interests through policy-oriented learning. 
The economic wealth of society has shifted public opinion towards environmental protection, 
paving the way for the growth of environmental awareness and later the rise of environmental 
protests in the cities. Although the ACF does not fully explain the Chinese context, it does 
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provide a set of variables that can be used to understand the policy-making process in non-
democratic regimes.  
 
However, the use of the ACF in non-plural China can be problematic. According to Han et al. 
(2014:314), ‘framework stretching’ may result in the ACF being misinterpreted. Because the 
ACF was originally designed to explain policy changes in democratic regimes, it can be 
misinterpreted. Nevertheless, if the possible coalitions for an issue are identified and the minimal 
conditions of the ACF are met, then framework stretching can be avoided (Sabatier and Jenkin-
Smith 1999:152), and its use in this work is justified. The ACF’s use here also contributes to the 
ACF literature and supports the framework’s generalisability.  
 
The next chapter introduces my methodology and research design, detailing the instruments used 
to investigate the empirical cases. The theories presented are then cross-referenced when 
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Chapter 5. Research Methodology  
 
Studying environmental activism has largely used qualitative approach to study participation in 
the process of environmental governance. These studies have typically used archival examination, 
interviews with stakeholders and ethnographic approaches to data collection to synthesise their 
analyses. For instance, Yearley et al. (2003) use group discussions to explore air pollution in the 
local communities of three cities in the UK. Saunders (2007) explores the relationships between 
London-based environmental movement organisations and national ENGOs in the UK and 
examines resource mobilisation using semi-structured interviews, surveys and participant network 
analyses. She also explained the advantage of using a qualitative approach for clarifying the 
reasons behind why the formal organizational structure inclines to compete the resources, which 
the quantitative approach fails to explain (Saunders 2013:17).  Some of other literatures have 
deployed a qualitative approach, for instance, Ogilvie and Rootes (2015) argued that the use of 
qualitative approach benefits to see the dynamics between the actors and the impacts of protests 
in studying the environmental campaigns (Ogilvie and Rootes 2015:878). These are just few 
examples and this research deploys qualitative approach and shows the advantages in studying 
environmental activism.  
 
In this work, I also used qualitative methods, emphasising archival examination and interview 
content to investigate public involvement in China’s environmental policy-making processes. The 
qualitative methods used here were particularly suitable for the deep analysis of social 
phenomena, and for providing textual descriptions of human behaviour such as experience, 
interpersonal interactions and feelings. Likewise, a qualitative approach helped reveal the 
complexity and implications of the policy actors’ involvement in the anti-incinerator protests. I 
conducted a systematic investigation of the origins, evolution and features of China’s 
environmental policy-making process, and of the responses to and effects of the anti-incineration 
protests. To achieve this, the data for this comparative empirical study were collected in four 
ways: i) through fieldwork in library research using publicly accessible archives in China on the 
topics of environmental policy making and environmental activism; ii) through the examination 
of Internet documents released by the Chinese government; iii); through fieldwork in gathering 
Chinese perspectives on public participation in environmental policy making and iv) through 
fieldwork conducted in Beijing and Guangzhou. In addition, I used a comparative study because 
it provided an awareness of ‘unexpected differences, or even surprising similarities, between 
cases, [as] comparison brings a sense of perspective to a familiar environment and discourages 
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parochial responses to political issues’ (Hopkin 2002:249). This comparison of the anti-
incinerator activism in Beijing and Guangzhou shed light on the political process between local 
governments and protesting groups. Theories were then tested to generalise the complexity of 
environmental management in China. The similarities and differences of the actors and their 
campaign strategies, the protests’ outcomes and the local governments’ responses were 
compared. Then, I examined the underlying causes of the campaigns’ various outcomes and the 
governmental responses to explain the link between protest and policy change. Finally, I 
attempted to identify general patterns in the variations in China’s environmental management 
using the framework of fragmented political structures. 
 
In this work, I compared activism in Liulitun, Beijing and in Panyu, Guangzhou. Beijing was the 
first of China’s cities to experience anti-incinerator protests, and they successfully pressed the 
municipal government to suspend the incinerator project, which set a country-wide example. As 
China’s capital and a city-province, Beijing acts as a mirror for national trends (Teets 2013:19). 
Guangzhou has served as an ‘indicator of the openness of China’ since the economic reform in 
the late 1970s. Traditionally open in terms of cultural and political perspectives, Guangzhou is 
one of the forerunners and ‘policy pilot places’ of economic reform. In addition, activism in 
Guangzhou has greatly influenced anti-incinerator construction in ways that other protests in 
China have not. The protesters in Guangzhou not only successfully suspended the incinerator 
project, but also later formed a green group advocating a zero-waste society in the city. The 
activism in Guangzhou also changed the attitudes of the municipal government regarding public 
participation in decision-making processes. Both Beijing and Guangzhou represent economic 
achievement, with GDPs ranked second and third, respectively, in 2013.35 Hence, the rise of the 
Chinese middle class becomes the new force in environmental activism as they strive to protect 
their rights to knowledge, to participation in decision making, to a better quality of life and to 
clean air and water. Thus, although environmental activism in urban China is similar to that in 
other places in the world, where ‘(the protesters) challenge government’s role in producing or 
reinforcing an uneven distribution of power and resources’ (Fainstein and Hirst 1998:183), it does 
takes place in a highly repressive political environment.  
 
The results provided a new impetus for revisiting some scholarly paradigms that have previously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  “Shenzhen’s GDP Ranks the Fifth in China” (Shenzhen GPD zhanju quanguo diwu luohuo 
beishangguang he Tianjin). (2013). China’s Economy (Zhonggup Jingji Wang), 31 October, Available at: 
<http://gd.ce.cn/sy/gd/201310/31/t20131031_1170964.shtml> (Accessed 21 July 2014).  
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been used to explain public participation in China’s environmental policies. This work received 
ethics approval from the University of York Economics, Law, Management, Politics and 
Sociology Ethics Committee. 
An empirical qualitative inquiry aims to ‘explore people’s subjective experiences and the 
meanings they attach to those experiences’ (Devine 2002:199), and thus is a good method for 
identifying holistic meanings, thought processes and the context of the information received 
(Ibid:199). Hence, the use of quantitative research methods was unfeasible and inadequate for this 
work. Moreover, the use of questionnaires did not allow for an in-depth analysis of the dynamic 
between state and non-state actors in protest and post-protest situations.  In this study, my close 
observations and intensive interviews with environmental activists, journalists and government 
officials revealed the dynamic between government and public participators in environmental 
decision making, providing further understanding of the transformation of environmental 
governance in China.   
 
In addition, an archival examination including newspapers and government documents provided 
background information that facilitated a better understanding of the cases. It also served as 
counter-evidence to my assumptions. Social media platforms, such as online discussion forums, 
provided a significant channel for collecting data on organising activism in Beijing and 
Guangzhou.  
 
5.1 Newspaper Articles and Government Archives   
First, information was acquired from governmental documents that focus on environmental policy 
and regulations, such as EIAs, which are available on the Internet. The Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information (中華人民共和國政府信息公
開條例) has been effective since May 2008, and aims to enhance governmental transparency. 
Several types of information are openly disclosed, such as information about the structure, 
function and working procedures and other matters relating to administrative agency, laws and 
regulations, regulatory documents and financial budgets. This information facilitates our 
understanding of decisions made by both central and local governments. In addition, information 
about the environmental protection department is helpful for investigating the relationship 
between this agency and environmental organisations. For example, a list of the participants who 
had been invited to become members of a consulting committee on municipal waste management 
in Guangzhou was very useful. The laws and regulations for public involvement in environmental 
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issues were also explored, including those regarding public hearings in China. Governmental 
information was an important component of this work, as it supplemented the oral interviews, 
which were sometimes deficient in providing information.  
 
Articles from newspapers (on issues such as protests in China) and stakeholders (such as reports 
about the incinerator projects posted on the Internet) were used extensively in this work. The 
information provided by newspapers was not used to check the validity of government and 
resister narratives, but rather to provide a backdrop for the protests studied. Six hundred 
newspaper articles in Chinese were collected from the Internet. I searched WiseNews (a Hong 
Kong-based online newspaper database service archiving Chinese and English newspapers from 
the Greater China region since 1998) for keywords related to incinerators, Guangzhou Panyu and 
Beijing Liulitun, and found articles and special reports on  incineration technology, including 
polling on the proposed location of the incinerator in Guangzhou conducted between 2006 and 
2014. Examples of China’s national and local newspapers were included, such as People’s Daily (
人民日報), Southern Weekly (南方周末), Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市報), Beijing 
Times (京   ), Beijing Daily (北京日 ) and Nan Fang Daily (南方日報). The newspaper 
articles generally sympathised with the protesters, particularly those published in Southern 
Weekly and Southern Metropolis Daily, which supported the Guangzhou incinerator protesters 
and thus played an important role in monitoring the government’s incinerator construction 
activity.36 Southern Weekly and Southern Metropolis Daily are members of the Nanfang Media 
Group (南方傳媒集團), a Guangzhou-based tabloid considered to be the most ‘outspoken’ 
newspaper in China.  
  
5.2 Online Discussion Forum  
Social media, which plays the roles of agent and platform in protests (Segerberg and Bennett 
2011:200), was my second source of information for this work. However, in authoritarian China 
there are policies and regulations in place to limit Internet use (Yang 2008:129), and they also 
control the spread of protest. This does not mean that it is impossible to use the Internet to 
mobilise protests. Chinese citizens still use the Internet to express their opinions about Chinese 
current affairs. In this work, I used two online discussion forums – the Riverside Garden 
Community Forum (江外江麗江花園社區論壇 http://www.rg-gd.net) and the Fenglin Mountain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Liu, J. and Lao, Y. (2012). “The Role of Newspaper Commentary in Public Policy Decision-making” 
(Xinwen pinglun zai gonggongzhenche de zuoyong), 17 April, People’s Daily, Available at: 
<http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22114/206896/242384/17679482.html> (Accessed 9 August 2014). 
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Villa Discussion Forum (中海楓漣山莊業主論壇   http://house.focus.cn/msglist/1396/) – to 
acquire information about the anti-incinerator protests in Guangzhou and Beijing. These forums 
are the major information exchange platforms for homeowners in residential complexes, who 
share information on topics such as the tariffs demanded by decoration companies or use the 
platforms to sell second-hand items. These online discussion forums also served as an important 
way to share information about activism. For example, the residents posted the plans for opposing 
the incinerator construction and shared their opinions on the government’s responses to their 
actions, hoping to obtain more resident support.  
 
5.3 In-depth Interviews  
Valuable information was also gathered through interviews with stakeholders about their 
involvement in environmental activism and municipal waste management programmes. Because I 
focused on the dynamics between the public and sub-national agencies, my interview targets were 
residents affected by the incineration projects, environmental activists and the officials in the 
environmental protection department. In addition, lawyers and academics who had voiced 
concerns about the incinerator projects were also interviewed. Twenty open-ended interviews 
were conducted, in individual and group formats. Twenty in-depth qualitative interviews were 
conducted during my fieldwork. The interviewees were divided into the following categories: 
protesters, ENGO activists, environmental lawyers, street-level bureaucrats (responsible for 
launching a trial waste sorting programme in one of Guangzhou’s communities) and academics. 
The interviewees’ demographics are listed in Appendix G. Their accounts were sorted and 
analysed alongside information from publicly accessible archives to reveal the dynamics between 
state and non-state actors at the local level.  I knew the improbability that a large number of 
interviewees who participated in the protests in Beijing and Guangzhou could be interviewed. 
The residents who were invited to participate in the interviews proved inaccessible in numerous 
ways, including being reluctant to take the political risk embodied in being interviewed. 
 
5.3.1 Interview questions 
Interview guides were drafted based on the controversies identified through existing discourses 
on the incinerator projects and public participation in environmental policy in China. The 
interviewees were invited to share their experiences with and opinions on the protests and the 
formation of the environmental groups, etc. Open-ended questions were developed, focusing 
specifically on anti-incinerator activism and public participation in environmental policy: 
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1) Example questions for the protesters: ‘Why did you participate in the protests?’; ‘Do you 
agree with the government’s response regarding the incinerator project?’; ‘What is your 
opinion on municipal waste management in this city?’ 
2) Example questions for ENGO activists: ‘What did your organisation do in the anti-
incinerator protest?’; ‘What has your organisation done for the launch of waste recycling 
programmes?’; ‘What was your organisation’s role in the activism? Was it that of 
mediator between the government and the public or was it to represent the public in 
expressing their concerns to the government?’  
3) Example questions for street level bureaucrats: ‘How would you encourage residents to 
participate in this trial programme?’; ‘What are the difficulties in promoting waste sorting 
programmes in this community?’ 
4) Example questions for environmental lawyers: ‘How did you get involved in activism 
and help protesters?’; ‘What is your opinion of environmental impact assessments?’ 
5) Example questions for academics: ‘How do you perceive the development of public 
participation in environmental policy in China?’; ‘What is your opinion of the 
government’s response to the public consultative committee?’  
 
5.3.2  Selection of Interviewees 
Twenty activism participants were interviewed, of whom two (Zhang Boju, the chief executive of 
Friends of Nature and Xia Jun, the environmental lawyer) were involved in both the Guangzhou 
and Beijing protests. All of the interviewees were approached through ENGO networks that had 
been involved in the anti-incinerator protests before the focus shifted to municipal waste 
management in China. Thus, I was able to obtain first-hand information about the protests in both 
Guangzhou and Beijing.  
 
I selected interviewees who had directly participated in the protests and/or had assisted with the 
municipal waste management project. Thus, my sample consisted of actors who were key 
participants in the different stages of activism and municipal waste management. The first 
category of interviewees – protesters – comprised residents who had participated in the activism 
in Guangzhou and Beijing. They lived near the proposed incinerator plants (less than 6 km in 
Guangzhou and less than 5 km in Beijing). Despite the presence of residents in Liulitun proper, 
most of the protesters in both cases lived in newly built private residential complexes and were 
well-educated, with professional occupations such as journalists, retired cadre members, teachers 
and business people. Thus, they were generally able to gain information about the problems 
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related to having incinerators near their homes and were aware that their rights had been 
overlooked. Their backgrounds also enabled them to seek external help through social networks. 
For instance, the retired cadre members contacted NPC and CPPCC members through personal 
contacts, which allowed them to table their grievances in NPC and CPPCC meetings.  
 
The second group of interviewees was the ENGO activists. Friends of Nature (自然之友), the 
first ENGO in China, was indirectly involved in both protests. Beijing’s Liulitun residents asked 
Friends of Nature for help in January 2009, when the municipal government resumed their plan to 
build an incinerator after the 2008 Olympic Games. Friends of Nature gave advice and contacted 
environmental scientists to discuss incineration-related problems. Later, the ENGO launched a 
waste-sorting programme to educate the communities in Beijing. The experience gained in 
Liulitun then allowed it to provide the same help for the Guangzhou activists. Friends of Nature 
also inspired the establishment of Eco-Canton, a green group formed by the protesters in Panyu to 
continue advocating a zero-waste society. Other ENGOs such as Nature University (自然大學) 
also organised waste-sorting programmes for the Liulitun residents in Beijing. Friends of Nature 
and Nature University both provide legal advice on incinerator construction nationwide.  
 
The third interviewee category was environmental lawyers, and Xia Jun played an important role 
in both anti-incinerator protests. Mr Xia, who specialises in environmental public interest 
litigation, provided legal advice for the Beijing and Guangzhou activism. For example, he helped 
the Liulitun residents use the ‘Administrative Reconsideration Law’ to complain that Beijing’s 
municipal government did not consult residents during the process of planning the incinerator. He 
also publicly advocated reforming the EIA Law to increase public participation in the EIA 
process and ensure that it could be supervised by lawyers.  
 
The fourth category of interviewees was officials. The officer interviewed was responsible for 
launching a trial waste-sorting programme in the Huale community of the Yuexie district in 
Guangzhou, and is thus labelled as a street-level bureaucrat due to his public service and his 
direct dealings with citizens (Lipsky 1980:3). He worked to establish the recycling centre in the 
community and organised regular educational programmes for the residents about waste recycling 
and sorting. He was also responsible for recruiting volunteers to monitor waste sorting on the 
street.  
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The last cohort of interviewees consisted of academics. Dr Chen Xiaoyun and Professor Kuo 
Weiqing, from Sun Yat-sen University’s School of Government, played significant roles in the 
Panyu, Guangzhou activism. Professor Kuo did not participate in the protests, but both advised 
the protesters and later helped them to form Eco-Canton. They also shared their perspectives on 
municipal waste management in China via the media.  
 
In general, the findings from the interviews revealed the differences in the perceptions held by 
state and non-state actors regarding incineration, municipal waste management and public 
participation in decision-making processes. The narratives of the actors were shaped by their 
experiences in the protests, their views on governmental dynamics and their backgrounds and 
professions. This information clarified both the activism and the dynamics between state and non-
state actors. 
 
The interviews were conducted in various locations in Guangzhou and Beijing. To interview the 
Liulitun protesters, I was invited to visit the offices of Green Monitoring Group (located inside a 
concrete plant initially intended for use as an incinerator. For details, refer to Chapter 6, section 
6.2). After the interview, a member of the group who had participated in the protest took me to 
visit the landfill next to the plant by Liulitun village. To interview the street-level bureaucrats, I 
visited the Huale community in the Yuexue district of Guangzhou to observe the operation of a 
trial waste-sorting programme. I also attended the annual meeting of Eco-Canton to better 
understand the group’s operation and to participate in their activities, including visiting a state-
run food waste plant in Datianshan Recycling Park (大田山生態循環園) in Huangpu district (黃
埔區), Guangzhou.  
 
5.4 Research Limitations  
 
It is still challenging to conduct research in China when the topic touches on data that are 
regarded as politically sensitive by the Chinese government, and thus the credibility of such 
information is often suspect (Carlson et al. 2010:6). However, multiple research methods such as 
interviews, surveys, newspapers and state-generated data can help to outline the big picture. 
Regarding the credibility of state-generated data, Xi Chen (2010:16) points out that an 
understanding of the political processes by which materials are generated should not be neglected, 
particularly ‘why and how state agencies have produced the data that we are going to use’ 
(Ibid:23). State-generated data are not only gleaned from official archives and agencies at the 
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local and national levels, but also from national mass media and stakeholders, such as social 
activists, who use government materials to enhance their bargaining power. Overall, multiple 
methods strengthen the objectivity of research.  
 
One major problem that I faced in this work was the lack of consolidated analytical frameworks 
and comparative approaches for studying protests and their relationship to policy change in 
China. Previous studies have mainly focused on the reasons for protests, and the environmental 
policy-making process is rarely discussed. Scholarly works have discussed the policy-making 
process and policy implementation in China in the 1980s (Lampton 1987; Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988) and the environmental policy-making process and implementation in the 1990s 
(Sinkule and Ortolano 1995; Lieberthal 1997), but data accessibility can prove challenging. 
Although the Chinese government promulgated the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Disclosure of Government Information in 2007, followed by the Archives Law in 1996, 
informational transparency is not always available. In particular, archives at the local level can be 
very old and incomplete due to certain agencies being unwilling to transfer materials to the 
archives. It was necessary to cross-check different sources to verify the validity of my data. For 
example, regarding the plan to build an incinerator in Liulitun, I double-checked that I had the 
complete official document by looking at local newspapers. Another limitation of interviewing 
government officials is that such interviews are notoriously difficult to arrange, and even when 
the opportunity is granted, there is further difficulty obtaining informative answers (Chen 
2010:16,20). None of the officials (current or former) from Beijing and Guangzhou’s municipal 
governments, environmental agencies or other related governmental departments agreed to be 
interviewed for this work. To compensate for their under-representation amongst the 
interviewees, I collected and analysed municipal governmental documents and mass media 
reports to help provide insight into the protests and interactions between the governments and the 
protesters in both cases. For instance, the governmental documents facilitate our understanding of 
decisions made by both the central and local governments. In addition, information about the 
environmental protection department is helpful for investigating the relationship between this 
agency and environmental organizations. It also serves as counter-evidence to the assumptions 
made in this study.  
Overall, this work provides a multi-dimensional examination of the anti-incinerator protests in 
Beijing and Guangzhou through the perspectives of various stakeholders. More specially, this 
mixed methods tease out actions and interactions of policy actors at multiple levels that can help 
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explain observed patterns as well as facilitates us to discuss in the framework of advocacy 
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Chapter 6 Case Study: The Anti-incinerator Protest in Liulitun, Beijing 
6.1 Background  
As mentioned above, environmental disputes have become one of the common causes of 
collective activism in China. Since 1996, the number of environmental collective incidents (環境
群體事件) has been increasing by 29% per year,37 and there were three protests (Qidong, Shifang 
and Ningbo) within four months in 2012,38 which alarmed the Party-state.39 Although the Chinese 
government implemented the Environmental Impacts Assessment Law in 2008, which has 
provided a channel for citizens to express their opinions about environmental projects, the law 
has not halted dissatisfaction among Chinese citizens. As such, the purpose of this research is to 
sketch and test an analytical lens for understanding the process of environmental policy change in 
authoritarian China. Specially, it employs the advocacy coalition framework to examine both 
Beijing and Guangzhou cases and analyses the political opportunity structure in order to 
comprehend coalition emergence, strategies and suspension of building incinerators in both cities. 
In this work, I study instances of environmental collective resistance in Beijing and Guangzhou, 
and the local governments’ responses in this chapter and the next, respectively. The following is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Environmental Collective Resistance Risen by 29%” (Zhongguo Xuntixing shijian nianzhen 29%, 
Fayuan yin mingen ju lian). (2012). Sohu News, 28 October. Available at: 
<http://news.sohu.com/20121028/n355887990.shtml> (Accessed 28 May 2014). 
38 Feng, J. (2012). “Officials Struggling to Respond to China’s Year of Environment Protests”, China 
Dialogue. Available at: <https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5438-Officials-struggling-
to-respond-to-China-s-year-of-environment-protests-> (Accessed 28 May 2014). 
39 For example, thousands of people opposed a paper-manufacturing factory drain in Qidong, Jiangsu 
province (located in Southeast China and less than 60 km from Shanghai city) in July 2012. The paper-
manufacturing factory, supported by investments from Japanese capital, planned to build a 110-km-long 
drain that would have affected the Qidong coast. The plan never underwent public consultation and angry 
protesters stormed the government building where they caught Party Secretary Sun Jianhua and tore his 
shirt off. He was then forced to wear a red t-shirt with the slogan ‘Strongly oppose the building of the 
drain’. The protesters searched Mr Sun’s office and found a box of condoms, luxury wines and cigarettes, 
and thus they also suspected him of being corrupt. Later, the protesters threw documents from the 
government building. In the face of this disruptive protest, the government announced that the drain project 
would be permanently cancelled. The protest ended when the cancellation was announced. 
<http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/international/art/20120729/16556752> (Accessed 18 August 2014). This 
event represented the tip of the iceberg. The central government has since issued documents on social 
disputes and their effects on the CCP’s rule. In the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China held in December 2006, the ruling party issued a document intended to 
‘actively prevent and manage people’s intra-conflicts to maintain the interests of mass citizens and social 
stability’ (積極預防和妥善處置人民内部矛盾引發的群體性事件，維護群眾利益和社會穩定 ), 
highlighting the social disputes challenging the CCP’s rule and suggesting that mass education be 
strengthened at all levels across the country. In addition, the concept of ‘harmonious society’ (和諧社會) 
was advocated. <ht tp : / /news.x inhuanet .com/pol i t ics /2006-12/08/content_5454148.h tm> 
(Accessed 18 August 2014). This was the first time that the CCP had mentioned social disputes in the 
national agenda since the implementation of economic reform (Zhu 2009) 
<http://soci.cssn.cn/shx/shx_zhyj/201310/t20131025_578498.shtml> 
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review of how the anti-incinerator protest in Liulitun, Beijing evolved. Then, the ACF is applied 
to the findings in the chapter conclusion.  
 
6.2 The Power of Citizens: The Anti-incinerator Protest in Liulitun, Beijing 
The ever increasing volume of municipal solid waste is one of the problems faced by the 
urbanised cities, like Liulitun; and solid waste management has stimulated a controversial debate 
within the community. In the analytical terms of the ACF, the municipal waste management 
incarnates a belief system as follows. At the deep core level, building a sustainable society is a 
target for the community as a whole among both pro-burn and anti-burn coalitions. To achieve 
the goal, the policy actors translate their policy core beliefs into the concerns for urban 
management at present as well as the environmental consequence to future generations. In 
instrumental policy beliefs level, two coalitions are formed by different policy beliefs. They use 
construction of incinerator, and protests respectively to achieve their desire goals in policy core 
beliefs. As mentioned above, two coalitions ‘pro-burn coalition” and “anti-burn coalition” were 
formed in this case: the ‘pro-burn coalition’ consists of municipal and district government 
officials and “pro-burn” scientists, while the “anti-burn coalition” formed by the Liulitun 
residents nearby the incinerator site, environmental lawyer, environmental group, academia and 
“anti-burn” scientists. This set of policy actors, as pointed out by Sabatier and Weible (2007), not 
only includes “iron triangles” of officials and interest groups leaders, but also involved other 
professionals, for example researchers and journalists, who specialised in that policy area and 
seek to affect environmental policy making process (Sabatier and Weible (2007: 192). In this 
section, the background of anti-incinerator protest is introduced, the formation of both “anti-burn” 
and “pro-burn” coalitions, and development of the activism are mentioned.  
 
Liulitun is a community of 30,000 residents located in Haidian district (海淀區), in the northwest 
of Beijing. Haidian covers and area of 431 km2 and its residents numbered 3.2 million in 2010.40 
Liulitun has several residential sites and schools, and there is an Aerospace Town just 3 km away. 
The construction of an incinerator in Liulitun was planned for 2007, less than 500 m away from 
surrounding poor villages and the heavily polluting factories of industries such as brick-firing and 
about 5 km away from some new middle-class residential areas. A landfill was developed in 1999 
next to the planned incinerator site. On 29 August 2006, the new middle-class residents of this 
community learned of the incinerator plans on an online forum for homeowners 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Haidian District Statistics Bureau. (2011). The Sixth National Population Census, Haidian, Beijing. 
Available at: <http://www.hdtjj.gov.cn/HDTJJWEB/rkpc6/S_38920.html> (Accessed 10 August 2013). 
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(http://house.focus.cn/msglist/, which subsequently became a primary communication channel in 
the protest), and the knowledge aroused discussions among the residents. Meanwhile, on 15 
September 2006, Beijing’s municipal government launched a one-month consultation about daily 
social issues in Beijing for 2007 (北京市 2007年在直接關係群眾生活方面擬辦的重要實事). 
The consultation aimed to collect the public’s opinions on many aspects of society, such as social 
security, education, employment, medical care, public order and city planning. Another purpose 
for this consultation was to collect opinions about the preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games. 
The residents in Liulitun sent the municipal government letters and expressed their concerns 
about the smell from the landfill and the possible detrimental effects of the proposed incinerator. 
A month later, in October, burning rubbish was found in the landfill and the smell spread over the 
community. This sparked a discussion among homeowners in the online forum in which the topic 
of dioxin was mentioned. In researching the smell from the landfill, the residents discovered 
documents showing that the municipal government was preparing to build four incinerators in the 
Chaoyang, Nangong and Haidian districts by 2008. These documents were the ‘Outline for 
National Economic and Social Development in the Tenth Five-Year Plan for Beijing City’ (北京
市國民經濟和社會發展第十個五年計劃綱要) and the ‘Outline for National Economic and 
Social Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Beijing City’ (北京市國民經濟和社會發
展第十一個五年計劃發展綱要).412 In November 2006, the municipal government published the 
urban plan for northern Haidian for the subsequent five years, which included the construction of 
an incinerator at a landfill site near the newly developed area with a daily disposal capacity of 
1,200 tonnes.42 These plans were based on the comprehensive city plan for 2004-2020, which was 
implemented by Beijing’s municipal government in January 2004 and included the construction 
of multiple incinerators.43 Clearly, incinerator construction was (and is) expected to be one of the 
solutions to the cities’ municipal waste problems, but the smell of the landfill and burning waste 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Outline for National Economic and Social Development in the Tenth Five-Year Plan for Beijing City” 
(北京市國民經濟和社會發展第十個五年計劃綱要 ). (2001). National Reform and Development 
Commission, <http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgh/ghwb/dfgh/W020050614802777788614.pdf>; “Outline for 
National Economic and Social Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Beijing City” (北京市國民
經 濟 和 社 會 發 展 第 十 一 個 五 年 計 劃 綱 要 ) (2006). Beijing Municipal Government. 
<http://zhengwu.beijing.gov.cn/ghxx/sywgh/t833176.htm>; “The Beijing Municipal Waste Management 
White Paper” (北京市生活垃圾治理白皮書). (2007). Beijing Solid Waste Administration Department. 
<http://www.bswad.org.cn/tabid/119/InfoID/757/Default.aspx> (Accessed 10 August 2013). 
42 “First Time to Display the New Developed Plan in Northern Haidian District in Coming 5 Years” (北京
海淀北部新区 5年规划首次亮相). (2006). Sina News. Available at Sina.com.cn. 28 November.  
 <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-11-28/141411643213.shtml> (Accessed 10 August 2013). 
43 “General Urban Planning of Beijing City, 2004-2020”, （北京城市重体计划）. (n.d.). Beijing 
Municipal Commission of Development and 
Reform,<http://www.bjpc.gov.cn/fzgh_1/csztgh/200710/t195452.htm> [Access 10 August 2013]. 
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again aroused concerns among the residents, who planned to use litigation to shut the project 
down. 
The public concerns about the smell of the landfill attracted other parties. The First Plenum of the 
8th CPPCC of Haidian district was held on 14-18 December 2006 and CPPCC members submitted 
two proposals: the ‘Proposal on Building Scientific Municipal Waste Management System’ (關於
建立科學處理生活垃圾體系的建議) and the ‘Proposal on Managing Liulitun Landfill’ (對六里
屯垃圾填埋場環境整治的建議). They highlighted the landfill’s effects on health, the ecosystem 
and the development of the district, and called for a solution to the problem. The ‘Proposal on 
Managing Liulitun Landfill’, written by the Jiu San (3 September) Society (九三學社)44 of 
Haidian district, investigated the landfill issue. The report showed that the smell from the landfill 
was affecting people’s lives, and that polluted water was leaking from the landfill. In addition, the 
landfill did not meet the requirement that it should be no less than 3 km from inhabited areas, 
which placed the residents at risk.45 At the conference, the Revolutionary Committee of the 
Chinese Kuomintang (中國國民黨革命委員會)46 of Haidian district disagreed with the plan to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The Jiu San society, founded in December 1944, is an officially recognised political party in China that 
currently has nearly 100,000 members. Its political aim was to carry on the traditions of democracy and 
science, oppose the civil war and practice democratic politics. Known as a party comprised primarily of 
intellectuals, its present programme stipulates that, organisationally, the party draws members from 
representatives of middle- and senior-level intellectuals in the fields of science, technology, higher 
education and medicine. 
In September 1949, representatives of the Jiu San Society participated in the First Plenary Session of the 
CPPCC at which the Common Programme was adopted as the provisional constitution, and the Central 
People’s Government was elected and founded, hence the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). 
After the founding of the PRC, the Jiu San Society solemnly declared that it accepted the leadership of the 
CPC and had adopted the Common Programme. Since then, the Jiu San Society has actively participated in 
governmental and political affairs as a democratic party. 
It held its third and fourth national congresses in October 1979 and December 1983, respectively, deciding 
that it should focus on economic construction and devote itself to the following: developing and improving 
the established multi-party cooperation led by the CPC and political consultative system; continually 
participating in government and political affairs; abiding by the principle of coexisting over a long period, 
engaging in mutual supervision; showing utter devotion to each other; and sharing honour and disgrace, 
weal and woe with the CPC.  
The Jiu San Society has played an increasingly important role in governmental and social affairs and 
economic construction, such as safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of its members, helping the 
CPC and government to adopt policies regarding intellectuals. It has also made significant contributions to 
the modernisation drive. Source: Non-Communist Parties in China, China Culture.org. 
http://www1.chinaculture.org/library/2008-02/14/content_22254_2.htm> (Accessed 11 August 2013). 
45 Guo, S. (2006). “Smell of Liulitun Landfill Is Being Criticised” (北京海澱區六裡屯垃圾填埋場惡臭熏
人遭批評), Sohu.com, 15 December. http://news.sohu.com/20061215/n247056064.shtml> (Accessed 11 
August 2013). 
46 The Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (RCCK) recruits its members from among 
those who have relationships with the former Chinese Kuomintang, those who are historically or socially 
related to the RCCK and those who have ties with Taiwan. The RCCK also recruits members from 
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build the incinerator in Liulitan. The two major industries in the newly developed area were 
tourism and research and development (R&D), and the committee was worried about emissions 
from the incinerator polluting the area and damaging these industries. They also implied that the 
incinerator might not be operated properly, and cited similar examples in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen.47 In responding to the inquiries from CPPCC members in Haidian about the smell from 
the landfill, the Haidian district government confirmed construction of the incinerator by March 
2007, stating that the landfill would be closed in 2010.48 The homeowners were angry and 
planned to take action to oppose the incinerator and the landfill plans.49 
 
The owners of Fenglin Mountain Villa (中海楓漣山莊) and Baiwang Jasmine Garden (Baiwang 
Moli Yuan, 百旺茉莉園)50 posted a message on the online homeowners’ forum calling for a 
protest against the landfill and incinerator on 22 December 2006. They also sought resources, 
including financing, to support this activism. The organisers (using Internet usernames) suggested 
that the participants send their contacts and their ‘preferred roles’ by email, so that the names of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
professionals in social and legal circles and from other sources, especially the middle and upper social 
strata, and leading intellectuals. Democratic Kuomintang forces and other patriotic democrats held their 
first congress in Hong Kong in November 1947. On 1 January 1948, the Congress officially announced the 
founding of the RCCK, after which it began actively preparing for the CPPCC and made lasting 
contributions to the founding of the People’s Republic of China. 
After the founding of the PRC, the RCCK, as a member of the multi-party cooperation led by the CPC, 
participated in the building of the people’s political power and the CPPCC, playing a constructive role in 
consolidating the people’s democratic dictatorship and developing a patriotic united front while 
successfully accomplishing the socialist transformation and advancing the cause of socialism. Since 
China’s reform and opening-up, the RCCK has been committed to multi-party cooperation and political 
consultation led by the CPC, building socialism with Chinese characteristics. In promoting self-
improvement, the RCCK has made efforts to perform the functions of a party participating in government 
and political affairs, constantly establishing and improving work mechanisms for participation in and 
deliberation of state affairs, and for democratic supervision. It has made new contributions to advancing 
reform and opening-up, promoting the peaceful reunification of the motherland. The RCCK has always 
been inspired and encouraged by Dr Sun Yat-sen’s spirit of patriotism, revolution and ceaseless progress. 
This is a glorious tradition for the RCCK. DITTO Source: Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese 
Kuomintang, <http://www.minge.gov.cn/mgzy/mgjj/list.shtml> (Accessed 11 August 2013).  
47 Guo, S. (2006). “Smell of Liulitun Landfill Is Being Criticised” (北京海澱區六里屯垃圾填埋場惡臭熏
人遭批評), Sohu.com, 15 December. <http://news.sohu.com/20061215/n247056064.shtml> (Accessed 11 
August 2013). 
48 Wang. Q. (2006). “Haidian District Government Replies to CPPCC Member: Plan to Build an Incinerator 
in Liulitun” (海澱區政府回應委員：六里屯垃圾處理將建焚燒廠), CPCC News Web, 5 December. 
<http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34952/5172640.html> (Accessed 11 August 2013). 
49 “Plan to Build an Incinerator in Liulitun” (六里屯垃圾處理將建焚燒廠), Fenglin Mountain Villa 
Discussion Forum (中海楓漣山莊業主論壇), 15 December 2006. 
<http://house.focus.cn/msgview/1396/71308944.html> (Accessed 11 August 2013). 
50 Both residences are located at Liulitun, which is near Summer Place Software Park. Fenglin Mountain 
Villa, built in 2005, is a small residency with 1,245 households. The Baiwang Moli Yuan (Baiwang 
Jasmine Garden), also built in 2005, has 2,000 households. 
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absentees and their reasons for absence would show on the online discussion forum after the 
protest. The protest took place on schedule. On the forum, the homeowners emphasised that the 
protest should take place within the existing legal framework.51 This message was echoed among 
the protesters, and other homeowners began to support them. Some left suggestions for further 
forms of activism, such as contacting the mass media, meeting with other official agencies, 
submitting a petition to the municipal government and using litigation.52  
 
The homeowners of Fenglin Mountain Villa and Baiwang Jasmine Garden had their first meeting 
on 23 December 2006 and drafted an action plan that they entitled, ‘Build a Harmonious 
Community, Strongly Oppose the Building of the Incinerator in Liulitun’ (共築和諧社區 共建美
好家園 強烈反對六里屯建設垃圾焚燒場). In the plan, they not only pointed out the problems 
with the landfill, such as the bad smell, they also expressed their worries about the proposed 
incinerator construction. They also listed the division of labour and guidelines for the protest: 1) 
the participants shall follow the organisers’ instructions and no-one shall be allowed to speak for 
the whole group, 2) the participants shall not oppose the CCP and socialism, 3) national laws and 
regulations shall be followed and 4) the participants shall not contact foreign mass media. To run 
a more organised campaign, the organisers worked out a division of labour that included the roles 
of leadership core, financial support, external relations and legal support. They also set the 
schedule for the campaign:  
24 December 2006: Petition start date  
24 December 2006–1 January 2007:  
(i) Have leading organisers confirm the action plan. 
(ii) Confirm the context for applying ombudsman and litigation, along with notice for other 
homeowners in Liulitun.  
(iii) Collect the information of other homeowners’ associations for contact in future. 
(iv) Collect evidence of incinerator-related problems for litigation. 
12–14 January 2007: Publish the notice among other homeowners’ associations to gain support. 
15-19 January 2007: Submit the complaint letter to the government agencies and the mass media. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 “About the Building of the Incinerator!” (關於建立垃圾焚燒廠事宜!), Fenglin Mountain Villa 
Discussion Forum, 20 December 2006. <http://house.focus.cn/msgview/1396/71767106.html> (Accessed 
11 August 2013). 
52 Ibid. 
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To be confirmed: Further action depends on the governmental response.53 
 
Meanwhile, they recruited volunteers to submit the complaint letter to the relevant government 
agencies and indicate increased participation, which could put pressure on the government; 
promote the campaign in the community; and (for those volunteers with a legal background) 
provide consultancy for the campaign. Then, they confirmed the content of the complaint letter 
(with 600 signatures) entitled, ‘A Complaint Letter about Opposing the Building of an Incinerator 
in Liulitun Community’ (百旺新城社區居民關於反對在六里屯建垃圾焚燒廠的申訴信), and 
submitted it to the State Environmental Protection Agency (formerly the MEP) and the Beijing 
Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau on 29 December 2006. The letter read as follows:  
 
To whom it may concern,  
A complaint letter opposing the building of an incinerator in Liulitun community 
We are the residents of the community Xibeiwang Baiwangxincheng in Haidian 
District, Beijing. We chose this place because of the surrounding landscape and 
urban planning in the newly developed northern Haidian district, which enabled 
us to spend our savings on buying the houses here. When we first moved in, 
however, we never thought that it would be the start of a nightmare! This 
nightmare is the Liulitun landfill, which is less than 2 km from our homes. In 
recent years, the smell overwhelmed us between 9-10 pm and 6-7 am every day 
(sometimes the smell is noticeable in the daytime). We close our windows in the 
summer but the smell stops us from sleeping. Starting in 2000, we, together with 
some business enterprises, expressed our concerns about the smell to the 
government, and government agencies, such as SEPA and the Office of Letters 
and Calls of Beijing, replied to our complaints. At the end of 2005, several 
members of NPC and CPPCC visited the landfill and tabled the proposal during 
the NPC and CPPCC conferences. A few media outlets (including CCTV2) 
reported the news. But the smell of the landfill has not been resolved and is 
getting more serious.  
 
Moreover, at the end of 2006, we learned of the new development plan for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 “Build a Harmonious Community, Strongly Oppose the Building of an Incinerator in Liulitun” (共築和
諧社區 共建美好家園 強烈反對六裡屯建設垃圾焚燒場), Fenglin Mountain Villa Discussion Forum, 24 
December 2006. <http://house.focus.cn/msgview/1396/72041648.html> (Accessed 11 August 2013). 
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northern Haidian district, which includes a new waste-to-energy plant to be built 
next to the landfill in mid-March 2007. The plan has made us anxious about our 
environment and we suspect that the government has done nothing to deal with 
the smell. Others in the community have the same concerns: at the First Plenum 
of the 8th CPPCC of Haidian district on 14 December 2006, CPPCC members 
tabled the proposals ‘Proposal on Building Scientific Municipal Waste 
Management System’ (關於建立科學處理生活垃圾體系的建議) and ‘Proposal 
on Managing Liulitun Landfill’ (對六里屯垃圾填埋場環境整治的建議) to 
highlight the effects of the landfill on health, the ecosystem and development of 
the district and seek a solution for the smell of the landfill and municipal waste 
disposal. The former proposal, tabled by the Revolutionary Committee of the 
Chinese Kuomintang (中國國民黨革命委員會) of Haidian district, was against 
building the incinerator in Liulitan because tourism and R&D were the two major 
industries in the newly developed area and there were concerns about emissions 
from the incinerator polluting the area and damaging these industries. The latter 
proposal, written by the Jiu San (3 September) Society （九三學社）of Haidian 
district, investigated the problems with the landfill. The report showed that the 
smell of the landfill has been affecting the lives of the people and that polluted 
water is leaking from the landfill. In addition, the landfill does not meet the 
requirement that it was no less than 3 km from inhabited areas, and residents may 
thus be at risk.54 
 
We are encouraged to take further action: a website named ‘Landfill and the 
Environment’ is now open for discussions. We are studying the problems related 
to landfills around the world through the Internet, academic journals and friends. 
We understand that there is no perfect solution for managing waste, but the 
landfill was built and located up-wind of the inhabited areas and next to drinking 
water sources, and the proposed incinerator violates the ‘Standard for Pollution 
Control on the Municipal Waste Incineration’ (GWKB3-2000) and the 
‘Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China’. The proposed 
location of the incinerator violates the law because 1) it is located in the newly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Guo, S. (2006). “Smell of Liulitun Landfill is Being Criticised” (北京海澱區六里屯垃圾填埋場惡臭熏
人遭批評), Sohu.com, 15 December. <http://news.sohu.com/20061215/n247056064.shtml> (Accessed 11 
August 2013). 
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developed area of the northern district, less than 5 km from some important 
landmarks (for example, Zhongguancun Software Park and Beijing Space City), 
which affects investment in that area; 2) the incinerator is located to the 
northwest of Beijing City and pollutants such as dioxin are carried on the wind, 
affecting the community and sources of drinking water; and 3) the design and 
construction of the incinerator do not meet the expected standard. The cost of 
emissions tests and control is very high and the safety of the incinerator is in 
doubt.  
 
In addition, we have found discrepancies between design and operation in 
various incinerators in different parts of our country, and we also worry that the 
Liulitun incinerator will not be able to manage 1 million tonnes of garbage 
annually. Some of our residents visited the incinerators in Switzerland and 
Macau and learnt that strict regulations are adopted in operation and waste 
separation. Thus, it is impossible to burn the garbage safely without any 
separation and the smell cannot be avoided. What is more, dioxin is another 
problem that cannot be solved and some foreign countries, such as Japan, the U.S. 
and some European countries, have banned waste-burning. In addition, the 
incinerators in Shanghai and Shenzhen cities cannot meet the emission standards.  
 
On the whole, we think that the government has not solved the problems 
surrounding the landfill and that the decision to build an incinerator is wrong. 
We, the residents in Liulitun, oppose the building of this incinerator! 
Last but not least, the residents are looking forward to receiving an official 
response as soon as possible.  
 
Residents in Liulitun Community 
26 December 200655 (The original letter is in Chinese) 
 
The agencies received the complaint letter and the staff of the Municipal Environmental 
Protection Bureau indicated that they were not the sole department responsible for building 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 “After Studying the Opinions Given by Homeowners, the Promotion Group Responds to the Opposition 
to Building the Incinerator at Liulitun…”, (在認真學習和研究各位熱心業主的意見和建議後，宣傳組
對反對建六里屯垃圾焚燒廠申訴…), Fenglin Mountain Villa Discussion Forum, 27 December 2006. 
<http://bjmsg.focus.cn/msgview/1396/1/72368685.html> (Accessed 11 August 2013). 
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incinerators – that there were other departments involved, such as the Haidian district 
government, Beijing Municipal Commission of City Administration and Environment and the 
Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural Development. Later, a televised 
current affairs programme, Beijing Chamber (北京議事廳), reported that the mayor of Beijing, 
Mr Wang Qishan (now currently serving as Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection), had met with Beijing Municipal NPC members on 30 December 2006. One of the 
members told the mayor about the smell being generated by the landfill and questioned the 
project, given that the masses were so opposed. Mr Wang replied that it was difficult to find an 
appropriate location for an incinerator, as it would be opposed by those in the nearest community 
regardless, but that the country faced increasing volumes of waste. Mr Wang claimed that the 
government constantly tested the impacts of its operations, along with the influence of landfills 
and incinerators on the local community.56 His speech and the response from the Environmental 
Protection Bureau stoked the homeowners’ dissatisfaction, and they planned to mount another 
protest.  
 
The homeowners organised an exhibition in the community on 1-3 January 2007 that included 
posters showing the facts: the distances between Fenglin Mountain Villa, Baiwang Jasmine 
Garden and the proposed incinerator; the effects of incinerator construction; the laws by which 
the incinerator was illegal; and suggestions for action to oppose the incinerator project. They also 
collected more signatures for a petition and financial support from homeowners. This activity was 
not only supported by the inhabitants of these two residences but by their property management 
company and other nearby homes. They received the attention of Professor Lu Anhuai, a National 
CPPCC member from Peking University who promised to table this issue at the next NCPPCC 
meeting.  
 
The leadership core responsible for coordinating and planning the campaign was formed on 8 
January 2007. There were 15 members, and while they promoted the campaign within the 
community and encouraged more residents to join, they were all from Fenglin Mountain Villa 
and Baiwang Jasmine Garden. Their Internet user names, email addresses and residential areas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Tian, L. (2008). “After the Building of Liulitun Incinerator was Abandoned” (六里屯垃圾電廠’叫停’之
後), Environmental Protection Union (中國環保聯盟), 14 March. 
<http://www.epuncn.com/huanbao/5157.htm> (Accessed 12 August 2013). 
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were posted on the forum and they planned to re-submit the complaint letter to government 
agencies on 18 January 2007.57 
 
The district government held a meeting about the incinerator project on 17 January 2007 and 
invited the residents’ representatives. The chief of the Beijing Municipal Commission of City 
Administration and Environment, the landfill and incinerator directors, the chief of the Haidian 
Local Taxation Bureau and select environmental scientists also attended the meeting. The 
environmental scientists reiterated that incinerators were a safe and effective municipal waste 
management solution. In addition, the chief of the Beijing Municipal Commission of City 
Administration and Environment divulged that the location of the incinerator had been chosen 
following the comprehensive plan in 2004. His speech aroused anger among the residents because 
the location had never been disclosed, and they felt that the district government should have 
released the information before they chose to move into the area. Thus, they decided to launch 
their petition as planned on 18 January 2007. 
 
On 18 January 2007, the residents split into several groups and submitted complaint letters to 
various government agencies, including the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, 
the Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning and the Office of Letters and Calls of the 
Beijing Committee of the Communist Party of China. In the process of submitting the complaint 
letter to the Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning, the residents discovered that the 
incinerator project had obtained a land use permit and administrative license, but not a building 
permit. The residents hung banners opposing the incinerator’s construction around their 
residences, but a day later the Municipal Bureau of City Administration and Law Enforcement 
asked that the banners be removed. 
 
Although the district government faced opposition to its plans for the incinerator, it held a press 
conference about the incinerator project on 22 January 2007. At the press conference, the 
government did not mention the date of project commencement, but stated that it expected the 
date of operation to fall within 2008. The government emphasised that the incinerator would be 
safe.58 However, the residents engaged in a series of activities against the project. They appealed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 “Name List of Group against Incinerator in Liulitun” (反對在六里屯建垃圾焚燒廠活動核心小組名單), 
Fenglin Mountain Villa Discussion Forum, 8 January 2007. 
<http://house.focus.cn/msgview/1396/73702714.html> (Accessed 12 August 2013). 
58 “Liulitun Incinerator Expected to Operate Next Year” (六里屯垃圾焚燒廠有望明年運), NetEase, 24 
January 2007. <http://news.163.com/07/0124/05/35J1VTJ30001124J.html> (Accessed 12 August 2013). 
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to the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau on 11 February 2007 citing the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law and asked that the incinerator project be cancelled. In March 
2007, they also conducted a survey of opinions regarding the incinerator construction. The 
survey’s design was based on the EIA and they collected 387 responses from residents.59 
Meanwhile, they also contacted a solicitor, Xia Jun – an expert in environmental litigation – for 
legal advice. The district government held a second meeting with the residents on 2 March and 
reiterated that the project should continue. 
 
The opposition to the incinerator also attracted the attention of National CPPCC and NPC 
members, and the groups tabled their objections in their respective meetings in early March. 
However, the residents discovered that construction materials had been found on the proposed 
incinerator site on 26 March 2007, which they suspected of being illegal because the building 
permit had not been approved.60 The following month, the mass media reported on the opposition 
to the incinerator in Liulitun and widely discussed the management of municipal waste in Beijing. 
On 3 April 2007, the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau defended their decision 
to build the incinerator, which had been taken comprehensively, based on all legal procedures.61 
 
On 14 April 2007, the residents launched another action against the incinerator project. The 
Liulitun landfill held an open house to give people the chance to learn more about its waste 
management operation and the technology used. Three hundred residents took this opportunity to 
launch a campaign at the landfill. They held a banner that said, ‘Opposing the building of the 
incinerator’, and blocked the main entrance.62 The residents also responded in a letter to the 
response regarding the Administrative Reconsideration Law given by the Beijing Municipal 
Environmental Protection Bureau on 3 April and submitted the letter to SEPA on 16 April 2007. 
In the letter, the residents disagreed with the scientific information provided by the Beijing 
Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau and restated their rights to raise a complaint within a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Interview with Friends of Nature, in Beijing on 28 August 2013.  
60 “Forward: Emergency Notice about the Incinerator!”, (轉貼：關於焚燒廠的緊急通知!!!), Fenglin 
Mountain Villa Discussion Forum, 26 March 2007. <http://house.focus.cn/msgview/1396/79296462.html> 
(Accessed 12 August 2013). 
61 “Written Defence of Administrative Reconsideration from the Beijing Municipal Environmental 
Protection Bureau” (北京市環保局對我們提出的行政覆議的答辯書), Fenglin Mountain Villa Discussion 
Forum, 3 April 2007. <http://bjmsg.focus.cn/msgview/1396/80067659.html> (Accessed 13 August 2013). 
62 Wang, Q. (2007). “Residents Held Banner against the Building of the Incinerator” (居民手持標語要求
停建垃圾焚燒廠), sina.news.com.cn, 15 April. <http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2007-04-
15/013812779589.shtml> (Accessed 13 August 2013). 
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legally stipulated period of time.63 However, the proposed incinerator project was started on 18 
April 2007.64 This angered the residents and they launched another round of activism. They sent 
individual complaint letters to the deputy chief of SEPA, Mr Pan Yue (currently serving as Vice 
Minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection), who was in charge of the EIA, opposing 
the response to the Administrative Reconsideration Law on 3 April and asking for a re-evaluation 
of the impact of building the incinerator in Liulitun.65 On 20 April, the residents also held a rally 
outside the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau and demanded that the bureau’s 
chief step down. This time, their action generated results. The Beijing Municipal Commission of 
City Administration and Environment announced the postponement of the incinerator’s 
construction on 10 May 2007 due to the residents’ opposition.66 
 
The residents did not end their campaign there. They launched another rally on Earth Day (5 
June). One thousand residents wearing T-shirts with the slogan ‘Against the incinerator in 
Liulitun’ went to SEPA to demonstrate. Two days later, the deputy chief of SEPA suggested the 
postponement of the incinerator’s construction,67 and on 12 June 2007 SEPA officially announced 
the postponement, citing the Administrative Reconsideration Law. In the announcement, SEPA 
stated that there should have been wide public participation and study in the planning stage, and 
that the process should have been transparent. Once the project had been studied, it should have 
been sent to the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau for approval and publicity. 
Moreover, the study’s results should have been reported to SEPA, as a project cannot commence 
before being publicised and reported to SEPA.68 The following day, the Beijing Municipal 
Environmental Protection Bureau announced that the new standard of waste burning would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 “Residents Reply to the Written Defence from the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau” 
(居民對北京市環保局答辯狀的回復), Fenglin Mountain Villa Discussion Forum, 16 April 2007. 
<http://house.focus.cn/msgview/1396/81308392.html> (Accessed 13 August 2013).  
64 Ma, J. (2007). “Debates of Liulitun Incinerator” (六里屯垃圾焚燒廠引爭議), Jinghua.cn, 18 April. 
<http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2007-04/18/content_107002.htm> (Accessed 13 August 2013). 
65 Ma, J. (2007). “Debates of Liulitun Incinerator” (六里屯垃圾焚燒廠引爭議), Jinghua.cn, 18 April. 
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66 Guo, X. (2007). “The Liulitun Incinerator is Postponed” (六里屯焚燒廠延期開工), 10 May. Beijing 
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67Wang, C. “Anti-Incinerator Activism in Beijing: A Case Study” (北京反垃圾焚燒發電廠抗爭之案例分
析), Taipei Forum. <http://140.119.184.164/taipeiforum/award_pdf/11.php> (Accessed 13 August 2013). 
68 “State Environmental Protection Administration Announces the Administrative Reconsideration on the 
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implemented within a year, and that incinerator construction should meet the requirements of this 
new standard.69 
 
The anxiety surrounding the incinerator’s construction did not dissipate, however. Rather, it 
continued after the 2008 Olympic Games. Sina News reported (2008) that the Haidian District 
Commission of City Administration and Environment had chosen the location of the Liulitun 
incinerator and completed the first stage of the EIA, and that it would seek public opinion about 
the project. Meanwhile, the district government planned to build a food waste processing plant 
the following year.70 This news roused the homeowners again and they launched a petition in 
mid-October 2008. They sent letters to SEPA, the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection 
Bureau, the Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, the Beijing Municipal 
Commission of Urban Planning, the Beijing Municipal Commission of City Administration and 
Environment and Beijing’s mayor. In the letters, they restated their strong dissatisfaction with the 
incinerator project and demanded that it be suspended immediately. In November and December, 
the residents of Liulitun visited the municipal government ten times, but none of the 
governmental agencies responded to their request. The mass media abandoned the issue and were 
reluctant to report the campaign’s actions. Given this situation, it was difficult for the residents to 
express their opinion, so they had to plan their next action.71 
 
The controversy over the incinerator dragged on into 2009. The Municipal Commission of City 
Administration and Environment held a meeting with other departments on 3 February 2009 
about incinerator construction in Beijing. The office emphasised the necessity of incinerator 
construction in Beijing (the Liulitun incinerator was one of five planned) and of implementing 
more comprehensive municipal waste management solutions.72 More than 20 residents gathered 
and discussed the problems of burning waste and how to deal with the government’s decision.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 “Standard of Burning Waste in Beijing City will be Announced within this Year” (北京垃圾焚燒環保標
準目前正制定 年內就將發), China Economy.net, 13 June 2007. 
<http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/200706/13/t20070613_11721346_1.shtml> (Accessed 13 August 
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72 “The Head of the Beijing Municipal Commission of City Administration and Environment Held a 
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The residents planned to expose the government’s decision and their situation through mass 
media and the green NGOs. The mass media, however, was constrained from reporting this 
sensitive news and the residents instead sought assistance from the ENGOs. One of the residents 
in Liulitun, Ms Han, contacted Friends of Nature on 21 January 2009. Ms Han claimed that 
several ENGOs in Beijing had been contacted, but that none of them had provided assistance. 
Thus, she attempted to reach Friends of Nature through a personal contact. In her interview for 
this work, Ms Han explained that the municipal government had not suspended the incineration 
plan in Liulitun because 1) the municipal government planned to give RMB600 million (around 
US$96.3 million) to the Haidain district government for building the incinerator, and the project 
was thus perceived as the district’s main source of income; and 2) incineration had become the 
municipal government’s main solution for managing waste. She further recalled that the Liulitun 
residents felt frustrated, as they had been attempting to contact the government since November 
2008 but had not received any response. It was not easy for the residents to secure a place to 
discuss the issue within the community, as meetings were prohibited by the government or 
interrupted by the police. They also felt that they were being excluded from participating in the 
decision-making process regarding incinerator construction, and thus they had contacted the mass 
media and ENGOs for assistance. Moreover, the Liliutun residents suggested seeking help from 
overseas ENGOs to increase the pressure on the municipal government.73 However, Friends of 
Nature turned down this suggestion due to the political risk it posed.  
 
With the help of Friends of Nature, the residents launched a discussion forum on 19 February 
2009. Dozens of residents attended the forum and environmental scientists, such as Zhao 
Yuanzhang, an expert in municipal waste management, were invited to speak and consult. The 
forum mainly focused on the problems of waste burning and the possible solutions for managing 
waste in the city. Zhao pointed out the challenges of burning waste in China, including deficient 
monitoring, the multi-interests behind the project and incomprehensive waste sorting. He further 
encouraged the residents in their actions. The residents were inspired and planned a website to 
publicise the problem of burning waste. They proposed that the website include the history of 
their campaign, the environmental laws and regulations, information from environmentalists and 
material that would help them defend their environmental rights. In February 2009, they also sent 
another petition letter with 10,000 signatures to the same government agencies to express their 
dissatisfaction and to request that the district government listen to the people.74 As a result, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Telephone interview with Ms Han on 12 April 2014.  
74 Interview with a resident in Beijing on 26 August 2013.  
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deputy head of the Haidian District Commission of City Administration and Environment met 
with them to discuss the incinerator construction in Liulitun in July 2009. He denied that the 
location of the incinerator had already been confirmed and claimed that the agency was still 
assessing the risks of incinerator construction.75 
 
After the petition, Friends of Nature organised waste sorting programmes in two residential 
complexes – Baiwang Jasmine Garden and Fenglin Mountain Villa – in the Liliutun community. 
The programmes were so successful that they expanded to other communities in May 2009. 
Friends of Nature also provided residents in the landfill area and several communities in Liulitun 
with environmental education. With the exception of Fenglin Mountain Villa, other residents and 
property management companies were delighted by the work of Friends of Nature. In addition, 
the work in Baiwang Jasmine Garden was suspended by the district government due to the 
outbreak of the Chinese Jasmine Revolution in February 2011.76 
 
A breakthrough came on 19 January 2011. The Haidian district government announced that a new 
location for the incinerator had been found in Sujiatuo town (蘇家坨), and they abandoned the 
plans for Liulitun.77 Finally, the campaign in Liulitun, which had lasted for over four years, 
concluded and the residents dismissed the anti-incinerator group. 
 
6.3 Post-activism: What is Going on in Liulitun? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 “Responding to the Opposition of Residents, the Liulitun Incinerator will Move to a New Location” (北
京六里屯垃圾焚燒廠因民眾反對將另行選新址), Chinanews.com, 4 February 2010. 
<http://www.chinanews.com/sh/news/2010/02-04/2108339.shtml> (Accessed 14 August 2013). 
76 Affected by the Jasmine Revolution in Africa in 2010, Chinese citizens called for ‘stalks’ under the same 
name in February 2011. Various places in China such as Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Shenzhen 
launched the same activity between mid-February and mid-March 2011. In the activity, the Chinese 
advocated freedom of speech and the end of one-party dictatorship in China. Friends of Nature launched a 
waste-sorting programme in Baiwang Jasmine Garden, but the residency’s name was considered sensitive 
by the authorities, who worried that it might be the place used to organise the Chinese Jasmine Revolution. 
Thus, the waste-sorting programme was suspended. Source: Interview with Zhang Boju, CEO of Friends of 
Nature, in Beijing in February 2014.  
77 Compared with the incinerator project in Liulitun, there was little opposition in Sujiatuo town because 
the location was far from residential areas. The incinerator was expected to be built in June 2015. (Source: 
Web of construction bidding in China (中國招標網), 
<http://www.jszhaobiao.com/projectdetail/27806011.html> (Accessed 8 May 2014).  
“Non-Stop Debates about the Building of the Liulitun Incinerator for 4 Years, the Government Restarts 
Public Participation” (4年裡六里屯垃圾焚燒廠建設紛爭不斷，政府重啟公眾參與程式), Beijing 
Environment and Resources Society (北京市法學會環境資源法研究會), 31 March 2011. 
<http://www.bjelf.com/news/bencandy.php?fid=47&aid=701&page=3> (Accessed 14 August 2013). 
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In the last section, development of protest is introduced and showed the complex dynamics 
among the policy actors over building incinerator in Liulitun. Either “pro-burn” or “anti-burn” 
coalitions used environmental laws, as well as scientific knowledge to affect the building 
decision. In this and following sections, the struggle of building a “zero-waste community” 
among policy actors in post-activism is shown: On one hand, the municipal government 
implemented relevant municipal waste management measures to the city; on the other hand, the 
green group initiated “zero-waste campaign” for encouraging residents to do waste sorting in the 
community.  
Although the incinerator project was relocated to Sujiatuo in 2011, Liulitun continued to 
experience severe air pollution. A concrete plant, owned by BBMG Group (金隅集團, a listed 
national construction enterprise) was built in 2009 next to the Liulitun landfill and the 
surrounding the villages. The plant did not undergo an EIA before construction and the villagers 
complained to the Haidian district government. The government replied that because the plant 
was on industrial land, it did not have to conduct an EIA.78 The villagers then turned to BBMG 
and opposed the plant. Eventually, the enterprise compensated them by building a road in the 
village that bypasses the concrete plant and connects to the main road; forming a recreational 
group for the elderly in the villages; installing street lights in the villages; and promising to clean 
the streets regularly. In June 2013, BBMG also initiated the formation of the Green Environment 
Monitoring Group, and five cadres from the villages were invited to serve as volunteers. The 
BBMG also provided an office inside the plant. The volunteers were responsible for reporting on 
the air quality in the villages to the plant manager and for reminding the company to clean the 
streets regularly. The group did not register under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but the volunteers 
insisted that it had a legal status.79 The villagers commented that the Green Environment 
Monitoring Group’s formation was a ‘win-win situation’ because the enterprise obtained a good 
reputation and increased profits and the villagers’ living conditions improved.80 The villagers also 
commented that their goal (to remove the incinerator) had been reached, and that they thus had no 
plans for further action.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 This has revealed a loophole in existing EIA Law in China. Article 8 of the law lists which projects are 
required to undergo EIAs, including industrial-related projects, but it does not mention that land use should 
be specified. Thus, the officials used the loophole to allow the construction of a concrete plant in Liulitun.   
79 In the interview, the volunteers claimed that the group is legal because the EIA Law gives it legal status. 
In Article 5, the state encourages the public to participate in EIA Law.  
80 Interview with the volunteers of Green Environment Group in Liulitun, Beijing in January 2014.  
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6.4 Municipal Waste Management in Beijing after the Activism  
Following the anti-incinerator protests in Lilitun, the municipal government implemented a series 
of measurements for reducing the volume of waste in the city, including a waste sorting 
programme, incinerator construction and garbage charges. Meanwhile, waste burning remained 
one of the major waste management solutions in Beijing. Other locations such as Gaoantun (高安
屯), Asuwei (阿蘇衛) and Nangong (南宮) planned to build incinerators. In November 2011, the 
municipal government promulgated ‘Regulations on Municipal Waste Management for Beijing 
City’, which was the first legal document on managing municipal waste in the country. The 
regulations highlighted the responsibilities of the citizens, authorities and corporations, and 
classified the waste into four treatment categories: 1) food waste for waste compost and biogas 
generation; 2) glass, paper and plastic for recycling; 3) non-recyclable waste for incineration; and 
4) hazardous waste for landfills. In January 2011, the government planned to promote a trial 
waste sorting programme in 1,200 communities within 5 years. Waste charges by volume were 
also suggested, and took effect in March 2012. 81  Later, Beijing’s municipal government 
implemented the ‘Three-Year Plan of Municipal Waste Facilities for Beijing City’ (北京市生活
垃圾處理設施建設三年實施方案), with an implementation date of April 2013. In this three-year 
plan, the government expected the municipal waste problem to be solved by 2015 through waste 
burning (70%) and landfill (30%). Thus, incinerators and food waste plants became mainstream 
ways of resolving future waste problems.82 
 
In contrast, after the Liliutun activism, green groups began promoting waste sorting. Famous 
Beijing-based ENGOs such as Friends of Nature and Nature University (自然大學) began to 
organise several activities advocating zero waste in the city. For example, both Nature University 
and Friends of Nature have used policies to halt incinerator construction, in addition to launching 
waste sorting programmes in residential communities. In 2011, the green groups established the 
country-wide ‘zero-waste alliance’ (零廢棄聯盟) to promote nationwide zero-waste status 
through cooperation between governments, businesses, citizens, social groups and academia. In 
August 2013, for example, the alliance invited Luo Jiangming (Internet pseudonym 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Sun, Q. (2011). “Waste Levy by Volume Turns to Regulation” (Duoreng laji cheng fagui), 19 November, 
Beijing Times (Jinghua Shibao). Available at: < http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2011-
11/19/content_731585.htm> (Accessed 20 January 2014).  
82 “Regulation for Municipal Waste Management in Beijing” (2013-2015), (Beijing Shi Shenghuo Laji 
Chuli sheshi jiangche sanlian shisi fangan). Available at: 
http://210.75.193.158/gate/big5/zhengwu.beijing.gov.cn/ghxx/qtgh/t1312026.htm (Accessed 20 January 
2014).  
	   89	  
‘Basuofengyu’, 巴索風雲), one of the founders of Eco-Canton, to share his experience in 
promoting waste sorting in Guangzhou.  
 
Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter examined the development of anti-incinerator activism in Beijing, from when the 
Liulitun citizens objected to the construction of an incinerator nearby and launched protests, to 
the municipal government’s decision to cancel the planned construction and relocate the 
incinerator. This four-year protest was significant in relation to similar instances of activism in 
other parts of China in that it was the first anti-incinerator activism in China and the first time the 
government responded by relocating the incinerator (Hsu 2010:6). Since then, anti-incinerator 
activism has emerged nationwide in places such as Guangzhou, Gaoantun (Beijing), Asuwei 
(Beijing), Nanjing and Shanghai. Anti-incinerator activism has revealed the varied concerns of 
the state and society, and I use the ACF in this section to summarise the decisions of the 
protestors and the government and show how they influenced the decision-making process. First 
of all, the municipal government suspended the plan of building  the incinerator as a response to 
the protest, which has shown the feature of decentralised governing structure at local level in 
China. As discussed in previous chapters, the local governments enjoy a certain degree of 
autonomy in public policy making and making policy changes. As such, the authorities are able to 
suspend any policy to respond the protest for minimising political and economic costs. The policy 
actors have played their roles for seeking policy change and the ACF help us to understand their 
dynamics in the process of policy change.  
 
In the case at hand, four groups of stakeholders with different concerns about the Liulitun 
incinerator were identified: the Beijing and Haidian district governments, the citizens, the ENGOs 
and the epistemic community. Two coalitions – pro- and anti-incinerator – were formed around 
different beliefs systems. Both the Beijing and Haidian district governments and some pro-
incinerator scientists planned to build an incinerator to solve the municipal waste management 
issue. The pro-incinerator coalition did not change their minds after the activism. Given that the 
city generates 18,000 tonnes of garbage every day, Beijing’s municipal government considered 
incineration to be the most effective solution for reducing the volume of solid waste in the city. 
Meanwhile, Liulitun residents, i.e. the ‘victims’ in the incinerator project exhibiting NIMBY 
syndrome, opposed the incinerator in their neighbourhood and thus were the major policy actors 
in the anti-incinerator coalition. The Liultun residents can be classified into two types: the 
residents who were living in the poor villages near to the planned incinerator location, and the 
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new, incoming residents surrounding the incinerator. Both of these groups opposed the project 
and asked for its relocation, but the incoming residents played a more significant role in the 
activism. The new residents were mainly from the newly built communities such as Fenglin 
Mountain Villa and Baiwang Jasmine Garden, both built in 2005, and most were retired cadre 
members and professionals with good educations, high incomes and experience fighting the 
government. These new residents used their knowledge and personal networks to further the 
cause. They acted on their knowledge of their rights and of how to submit petitions. They 
contacted CPPCC and NPC members to bring residents’ opinions to the attention of the top levels 
of government. They met with lawyers to discuss litigation and invited scientists and other 
experts to provide information on the hazards of incinerators. They also initiated and organised 
the anti-incinerator protests. Hence, both the anti- and pro-incinerator coalitions were clearly 
identified in the incinerator policy subsystem, through clear beliefs and abundant resources.  
Social networks were one of the most important resources for the anti-incinerator coalition, which 
had to deal with asymmetric power compared with the state actors. Most of the residents in 
Lilitun were retired cadre members and professionals, which meant that they had strong social 
networks through which to enhance their negotiation power in the policy change process. The 
NPC and CPPCC members, for example, wielded a notable level of power in the activism that 
influenced the outcomes. As both NPC and CPPCC members are part of the ‘ruling elite’ in the 
context of socialist China, with the former responsible for law-making and supervising 
governmental work and the latter involved in ‘political consultation on state’s policies’ and 
‘democratic supervision through proposals and criticisms’,83 their influence over public policies 
such as the incinerator project in Liulitun was significant. The Liulitun residents contacted them 
with the expectation that they could affect the government’s decision. In addition, some NPC 
members were living in the residencies and were thus victims. Hence, it is not surprising that the 
NPC and CPPCC members tabled concerns about the effects of incinerators on human health and 
the ecosystem in the district’s CPPCC meetings.  
 
In the policy-oriented learning process, scientific and technical information was used in both the 
pro- and anti-incinerator coalitions. The protesters used legal knowledge to defend their rights. 
First, they discussed the activism strategies at their residences. Then, they posted their opinions 
and called for action through social media, such as their online discussion forums. Unlike the new 
residents, the villagers who lived close to the landfill and planned incinerator location initially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 “The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee”. Available at: 
http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2012/07/03/ARTI1341301557187103.shtml (Accessed 1 February 2014).  
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appeared to accept the incinerator construction. They were weak in opposing any governmental 
decisions, and while they did participate in the anti-incinerator protests, it is notable that they 
later accepted the construction and operation of a concrete plant nearby. The Lilitun residents did 
not have any further plans for action once the incinerator was relocated, such as promoting or 
engaging in a waste recycling programme. 84  The contradictions regarding the effects of 
incineration were found among the epistemic communities of both coalitions. The scientists 
mainly debated the technology of incineration and its effects on human health and the ecosystem. 
Their debates were either pro- or anti-incineration. The Liulitun residents had invited Zhao 
Yuanzhang, a famous anti-incineration scientist, to consult, and his scientific data on the 
consequences of incineration became strong evidence in the petition letters. The government, in 
contrast, invited the pro-incineration scientists to support the planned construction by focusing on 
the problems stemming from an overload of waste. All of the scientists involved used a variety of 
scientific information and overseas experience to prove the strengths and weaknesses of 
incineration, which led to wider social discussions. Representatives of the mass media, such as 
Southern Weekend and China Central Television (CCTV), reported on the debates among the 
scientists, and while no consensus was reached on the safety of incineration, their discussions 
enlightened and enriched the development of civil society in China.   
 
Under the pressure exerted by protesters, the municipal government suspended incinerator 
construction and imposed several measures for waste reduction that were perceived as policy 
change, such as the Outline for National Economic and Social Development in the Tenth FYP, 
the Outline for National Economic and Social Development in the Eleventh FYP and the 
Regulations on Municipal Waste Management (2011). These measures were designed to reduce 
the volume of waste in the city and set up a more comprehensive waste management system, and 
the government has been active in implementing them. Since the protests, a more comprehensive 
waste management system has been established, including garbage charges and trial waste sorting 
programmes in dozens of communities.  
 
According to the ACF, in the Beijing case, specific factors drove the municipal government to 
enact policy change. First, the changes in economic and cultural values and those in public 
opinion fostered the rise of environmental awareness at the society level. Having explored the 
stakeholders’ concerns, it is clear that the activism in Liulitun was not a typical NIMBY 
campaign, which can usually be described as an emotional, and selfish action (McAvoy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Interview with the volunteers of Green Environment Group in Liulitun, Beijing in January 2014.  
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1998:275) aimed at removing unpopular nearby facilities. The protesters in the Beijing case 
challenged the NIMBY stereotype in that they prepared well and expressed their dissatisfaction to 
the government by producing scientific data on the hazardous effects of incineration. 
Nevertheless, the residents did not take further action after the suspension of incinerator 
construction, such as promoting a ‘zero-waste’ model in their communities.  
Second, Beijing’s municipal government responded to the pressure applied by the protesters by 
suspending the planned incinerator construction and implementing waste reduction measures. As 
Cai (2010) notes, the local government’s policy changes were a response to the collective 
activism with the aim of maintaining the social order. When faced with the pressure of several 
protests and widespread media reporting, both the district and municipal governments were 
forced to suspend and relocate the incinerator in response to the grievances of the Lilitun 
protesters. Then, later, a solid waste management programme was implemented as proof of the 
governments’ efforts to maintain social order and legitimacy.  
 
I made the following observations in relation to the Beijing case study. Although the government 
stopped the incinerator construction in Liulitun as a response to the residents’ demands, it still 
manipulated the waste management policy without public involvement. The protest did not 
influence public participation in policy-making processes; that is, citizens still suffer from a lack 
of channels through which they can participate in decision-making related to waste management, 
with the exception of EIA Law. Thus, anti-incinerator protests continue to crop up in other 
districts of Beijing, such as Gaoantun and Asuwei. Moreover, the work of green groups has not 
changed much since the Liulitun activism. Limited by the existing political system, green groups 
are unable to play a role in monitoring the government. Instead, they play a non-confrontational 
role in areas such as education, policy advocacy and the establishment of waste-sorting and 
recycling programmes in the community. As such, citizens rarely seek help from the ENGOs and 
green groups and thus do not benefit from their mediating role between government and society. 
In ACF, coalition opportunity structure affects policy subsystem also found in this case. 
Suggested by Sabatier and Weible (2007), coalition opportunity structure mediates stable system 
parameters and exogenous factors which affect the policymaking within the subsystem (Sabatier 
and Weible 2007: 1999). In this case, the decentralised governing structure provides a stable 
system parameters and the exogenous factors in the society, such as the change of public opinion 
and economic condition, have affected the attitudes of building incinerator among the Liulitun 
citizens. The economic growth leads to create middle class, who are living near the proposed 
incinerator location, understood the negative impacts of incinerator to the health and the 
	   93	  
environment. Thus, they did studies to collect the evidences to show hazardous of incinerator, 
used environmental laws to protect their rights, and connected NPC / CPPCC members and 
journalists to express their grievances.  
 
In this work, I explore the power that the citizens in the studied cases wielded when fighting en 
mass against incinerator pollution and for the right to participate in the policy process. In the case 
of Liliutun, the residents launched protests and successfully stopped the incinerator construction 
in their community; specifically, Beijing’s municipal government acknowledged their demands 
and relocated the incinerator. After the anti-incinerator activism, however, the government did 
not create a mechanism that would allow the public to participate in decision-making processes. 
Although Beijing’s municipal government is still assuming a leadership role in planning and 
building incinerators around the city, neither citizens nor ENGOs are able to monitor the 
government’s actions. Consequently, similar anti-incinerator activism has emerged in other parts 
of China. The ACF was also used to identify the structure of advocacy coalitions and their beliefs 
within policy subsystems, and the factors driving policy change have been discussed above.  
All in all, the case study further exposes the limitations of Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
when explaining the dynamics of policy process in PRC in two ways. First, the local governments 
have apparently enjoyed certain degree of discretion when putting forward the decrees from the 
Central People’s Government (CPG) in public policymaking and implementation. The Beijing 
government, as a municipality directly under the CPG in PRC,    have actively responded to the 
public outcries and protests against the incinerator proposal and eventually retrieved its decision. 
Regardless the reasons for the ‘concession’ from government, the case simply contradicts to the 
most fundamental presumption of the ACF that is not likely to take place in the ‘nondemocratic 
regimes’. The case shows the Beijing government, together with those economically prosperous 
municipalities, may be blessed by the CPG and could be more autonomous in policy implantation 
so as to minimise ‘political’ and ‘economic’ costs. Secondly, the ACF argues for the attention to 
the coalition within environmental policy subsystem. The members in “anti-burn coalition’ are all 
from a social network that is composed of middle class professionals and retired cadre members 
who maintain smooth and strong interactions with the government. Some activists are even 
former actors in governance (delegates of the CCPCC in this case) and they have skilfully 
collaborated with the non-fully autonomous mass media to put pressure on government. This 
further reveals the imperfection of the ACF in explaining the policy process in PRC- in 
particularly in the environmental agenda as I argued in the previous chapters, as the well-received 
conceptual construct appears paying insufficient regard to the central-peripheral power dynamics 
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in policy process in an unitary political system in Asia; as well as the different pattern of civil 
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Chapter 7  
The Anti-incinerator Movement in Guangzhou: From Activism to a Consultative 
Committee 
 
7.1 Background  of Activism 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the anti-incinerator activism in Beijing Liulitun has 
encouraged the emergence of anti-incinerator activism in other parts of China, such as 
Guangzhou Panyu. In this chapter, the ACF is used to understand the development of anti-
incinerator activism, as well as the complex dynamics among the policy actors in Guangzhou 
Panyu. 
 
Guangzhou (in Canton), located in the south of China, is the political, economic and political 
centre of Guangdong province. Guangzhou covers an area of 7,434 km2 and has a population of 8 
million, of whom over 67% were permanent residents in 2011.85 The city is divided into ten 
districts (Yuexiu, Haizhu, Liwan, Tianhe, Baiyun, Huangpu, Huadu, Panyu, Nansha and 
Luogang) and two county-level cities (Conghua and Zengcheng). As a result of economic 
development, the GDP per capita for Guangzhou reached US$13,000 in 2011. It is one of the 
wealthiest cities in the country, with both secondary and tertiary industries (such as automobile 
manufacturing, tourism, business and exhibitions) making key contributions to the city’s 
economy. Guangzhou was one of first trading ports to the western modern world in the Qing 
Dynasty (1644-1911). Later on, Guangzhou became the leased territory of Britain and France 
until the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949 and it has been seen as the first 
page of history to connect modern world. In addition, Guangzhou was a pioneer city in 
Guangdong province in the early reform period. Guangzhou reformed its price system in 1978, 
the year of the Open Door Policy in China, and changed to a market-oriented system. The city 
also implemented a shareholder system in the late 1990s and became one of most marketised 
places in the country.86 Thus, Guangzhou is described as an ‘open city’ with a relatively 
pluralistic society in terms of its economic, social and cultural perspective (Chan 1999:265).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Factsheet, Guangzhou Government, 
<http://english.gz.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/gzgoven/s9148/201104/789512.html> (Accessed 1 
December 2013).  
86 “Local Chronicles of Guangzhou”, <http://www.gzsdfz.org.cn/rsgz/kfqy/201311/t20131120_8391.htm> 
(Assessed 1 December 2013).  
	   96	  
This ‘open city’ has also been described as ‘a place of social activism’ (Zhang 2013:104) due to 
its geographical location. Guangzhou is close to Hong Kong (about 130 km), with which it shares 
close economic and social ties. The cities share a common dialect (Cantonese), they are linked by 
flow of population (thousands of people have fled to Hong Kong since the establishment of 
socialist China in 1949) and Hong Kong’s popular culture affects the lifestyles and mentalities of 
Guangzhou’s communities. The ‘open mentality’ exhibited in Guangzhou has influenced civil 
society and associational life. Moreover, Guangzhou’s government has shown more tolerance 
towards the growth of NGOs and their tendency towards being openly confrontational (Chan 
1999:265). This more tolerant nature is also reflected in the strong social activist presence. In an 
interview for this work, Luo Jingming (Internet pseudonym ‘Basuofengyun’ 巴索風雲) and Chen 
Xiaoyun, both of whom participated in anti-incinerator protests and other social activism, agreed 
that Guangzhou’s government had never suppressed a rally.87  
 
Regarding the development of civil society in Guangzhou, 5,967 grassroots NGOs were 
registered at the Bureau of Civil Affairs of Guangzhou Municipality in 2013,88 and their members 
include elderly service, environmental protection, migrant, women’s rights and healthcare 
workers. These social groups play roles in education and welfare service provision. However, the 
rise of NGOs in Guangzhou and the demonstrations in Hong Kong seeking democracy have also 
affected the people in Guangzhou, encouraging them to enthusiastically defend their rights. 
Topics related to social activism, similar to those in other places in the country, include labour 
rights, land acquisition and urban management. The strong sense of local identity amongst the 
people in Guangzhou has also been discussed. For example, thousands of people took a ‘stroll’ to 
protest a proposed increase in Mandarin programming across Guangzhou TV in July 2010 – 
referred to as the ‘Preserving Cantonese Incident’ (保衛 語事件).89 Such social activism in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Interviews with Luo Jingming and Chen Xiaoyun in Guangzhou on 23 January 2014.  
88 “Annual Report of Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau”, Guangzhou 2013. Available at: 
<http://www.gzmz.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/GZ09/8.1/201403/2630481.html> (Accessed 1 
February 2014).  
89 In June 2010, the CPPCC Guangzhou Committee conducted an online survey suggesting that Mandarin 
be the broadcasting medium for TV and raising debates on preserving Cantonese. The CPPCC members 
asserted that Mandarin is the best way to understand the country. Starting in mid-July, protesters gathered 
at the exit of one of the underground stations in Guangzhou, but the exit was blocked by the police. 
Although the gathering was forced to cancel, hundreds of people still gathered at the station exit. A month 
later, thousands of people gathered in a park in defence of Cantonese and three people were arrested. At the 
same time, in Hong Kong, two hundred people joined a demonstration to support the ‘stalk’ in Guangzhou. 
The incident showed that local identity is strong in Guangzhou. Source: Wikipedia (Chinese version), 
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Guangzhou is the focus of my second case study, with the people’s ‘open mentality’ and the 
government’s tolerance as leading examples of political reform in China (Chan 1999:265).  
 
There are 24 ENGOs in Guangzhou founded by the government (GOENGOs), and they are 
mainly green business associations and green societies.90  The total number of ENGOs in 
Guangzhou is unidentified. Even the government has not publicised the exact number registered. 
According to a survey by the Green Society Environmental Action Network (濟溪環境交流網
路), an ENGO in Chongqing, there are 27 ENGOs (including official, registered and grassroots 
environmental groups) in the city.91 The history of ENGO development in Guangzhou is short 
compared to that in Beijing. The first registered ENGO, the Guangzhou Green Point 
Environmental Welfare Association (Green Point, 綠點), was founded in 2003 by a group of 
university students to provide environmental education services to the government, business 
groups and other NGOs. Bike Guangzhou (拜客廣州), another famous ENGO established in 
2009, advocates green transportation and builds bike lanes. However, the Guangzhou green 
groups are facing similar challenges to those troubling other parts of China, the most important of 
which is the local government’s tendency to prioritise economic development over environmental 
protection. The ENGOs prefer to adopt non-radical, non-confrontational and self-contained 
strategies to minimise political risk in the context of authoritarian China (Sun and Zhao 
2008:160), and their weakness drives the environmental campaigns led by citizens. 
 
Similar to other places in China, environmental deterioration is a severe problem in this wealthy 
city. According to a public poll conducted in 2013, 20% of people are dissatisfied with the current 
environmental situation in Guangzhou, mainly in relation to air (38%) and water (41%) 
conditions, respectively. The poor enforcement of environmental rules was also mentioned in the 
poll results (32%).92 The Ministry of Environmental Protection pointed out that the air pollutants 
in Guangzhou, mainly PM2.5 and ozone, exceed the national standards, with industries in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Action for Supporting Cantonese in Guangzhou, 2010” (2010年廣州撐粵語行動), 
<http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010%E5%B9%B4%E5%BB%A3%E5%B7%9E%E6%92%90%E7%B2%B
5%E8%AA%9E%E8%A1%8C%E5%8B%95> (Accessed 31 March 2014).  
90 Guangdong Environmental Web. Available at: < http://www.gepf.org.cn/> (Accessed 1 February 2014).  
91 Jingqi Environmental Web. Available at: <http://epo.gsean.org/> (Accessed 13 February 2014). 
92 This survey was conducted by the Canton Public Opinion Research Centre, a non-profit organisation in 
Guangzhou. Please note that the sample size is not mentioned in this survey. Available at: <http://www.c-
por.org/index.php?c=news&a=baogaodetail&id=2301&pid=10> (Accessed 13 February 2014).  
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suburban areas and urban vehicle emissions as the main sources.93 Zhujiang (Pearl River) and 
cross-border pollution between Guangzhou and Foshan City are the main locations of water 
pollution. Illegal dumping from woodwork, plastics and paper-making factories and illegal 
livestock farming along the border create water pollution in the city. Municipal waste is another 
environmental issue in Guangzhou that is discussed in this work. The city generates 10.4 
thousand tonnes of waste per day, with incineration and landfills used as waste management 
solutions. Currently, two landfills and one incinerator are set up in the city, with 90% of waste 
delivered to the landfills,94 which are expected to be full in 3 years.95 Incinerator construction is 
seen as an alternative way to reduce waste in the city. The severe environmental situation in 
Guangzhou and the weak ENGOs explain the rise of environmental campaigns and consciousness 
among its citizens, who expressed their opposition to incinerator construction. These citizens 
were also dissatisfied with the lack of opportunities to participate in decision-making processes 
and the lack of accessible information about the incinerator. The citizens who participated in the 
street protests revealed the deficiency of the non-confrontational strategies favoured by 
environmentalists in the past.  
 
Apparently in the analytical terms of ACF, decentralised governing structure and socio-economic 
condition of Guangzhou are significant factors in affecting the change of incinerator building 
policy. The growing of social groups in Guangzhou implies an “opened political opportunity 
structure” that the government tolerates diversified interests thrive in a society. In the next section 
of this chapter, the anti-incinerator activism in Panyu, Guangzhou is discussed, demonstrating the 
aforementioned rise of environmental activism.  
 
7.2 The Rise of Activism in Panyu 
In the analytical terms of ACF, two coalitions are found in the anti-incinerator activism in Panyu 
case, “Pro-incinerator” and “Anti-incinerator” coalitions, with different policy beliefs. Similar to 
the case of Beijing Liulitun, the coalitions of Panyu have been struggling the concerns between 
urban management and sustainable development for the next generation. The “Pro-incinerator” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 “The top 10 most air pollution cities, Guangzhou exceeds the standard” (十大空气最差城市， 广州未
上榜但空气污染超标), Fang.com (10 March 2014), <http://news.gz.soufun.com/2014-03-
10/12265386_all.html> [Access 3 January 2014]. 
94 People’s Daily. (2013). 26 August. Available at: http://gd.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2013/0826/c123932-
19390670.html (Accessed 20 February 2014).  
95 “Insufficient Land for Disposal Waste in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Laji Bufenxiao sanlianhou modi 
ketie), Ifeng.com. Available at: http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2013_04/24/24569734_0.shtml 
(Accessed 3 January 2014).  
	   99	  
coalition comprised of municipal and district government officials, and scientists, who support 
the build of incinerator for reducing the municipal waste volume in the city; while the “Anti-
incinerator” coalition formed by residents, journalist, “anti-burn” scientist, environmentalists, and 
environmental lawyer. They expressed their concerns over the impacts of building incinerator to 
the health and the environment; in addition, the government never informed the incinerator plan 
to the residents nearby and the residents have not been invited to participate in the decision 
making process. The competing coalitions used both scientific and technological information to 
revise policy objectives in the policy-oriented learning process.  
Panyu, a highly urbanised district in the south-east of Guangzhou, was the proposed location for 
an incinerator. Panyu covers an area of 1,314 km2 and had a population of 1.8 million in 2011. 
Several landmarks are found in this district, including Guangzhou University and Chimelong 
Xiangjiang Safari Park. In addition, various famous and new residential complexes such as 
Riverside Garden, Clifford Estates and Huanan Country Garden96 are located in this district 
within 6 km of the proposed incinerator site. The closest residential area to the proposed site is 
just 1 km away. The Panyu district government posted the plans for the incinerator project in 
February 2009, with the expectation that construction would be completed in 2010. The 
municipal government cited the Likeng incinerator in the Baiyun district as an ‘outstanding 
example’, and claimed in their promotional materials that the proposed incinerator would use the 
same technology. Initially, the proposal did not receive much attention from local residents (Kuo 
and Chen 2011:102).  
In September 2009, the Municipal Urban Management Bureau confirmed the incinerator project 
and the land was requisitioned while the EIA was launched. The residents learned from a 
government website that a waste incinerator power plant was going to be built, and posted the 
information on an online residential discussion forum, ‘Jiangwaijiang’ (江外江論壇 , 
http://www.rg-gd.net/forum.php?mod=forumdisplay&fid=12) that opposed the incinerator project. 
The news spread quickly and several online discussion forums posted the same message 
protesting the incinerator construction. The information on the government website revealed that 
the Panyu district government had proposed and approved the construction of a waste-to-energy 
incinerator in 2004, and that the Guangzhou Planning Bureau had approved the location in 2006, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Most of the residents living in these residential complexes were government officials, business 
professionals, teachers and journalists. Riverside Garden has 40,000 households and is home to most of the 
journalists from the Southern Metropolis Daily, a Guangzhou-based tabloid considered to be the most 
‘outspoken’ newspaper in China. In addition, the residents of Riverside Garden are experienced in social 
activism, having campaigned against road construction in 2002 and fought for a residents-based 
homeowners’ association in 2004 (Kuo and Chen 2011:101-102). Thus, intensive interaction between 
journalists and activists took place in this anti-incinerator campaign.  
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without the residents’ knowledge. The government had not consulted the public, from the time of 
implementation through the time of approval. The residents also learned that the proposed 
location was less than 6 km from residential complexes. In the following days, the residents sat 
together to study the incinerator’s effects and discussed what, if any, action to take. Later, on 13 
and 14 October 2009, the residents took to the streets of the district with a petition and distributed 
handbills about the problems associated with incinerators, seeking public support.  
 
Alongside these actions, the residents organised a visit to the Likeng (李坑) waste-to-energy plant 
located in Baiyun district (白雲區, a northern suburb of Guangzhou city). The Likeng incinerator 
was the first in the city and was hailed as an exemplar by the municipal government.97 However, 
the Panyu residents found that the incinerator exuded a noxious smell into the surrounding area, 
and expressed their worries about the technology. Likeng incinerator was built on what had 
previously been a landfill site that had seriously polluted the underground water, affecting a 
nearby village. The environmental deterioration continued even after the landfill was closed in 
2004. The incinerator was built in 2005, at a distance of less than 300 m from local houses. The 
smell and dust from the incinerator spread over the village; moreover, the media had publicised 
its effect on the health of the local populace. Sixty-two cases of cancer had been reported in this 
village of 8,000 people, with 42 people dying between 2005 and 2009. The villagers believed that 
the cancer was related to emissions from the incinerator.98 The Panyu residents expressed their 
sympathy to the villagers and reiterated their belief that banning the Panyu incinerator project was 
necessary. They made a documentary entitled, ‘Who can save you, people in Likeng?’ (誰來拯救
你，李坑人民), and uploaded it to the Internet to publicise the hazardous effects of incinerators 
(Kuo and Chen 2011:104).  
 
Some days later, a group of residents carrying a letter stating their concerns and a thousand 
signatures visited the Guangzhou Municipal Bureau for Environment and Hygiene (now renamed 
the Guangzhou Municipal Urban Management Committee). The agency promised to reply within 
two months. In the letter, the residents expressed their dissatisfaction with the plans to build the 
incinerator without public consultation, and requested that the agency disclose the details of the 
EIA process and cancel the project. In the following days, the residents also visited the Panyu 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 “Guangzhou Likeng Waste-to-Energy Plant”, Veolia Environmental Service (China). Available at:  
<http://www.veolia-es.cn/en/about-us/20121105241.html> (Accessed 1 December 2013).  
98 “Cancer Deaths Found Near to Likeng Incinerator” (李坑垃圾焚燒發電廠附近部分村民死於癌症), 
Sina News, 26 November 2009, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-11-26/111519132701_2.shtml> 
(Accessed 1 December 2013). 
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district government, the South China Institute of Environmental Sciences (the agency responsible 
for conducting the EIA for the incinerator) and the Municipal Bureau of Gardens of Panyu district 
(廣州市番禺區市政園林管理局, the agency responsible for choosing the incinerator’s location). 
They also contacted NPC and CPPCC members and the mass media for support.  
 
On 25 October 2009, dozens of protesters wearing surgical masks and dressed in t-shirts bearing 
the slogan ‘Refuse Toxic Air’ collected signatures from the public at the entrance of a 
supermarket. Some protestors held banners with slogans such as ‘Anti-burning’ and ‘Anti-
dioxin’.99 Their actions attracted the attention of the police, who arrested some protestors on the 
charge of ‘alleged unlawful assembly’. A few days later on 22 November, government 
representatives held a press conference, during which both the municipal and district 
governments announced that they had not changed their positions, emphasising the incinerator’s 
necessity. This made the residents angry. The following morning, one thousand residents 
‘strolled’ to the headquarters of the municipal government and Guangzhou Municipal Urban 
Management Committee with banners, where they shouted slogans and sang the national anthem. 
Although the police were present and the protesters posted their banners on police patrol cars, the 
police remained on standby and did not take further action. After lunchtime, the municipal 
government suggested that the protesters select a representative from their number to allow for 
better communication, but the suggestion was rejected. They shouted: ‘We are representing 
ourselves!’ and ‘No one is representing us!’ Eventually, at 2 pm, the protestors left peacefully.  
 
In the face of this opposition, the government attempted to change its position on the incinerator 
construction. Three days after the protest march, the Panyu district government suggested inviting 
an expert to consult on a comprehensive plan for the district, with residents invited to vote and 
decide on the plan. In addition, the Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau announced that 
the EIA for the incinerator would be assessed by the Bureau and the final decision shown to the 
public after the hearings. The project reached a breakthrough on 10 December, two weeks after 
the ‘stroll’. The district government announced that construction of the planned incinerator would 
be postponed until 2011 (a year after the 2010 Asian Games, of which Guangzhou was the host). 
Meanwhile, the district government released a document about waste management solutions and 
sought public opinion. Finally, the party secretary of the district was invited to attend a meeting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 “Guangzhou: Environmental Protection in the Name of ‘stroll’” (廣州：’散步’，以環保之名), China 
News Week (中國新聞周刊), 7 December 2009, 
<http://magazine.sina.com/bg/chinanewsweek/2009044/2009-12-07/ba80275.html> (Accessed 1 December 
2013). 
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with the residents of Riverside Garden on 20 December 2009. In the meeting, the party secretary 
let it be known that the project had been suspended as a result of the mass opposition, and 
announced that public opinion on waste management in the district would be considered in the 
future. It was also decided that there would be a study on the feasibility of introducing waste 
sorting in a small residential community.100 The four-month campaign of activism had finally 
reached an end.    
 
7.3 Incinerator Returns to Panyu District  
Even though this controversial project was suspended, and the mayor promised to implement a 
waste-sorting scheme in ten small communities in April 2011,101 the controversy over incinerator 
construction started again after the Asian Games. In a press conference launched by the Panyu 
district government on 11 April 2011, it was announced that five locations had been selected 
(please see Appendix), and that one would be chosen as the site for an incinerator, with two 
months of public consultation provided to discuss the proposal.102 The proposal, however, was 
contentious because Dashi town (大石), despite mass citizen opposition in 2009, was one of the 
five proposed locations. Moreover, three of the locations were near Foshan city (3-5 km away), 
and the Foshan municipal government had not been informed.103 The citizens in both Guangzhou 
and Foshan criticised the proposal. They questioned the standards being used to choose locations, 
the means of public involvement in the process of selection and the supervision that would be 
used for the incinerator operation. In addition, following questionable public participation, the 
citizens worried that the waste-sorting plan would be halted in the future. The people living in 
Foshan, particularly those in the Shunde (順德區) district, worried about ash polluting the lands 
and rivers within the district and suggested that district governments should have better 
communication systems to monitor the issue.104 The Bureau of Environment, Transportation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 “Construction of Panyu Incinerator Suspended: 75% of Mass Consent is Required to Pass EIA” (番禺垃
圾焚燒廠已停建 環評需敏感區群眾 75%以上同意才通過), Boxun.com (博迅網), 21 December 2009, 
<http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2009/12/200912212012.shtml> (Accessed 1 December 2013). 
101 “Waste Sorting Programme Kicks off in 16 Communities” (2011). Dayoo News, 8 March. Available at:  
<http://m.dayoo.com/105163/105166/105167/201103/08/105167_16720801.htm> 
(Accessed 24 January 2014). 
 
102 “Panyu waste incinerator ‘5 chooses one’” (番禺垃圾焚烧发电厂五选一), Nddaily, (13 April 2011),  
<http://gcontent.oeeee.com/8/3f/83fa5a432ae55c25/Blog/02a/616b1f.html >[Access 13 August 2013].  
103 “Building Punyu Incinerator, the Locations Close to Shunde”, Southern Metropolis Daily, 13 April 
2011.  
104 Due to time limitations, I did not conduct an interview in Foshan. The opinions were obtained from 
newspapers. Source: “Public Consultation will be Launched for 2 Months on the Locations of Building 
Incinerator”, Southern Metropolis Daily, 13 April 2011. 
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Urban Management for the Shunde district (順德區環境運輸和城市管理局) also expressed 
concern about the incinerator proposal, claiming that the Panyu district government had never 
informed it about the proposal. It expected the Panyu government to exhibit comprehensive 
planning before the construction, to minimise the effect on the Shunde district.105   
 
Days later, the ruling leaders of the Foshan municipal government and the Shunde district 
government asserted that they had known nothing until told by the mass media, claiming that the 
Panyu district government should consult with Foshan. On 15 April 2011, the Bureau of 
Environment, Transportation and Urban Management for the Shunde district visited both 
Guangzhou and Panyu’s EPBs to get more information on the incinerator.106 After the visit, the 
officers of the Shunde government disclosed the content of the meeting and the Panyu EPB’s 
response. The Panyu EPB emphasised that the Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau was 
responsible for choosing the incinerator location while the district EPB was responsible for 
managing the EIA afterwards. Finally, the Shunde government’s message of opposition against 
the incinerator was forwarded to the Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau.107  
 
A few days later, the Foshan and Shunde governments expressed their opinions on incinerators. 
In a press conference on 21 April 2011, the Panyu government released the standards and process 
used to choose the incinerator locations, which had been selected by the urban planners in special 
meetings alongside plans to collect public opinions. Meanwhile, Guangzhou’s municipal 
government consulted neighbouring district governments and experts launched a special seminar 
for studying the locations. Eventually, the EIA process would be conducted for the selected 
location. The Panyu district government expected the EIA to be completed by the end of 2011.108 
 
The disclosure of this selection process, however, did not quell the anger of the citizens living 
nearby. Dozens of residents from Riverside Garden and elsewhere visited the Municipal Urban 
Management Committee on 25 April 2011 and expressed their dissatisfaction, pressing the 
government to speed up a waste-sorting scheme for the whole city. The residents also revisited 
the authority with 5,000 signatures and a letter opposing incinerator construction in Dashi town, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 “Shunde Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau: Guangzhou Should Assess the Impact 
Immediately”, Nan Fang Daily, 14 April 2011.  
106 “Shunde Environmental Protection Bureau Visited Reclamation Site in Panyu”, Nan Fang Daily, 15 
April 2011.  
107 “Oppose to Build in Shunde City”, Southern Metropolis Daily, 18 April 2011. 
108 “EIA Will Be Conducted for Panyu Incinerator”, Southern Metropolis Daily, 22 April 2011. 
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but the Panyu district government did not provide an immediate response. One of the residents 
living in Riverside Garden told me that he attempted to submit a proposal for a waste-sorting 
scheme for Riverside Garden, but did not receive any support from the Municipal Urban 
Management Committee. He felt frustrated because the residents lacked the resources to promote 
waste sorting in their residential complex.109  
 
The mass media also kept an eye on the debate over location selection. Nandu.com110 organised 
online voting for the best place to build an incinerator. More than 380,000 votes were cast, and 
most of them (over 57,000 votes) opposed Daishi as a location due to the proximity of several 
residential complexes. Dagang town (大崗鎮, located in southwest Panyu district), however, was 
favoured by voters as an ideal location for an incinerator (around 53,000 votes) because it was 
several miles away from the residential area and the land acquisition had already been 
completed.111 
 
On 22 June 2011, the Panyu district government announced that the incinerator would be built in 
Dagang town. The reaction to this selection outcome varied between Guangzhou and Foshan’s 
citizens. The residents in Daishi town and Riverside Garden celebrated the result, but the 
residents living near Dagang and Foshan’s citizens expressed concern and asked that the 
decision-making process be disclosed.112 Days after the announcement, Shunde Environmental 
Science Association, a government affiliation, issued 20,000 questionnaires to Shunde’s citizens 
about the incinerator location, and over 77% of the respondents preferred Dongchong town (東涌
鎮, located in southeast Panyu district, 13.5 km away from Shunde district). After collecting these 
opinions, the Shunde district government planned to discuss the matter with the Panyu district 
government.113 Meanwhile, the residents of Dagang town were angry about the election result. 
The town comprised numerous villages and several new-build residential complexes, and the 
residents submitted 2,000 signatures to the Municipal Urban Management Committee opposing 
the incinerator.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Interview with Mr A, resident of Riverside Garden, in Guangzhou on 12 April 2012.  
110 Nandu.com is a member of Nandu Daily Media Group, a Guangzhou-based newspaper. For more 
information, please refer to footnote 16 in chapter 2.   
111 “Deadline of collecting opinion on Panyu incinerator location” (番禺垃圾焚烧厂五选一意见收集截止
) , Tencent News (腾讯新闻),16 June 2011. <http://news.qq.com/a/20110616/000394.htm > [Access 12 
August 2013]. 
112 “Oppose to Build Incinerator in Shunde City”, Nan Fang Daily, 23 June 2011. 




Given this opposition, the Panyu district government promised to maintain high transparency in 
the selection process, and to undertake a more comprehensive study before building the 
incinerator. Yet even in 2015, plans to build incinerators in Guangzhou have continued due to 
their reputation as the most effective way to reduce the volume of municipal waste. The ‘garbage’ 
battle between the government and the citizens continues. 
 
In the ACF’s terms, the change of building incinerator policy was resulted by both stable system 
parameters and external system factors. In stable system factor, the decentralised governing 
structure provided certain degree of autonomy to local government, both Panyu district and 
Guangzhou municipal governments changed their incinerator plan as a response to the activism 
for minimising economic and political costs. In external factor, the rise of new wealth-off class in 
the society worried about the hazardous impacts of incinerators to health and environment, and 
against the build of incinerator. These factors had been affecting policy actors’ strategies in 
policy-oriented learning process. In the policy-oriented learning process, the competing coalition 
had deployed different strategies, for example both coalitions contacted mass media for showing 
scientific data about the impact of incinerator to health and the environment, and the “anti-
incinerator coalition” adopted national environmental laws to safeguard their rights.  Facing the 
growing pressure from the protests, the authorities changed the plan of building incinerator to 
minimise political and economic costs.  
 
7.4 The Emergence of Eco-Canton: From Activism to a Consultative Committee 
  
Decentralised and opened political structure enhanced further public participation in decision 
making process. Following their campaign against the incinerator, Panyu residents – particularly 
those from Riverside Garden – realised that municipal waste was a problem and that the city 
needed an efficient solution. They formed a volunteer group, Green Family (綠色家庭), in 
February 2010, just a few months after the suspension of the incinerator project. At first, Green 
Family mainly advocated waste recycling in local communities with the belief that it would 
fundamentally change municipal waste management in Guangzhou. Seventy families joined the 
waste-sorting programme at Riverside Garden. After a short time, the group recognised that the 
role of government should not be neglected, and thus in mid-April 2010 they urged the Municipal 
Urban Management Committee to implement an effective recycling policy. This informal 
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organisation faced some difficulties, such as a lack of volunteers and a shortage of financial 
support, which hindered its development and the launch of the waste management campaign.  
 
Meanwhile, the group recognised that assistance from a professional ENGO was essential to help 
and sustain Green Family’s development. At the conclusion of the anti-incinerator activism in 
2009, one of Green Family’s founders, Luo Jingming (Internet pseudonym ‘Basuofengyun’, 巴索
風雲), travelled to Beijing where he met Zhang Boju, the chief executive officer of Friends of 
Nature, to exchange campaigning experience and waste management knowledge. The meeting 
came about because Friends of Nature had assisted the Liulitun residents in their anti-incinerator 
campaign by launching community recycling projects.114  
 
With help in the form of funding, knowledge and human resources from Friends of Nature, Green 
Family became more institutionalised. The group renamed itself ‘Eco-Canton’ and registered as 
an NGO with the Bureau of Civil Affairs of Guangzhou Municipality in June 2012. There are 
now more than 40 core volunteers in the group, which is formed mainly of residents of Riverside 
Garden, Clifford Estates and Huanan Country Garden. The newly founded ENGO aims to 
advocate zero-waste in communities, with the cooperation of government and enterprises, and to 
promote public participation in environmental issues. To this end, Eco-Canton has launched 
various activities with different parties to promote ideas such as establishing a recycling 
community in Clifford Estates; promoting a recycling programme to the offices of Sun Yet-Sen 
University; forming a ‘Zero-Waste Coalition’ with other Chinese ENGOs (such as Friends of 
Nature and the Green Beagle Environment Institute) to promote recycling in society;115 and 
publicising a survey about waste sorting in the streets of Guangzhou in 2012.116  
 
Meanwhile, Guangzhou’s municipal government not only suspended the incinerator project in 
December 2009, but it has since implemented a series of new instruments for municipal waste 
management. These new instruments, such as plans to promulgate regulation on waste sorting in 
Guangzhou and setting more pilot points for waste sorting, aim to promote recycling in 
Guangzhou.117 A further breakthrough has been made in the policy-making process. The Public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Interview with Zhang Boju (Friends of Nature) in Beijing on 26 August 2013.  
115 “‘Zero Waste Coalition’ Is Formed Today” (零廢棄聯盟今日宣告成立), Friends of Nature （自然之
友), <http://old.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=14806> (Accessed 3 December 2013). 
116 “About Us” (關於我們), Eco-Canton (宜居廣州), <http://www.yjgz.org/a/aboutus/dsj/ > (Accessed 3 
December 2013).  
117 Zhang, Y.Q. (2011). “Regulations Have Been Set for Waste Sorting” (廣州垃圾分類將有法可依), 
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Consultative and Supervision Committee for Urban Waste Management of Guangzhou City (廣
州市城市廢棄物處理公眾咨詢監督委員會) was established under the Municipal Urban 
Management Committee in August 2012. The agency first announced that a public committee 
was to be established, and invited citizens to become members by applying online by mid-June 
2012. The committee members were required to be residents of Guangzhou and aged 18 years or 
above with knowledge of municipal waste management. The duration of membership was one 
year.118 The 30-member consultative committee was made up of two groups: the public and the 
experts. The former group comprised 19 people from different sectors of society selected by the 
agency; specifically, citizen representatives (12 people), business representatives (3 people) and 
representatives of social organisations (4 people). The expert group comprised 11 people selected 
from within the recycling industry from universities and professional institutes at different levels. 
On the day the consultative committee was founded, Guangzhou’s mayor, Mr Chen Jianghua, 
stated that the aim of establishing the committee was to create a platform for communication, 
supervision and advocacy of municipal waste management.119  He also recognised that the 
committee was a breakthrough in public policy making in Guangzhou and a landmark for urban 
management and governance.120 One of the leaders in the anti-incinerator campaign, the founder 
and CEO of Eco-Canton, Basuofengyun, was a member of this committee in both its first and 
second cohorts.  
 
After the establishment of the consultative committee, its members actively engaged in promoting 
waste management for the city. The members discussed solutions for managing waste and 
suggested their ideas to the municipal government in a meeting in April 2013. One such 
suggestion was waste charging. After discussion, the committee and the government came to a 
consensus and planned to choose some communities in which to pilot waste charging and waste 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
China News (中國新聞網) (Online) 26 January. <http://www.chinanews.com/ny/news/2010/01-
26/2091751.shtml> (Accessed 3 December 2013); Lai, W.X. (2010). “A Trial Waste Sorting Takes Place in 
Donghu Street, Guangzhou: Professional Garbage Collection Company Incorporated Junk Collectors to 
Serve the Community” (廣州垃圾分類動真格了東湖街將試行由專業垃圾回收公司收編收買佬以服務
社區), Dayoo News (大洋網) (Online) 25 January. 
<http://news.dayoo.com/guangzhou/201001/25/73437_11861975.htm> (Accessed 3 December 2013). 
118Qiu, P. (2012). “How to Manage Waste? Municipal Urban Management Committee Nominates Members 
for Consultative Committee for One Year Term” (垃圾如何處理  城管委徵顧問市垃圾處理 ’咨委會 ’
徵義務委員，聘期一年 ), Southern Metropolis Daily (Guangzhou) (南方都市報 廣州版), 19 June, p. 
AII 09.  
119 Xu, H.X. (2012). “Take Advice from Experts and Listen to Mass Opinion Fighting For Better Waste 
Management” (融專家智慧  聽民眾呼聲全力以赴打好垃圾處理攻堅戰 ), Guangzhou Daily (廣州日
報), 5 August, pp. A01-02.  
120 Ibid.  
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sorting by June 2013,121 with the waste-charging scheme to be extended to six more communities 
in January 2014.122 After the first one-year term, the consultative committee rotated, with a cohort 
of 15 new members joining the 30-member committee in October 2013.123  
 
The municipal government also launched two public forums on municipal waste management in 
August and October 2012. In these forums, the government invited experts, the consultative 
committee and the general public to discuss effective measures for managing waste in the city, 
and the possibility of waste sorting. The municipal government appeared to have learned the 
importance of listening to the public in maintaining social stability and legitimacy of rule.  
 
7.5 Public Participation in Public Affairs: A Trial 
The establishment of the Public Consultative and Supervision Committee for the Urban Waste 
Management of Guangzhou City influenced other public policies in Guangzhou. On 11 March 
2013, the municipal government announced another breakthrough measurement: the Guangzhou 
Major Livelihood Decisions Public Consultation Committee System (trial) (廣州市重大民生決
策公共意見征詢委員會制度 (試行)). Under this measurement, consultative committees for 
collecting public opinion are set up before any important public decisions are made. The public 
decisions covered under this measure include those relating to public services, budget allocation 
for providing public services, important public infrastructure in both urban and rural areas, land 
use and development, land acquisition, environmental protection, employment, social security, 
family planning, education, health, food security, housing security, public transportation, urban 
management and public order. Other decisions closely related to the interests of the people, 
including those involving a wide range of social and livelihood decisions, now require extensive 
consultation of public opinion. Prospective members of consultative committees are invited to 
express their interest via application, invitation or referral. Then, the municipal government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Zhang, L., Zheng, Y.P., Huang, S.J. (2013). “A Consensus on Waste Charging Model Will Be Made in 
mid-June” (垃圾分類收費模式 6月中旬會有共識), Yangcheng Evening News (羊城晚報), 26 April, p. 
A14G.  
122 “Waste Charging Will Be Implemented in Guangzhou Today” (廣州今啟動生活垃圾計量收費), 
Guangzhou Daily (廣州日報), 21 January 2014, 
<http://newsapp.gzdaily.com/jsp/share.jsp?code=MjQ3NTM%3D> (Accessed 18 December 2013).  
123 Quan, J. (2013). “15 New Members Joined the Second Term of Consultative Committee” (第二期公咨
委新進 15名成員), Guangzhou Daily (廣州日報), 15 October, p. A02. 
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makes its selections and the list of candidates is published for further nomination.124 The number 
of members in the consultative committee is no fewer than 15 people, and one-third of its 
members must be citizens. Its members also have access to full information and all relevant 
documents, and the right to participate and express their opinion in the policy-making process. If 
the consultative committee has not been formed, the government cadres are not allowed to make 
unilateral decisions on a public policy.125  
 
This breakthrough was significant for public policy making in the Chinese context, effectively 
institutionalising public participation in policy making. Although the current participatory 
mechanisms involving the NPC, the CPPCC and public hearings have provided channels for 
collecting and expressing opinions, the formation and implementation of a consultative 
committee is a new platform for direct communication and participation in public policy making 
that is shared between governments, citizens, experts and businesses. All major policies are 
discussed at the agenda-setting stage by committee members representing different sectors, and 
the selection of committee members is more transparent and representative than those used in the 
NPC and the CPPCC. In addition, the consultative committee encourages public engagement in 
public affairs, as people are entitled to initiate requests for policy advice, which is different from 
public hearings. Thus, the newly implemented participatory mechanism reduces the risk of public 
opposition to the launch of controversial projects while maintaining the government’s legitimacy.  
 
This breakthrough was in part facilitated by the style of government in Guangzhou. First, as a 
forerunner in the reform era, Guangzhou has proven eager to implement innovative policies. It is 
a ‘place of social activism’ (群體性事件) (Zhang 2013:104), with widespread public recognition 
of the need to establish a more responsive government. The subjects of this social activism not 
only include environmental protection, but also labour rights, land acquisition, urban 
management, etc. with campaigns highlighting the deficiencies of municipal government on the 
one hand and the rise of civil consciousness on the other. As such, social activism has pressured 
the municipal government to be more responsive. In December 2011, the Party Secretary of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Feng, Y.Q. (2013). “Guangzhou: Public Opinion Is Guaranteed in Making Major Decisions” (廣州: 用
制度來保障 重大民生決策必須徵求民意), People’s Daily （人民日報）
<http://gd.people.com.cn/n/2013/0311/c123932-18280036.html> (Accessed 18 December 2013).  
125 “The Set-up of Major Decision Public Consultative Committee (Trial) Is Approved” (廣州重大民生決
策公共意見徵詢委員會制度（試行）通過), People’s Government of Guangdong Province （廣東省人
民政府), <http://www.gd.gov.cn/gdgk/gdyw/201303/t20130312_175976.htm> (Accessed 19 December 
2013).  
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Guangdong province, Mr Wang Yang (now serving as a committee member on the Political 
Bureau of the CCP), advocated the concept of ‘Environmental Democracy’ (民主環保) in 
response to the increasing level of environmental activism in the province.126 According to Wang, 
environmental democracy means that the general public has rights of information, participation 
and supervision in all environmental issues. In addition, a policy for disclosing environmental 
information should be developed and an environmental consultative system established.127 In the 
same month in 2011, Guangzhou’s government advocated an initiative called ‘Happiness 
Guangzhou’ (幸福廣州) at the 10th Party Congress of Guangzhou. ‘Happiness Guangzhou’ not 
only emphasised economic growth in the city, but also advocated the improvement of all aspects 
of living conditions and the drive towards a sustainable city. The scheme called for enhanced 
public participation in public affairs and promoted the growth of social organisations in the 
city.128  
 
7.6 Municipal Waste Management in the Post-activism Era 
After the anti-incinerator campaign and the establishment of the Public Consultative Committee 
on Municipal Waste Management in Guangzhou, the municipal government initiated a series of 
measures for managing waste. First, it launched a waste recycling programme in January 2011, 
under which a district was chosen to conduct a trial of a recycling scheme that could later be 
rolled out to the wider city with the goal of cutting the volume of waste in half after three 
years.129 This plan, the Trial Regulation on Municipal Waste Recycling and Management (廣州
城市生活垃圾分類管理暫行規定), took effect on 1 April 2011, and the volume of waste sent to 
incinerators and landfills was reduced by 3.09% between 2012 and 2013.130 However, concerns 
about overloading the city’s waste management facilities remained. In February 2010, two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Du, J. (2011). Wang Yang raised questions about PM2.5 four times and introduced the concept of 
‘Environmental Democracy’, (汪洋4提PM2.5 問題：提’民主環保’概念), ifeng news  (鳳凰網). Available at: 
<http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2011_12/28/11619569_0.shtml> (Accessed 21 December 2013).  
127 Ibid.  
128 Tian, E., Zheng, X.X., Ma, H.Y. (2011). “Target in Coming 5 Years: Happiness Guangzhou” (未來五年
目標：幸福廣州), Yangcheng Evening News (羊城晚報), 24 November, 
<http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwb/html/2011-12/24/content_1287690.htm> (Accessed 21 December 
2013).  
129 Dai Dai. (2010). “Guangzhou Promoted Waste Sorting” (廣州啓動全面推廣垃圾分類), Chinese 
Economy (中國經濟網), 26 January, 
<http://www.ce.cn/cysc/ny/xny/201001/26/t20100126_20076965.shtml> (Accessed 22 December 2013.) 
130 Huang, G.P., Chen, Q. (2013). “Guangzhou Waste Sorting Reaches New Achievement” (廣州垃圾分類
處理取得新成效), 12 July, Xinhua News (新華網)  
<http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/www.gd.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2013-07/12/c_116505255.htm> 
(Accessed 22 December 2013). 
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months after the anti-incinerator campaign, the municipal government held a two-day conference 
on waste management. They invited 32 experts to attend the conference, which had the following 
discussion themes: 1) how to promote recycling management, 2) how to manage municipal waste 
in Guangzhou and 3) how to effectively supervise waste management. The experts suggested that 
‘trash burning is the core [and] landfill is the auxiliary strategy for municipal waste management 
in the future.’131 Furthermore, the municipal People’s Congress, held in April 2012, confirmed 
plans to build four incinerators before 2014, on the basis that waste burning is an effective way 
for solving waste overload in the city.132 These plans aroused a great debate in the city. Experts 
and citizens alike worried about issues such as the technology used for waste burning, 
incinerators’ locations and the transpareny with which they would be constructed. Opposition to 
the proposals was reflected in a July 2012 survey, in which 2,342 out of 3,129 citizens (75%) 
were against building 6 more incinerators in the city.133  
 
Chapter Conclusion  
Incinerator construction seems to be an inevitable solution for managing the severe volumes of 
municipal waste in Guangzhou. However, the lack of transparency and public participation in the 
process tends to leave citizens dissatisfied. The Guangzhou case is notably interesting when 
compared with other instances of NIMBY activism in China, because a new green group was 
formed with the aim of promoting a long-term strategy against incinerator construction, to 
encourage waste sorting in the city and to fight for public involvement in decision making.  
 
This chapter tells the story of anti-incinerator construction activism in Guangzhou and highlights 
how it differed from conventional NIMBY protests, which disbanded after reaching their goal. 
The Guangzhou activists did not disband. Instead, they changed the focus of their activism to 
incorporate a wider public issue: zero waste in the city. In their campaign, the residents were not 
only fighting for the suspension of the incinerator project, but also for greater transparency and 
participation in decision-making processes. The incinerator project was suspended, indicating a 
successful campaign, and the activists later formed Eco-Canton to advocate waste-sorting 
programmes and government-implemented public consultative committees. Beyond the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 “Local Chronicles of Guangzhou”, 
<http://www.gzdaj.gov.cn/gzdsj/2010dsj/201007/t20100713_52779.htm> (Accessed 22 December 2013).  
132 Haung, X., Wang. (2012). “Six Incinerators Planned to Be Built Before 2014” (6個垃圾焚燒廠 2014年
前建成 一期若滿足需求，二期或不建), Nan Fang Daily (Guangzhou) (南方日報 廣州版), 26 April, p. 
GC02.    
133 “Six More Incinerators Planned” (廣州再建六個焚燒廠), Tencent.com (騰訊網). Available at:  
http://gd.qq.com/zt2012/ljfs/ (Accessed 3 January 2014).  
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municipal government-implemented waste reduction and management policy, the activism further 
encouraged public engagement through innovative participatory mechanisms, which is a 
breakthrough in China’s public policy-making process. In this section, the ACF is used to analyse 
the case of Guangzhou.  
 
Both anti- and pro-incinerator coalitions were present in this case. The Panyu district government, 
Guangzhou’s municipal government and the ‘pro-incineration’ scientists composed the pro-
incineration coalition, supporting incineration technology. In contrast, the anti-incineration 
coalition comprised the residents living near the proposed incinerator site, particularly those in 
the Panyu and Shunde districts living in Riverside Garden, Clifford Estates and Huannan Country 
Garden (most of whom were civil servants, business professionals, teachers, journalists and 
members of the new middle class). Riverside Garden was home to numerous journalists from 
Southern Metropolis Daily, and many of the other residents were experienced in social activism. 
They became the major force in launching anti-incinerator campaigns. They not only opposed the 
incinerator, but also advocated waste sorting and recycling in the city. Their backgrounds 
provided valuable social networks with the ruling elite and other high-level professionals through 
which to express their grievances.  
The activists expressed their opposition by contacting CPPCC and NPC members to seek their 
support. Similar to the case in Beijing, this ‘power leverage’ strategy is a traditional way for 
citizens to influence decision making; specifically, to change unfavourable decisions. Their 
personal and social networks (for instance, some residents work as civil servants and journalists) 
become a strong connection to the political and social elite. Chinese citizens expect NPC and 
CPPCC members to influence decisions by putting pressure on local governments, based on the 
Constitution, which gives such members the right to propose or amend any policy in the 
meetings. Moreover, the opinions of experts such as government- and university-affiliated 
scientists have also influenced the decision-making process. For example, the Panyu district 
government heard board experts’ suggestions prior to incinerator location and construction. This 
power makes experts a target when protestors are seeking support. Panyu’s residents sought help 
from Dr Zhao Zhangyuan, a scientist from the Chinese Academy for Sciences who, during the 
activism, opposed the argument that the incinerator was the only solution for reducing municipal 
waste. In meetings with the government, Dr Zhao stated the problems that incinerators pose to 
human and environmental health and raised debates with the pro-incineration coalition. This 
practice of citizens securing ‘power leverage’ is a common strategy in China’s current political 
environment. Because Chinese citizens lack participation rights in policy-making processes, they 
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expect the political elites (i.e. CPPCC and NPC members and experts), who have the power to 
influence government, to change unfavourable policy outcomes. Although power leverage is one 
possible strategy for expressing dissatisfaction, in the long run, the residents still want to 
participate in policy processes.  
 
Although most of the residents and political elite opposed the construction of an incinerator in 
Guangzhou, others – members of the pro-incineration coalition such as Panyu government 
officials, scientists and urban planners – continued to consider incineration as the most efficient 
way to resolve municipal waste problems. For example, Zeng Minhui, a researcher at the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences’ Research Centre for Eco-Environmental Sciences, attended a press 
conference on 30 October 2009 regarding the proposed incinerator construction in Panyu. He 
emphasised that dioxin is very common in the atmosphere, and that it should not make people 
over-anxious.134 Another expert, Shu Chengguang, attended the same press conference and 
asserted that the waste-burning technology in China is mature, and is thus the most effective way 
to resolve the city’s municipal waste issues.135 However, conflicts of interest in Shu’s background 
incited the residents’ anger, and they launched a protest against his input on 24 November 2009. 
Shu was the vice-president of Covanta Energy (China Region), an American-based company 
providing waste-to-energy infrastructure solutions, and the residents believed that his business 
interests drove his decision to back the government and the incinerator provider. Moreover, a 
magazine, Yazhou Zhoukan (亞洲周刊, Asia Weekly), featured an article about the connections 
between incinerator construction and business interests. In the article, an interviewee noted that 
pro-incinerator coalitions comprising scholars, entrepreneurs, facility suppliers and investors 
frequently organised seminars promoting incineration technology and lobbying government 
officials or local governments to build incinerators in build-operate-transfer collaborations. In 
these seminars, the coalition invites guests to give ‘positive descriptions’ of incinerators in return 
for a US$2,195 honorarium paid after the seminar. This anonymous interviewee had participated 
in a coalition and previously promoted incineration in China, but had since seen the problems 
created by incinerators as a resident of Riverside Garden.136 Thus, the ‘pro-burning’ parties were 
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criticised as being middlemen for profit proliferation rather than true experts on incineration 
(Southern Weekend 2009).   
 
Both the pro- and anti-incinerator coalitions used scientific and technological information to 
address the safety of incineration and to suggest alternate ways of reducing waste. The protesters 
tactically defended their rights through different means in the policy-oriented learning process. 
The residents’ backgrounds and professions helped them oppose incinerator construction through 
legal means. Luo Jingming (Internet pseudonym ‘Basuofengyun’, 巴索風雲) and ‘White Cherry’ 
(Internet pseudonym, 櫻桃白), two of the main activism organisers and founders of Eco-Canton, 
mentioned that the participants understood that activism had to abide by the law through channels 
such as, for example, submitting petitions to the government agencies. They also reached a 
consensus that radical actions, such as attacking police and government officials, were to be 
prohibited in the protests.137 Meanwhile, the residents studied the laws and conducted scientific 
investigations to gather empirical evidence of the environmental disadvantages of building 
incinerators in the selected locations, and of policy implementation mismanagement. This 
evidence has become important material for bargaining with the governments and publicising the 
matter via mass media, and its collection was a good learning process for the participants in that it 
paved the way for the formation of Eco-Canton. As some of the residents were journalists 
working for conventional mass media outlets such as newspapers, online-forums and instant 
online messenger (QQ), the media were the main channels for spreading the news.  
 
Ultimately, the coalitions reached a consensus and the government relocated the proposed 
incinerator for reasons similar to those in the Beijing case; namely, to maintain local social order 
and the municipal government’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, applying the ACF to discuss the policy 
changes in this case revealed that the development of civil society and the ‘openness’ of local 
government in Guangzhou were responsible for the campaign’s success.  
 
Similar to citizens in other places in China, Panyu’s residents were unable to participate in 
creating waste management policies under the context of an authoritarian regime. They began by 
expressing their concerns about the incinerator construction through petitions and visits to 
government officials. Then, they contacted NPC and CPPCC members, scientists and the mass 
media but did not receive any help from local green groups. Using the limited channels available 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Interviews in Guangzhou on 12 April 2014.  
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for voicing their dissatisfaction, Panyu’s residents launched campaigns and obtained wider 
sympathy and support throughout the city.   
 
Both Guangzhou and Panyu’s governments were responsive to the activists and suspended 
incinerator construction immediately. After the anti-incinerator activism in Panyu district in 2009, 
the municipal government established the Public Consultative and Supervision Committee for 
Urban Waste Management of Guangzhou City, which provides encouragement in relation to 
urban waste management. In each case, the governments chose to be responsive and resolve the 
confrontations with the citizens to maintain the legitimacy of their rule. The institutionalisation of 
the public consultative committee has provided a platform for effective communication between 
government and citizens, which has in turn facilitated the growth of a sense of civil rights in the 
city. For instance, Eco-Canton has been invited to consult on waste sorting in the Huale 
community of the Yuexiu district.   
 
 An ‘open’ local government encourages public participation in environmental policy, which 
benefits the institutionalisation of campaigns and the development of civil society. The 
experience of activists forming a green group was highlighted in the ensuing NIMBY campaign. 
There was no leadership in the process of opposing the incinerator. The local homeowners 
gathered to discuss the campaign with the aim of avoiding any political risk and sharing the 
responsibilities of organisation. Unlike other NIMBY campaigns, which tend to disband after 
reaching their goal, this campaign resulted in the establishment of Eco-Canton and those involved 
continue to advocate ‘zero-waste’ in Guangzhou, thereby shifting the focus of further activism 
from ‘not in my back yard’ to a wider public issue; namely, the problem of waste overload in 
Guangzhou. Eco-Canton has been institutionalised, hiring full-time staff, composing a 
constitution, electing board members, recruiting members and volunteers and accepting 
donations. It has also extended its network of other NGOs country-wide. For example, along with 
Friends of Nature, Eco-Canton joined the ‘zero-waste coalition’ (零廢棄聯盟) founded in Beijing 
in 2011 by several green groups, research institutes and environmental experts. It aims to promote 
the ‘3Rs’ (i.e. reduce, reuse, recycle), provide waste management education and present 
technological suggestions to the government. Furthermore, the head of Eco-Canton, one of the 
original anti-incinerator activists, has been invited to serve as a member of the Public 
Consultative and Supervision Committee for Urban Waste Management of Guangzhou City – an 
event that reflects the openness of government and encourages the development of environmental 
civil society in the city. For example, the waste-sorting programme in Huale community has 
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attracted people to be volunteers. Those living in Huale community, students and people from 
other places have been participating in training workshops and activities to learn waste sorting 
and assist with garbage sorting and recycling on community street corners. Other green groups in 
Guangzhou have taken similar steps. Green Point has launched a new waste management project 
and Biker Guangzhou advocates green transportation in the city. The anti-incinerator campaign 
and Eco-Canton’s work have generated new green groups and re-posited their role in society.  
 
The institutionalisation of the campaign has also increased the effect of public participation in 
environmental policy. Unlike the green groups in developed societies, who confront governments, 
Chinese green groups are non-confrontational in that they believe that their effect on 
environmental policy will come about through their local experience and knowledge. The goal of 
obtaining legal status is supported by citizens en masse, and is thus the reason why the activists 
formed Eco-Canton.  
 
Eco-Canton, however, was faced with a difficult choice during the outbreak of an anti-incinerator 
demonstration in the Huadu district (about 68 km away from the Panyu district) in July 2013.138 
The activists claimed that Eco-Canton did not provide any help with their demonstration. On the 
one hand, Eco-Canton was concerned that its relationship with the government would suffer and 
that its NGO registration would be cancelled if it aided the activists. On the other hand, its aim of 
supporting the people would not be achieved if it did not provide some sort of assistance.139 This 
incident exemplifies the dilemmas faced by newly founded NGOs and tests the consultative 
committee’s decision-making effectiveness while revealing doubts about the degree of 
transparency surrounding access to government documents.   
 
Panyu’s residents successfully protested the incinerator construction in their district and the 
municipal government not only tolerated the establishment of Eco-Canton but also established the 
public consultative committee. In this case, policy change appears to have been driven by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Thousands of people opposed the construction of an incinerator in Huadu district on 19 July 2013. Two 
people were injured in the demonstration. The Huadu district government conceded that more research on 
the project was necessary, and thus it did not confirm the project. Source: King, B. (2013). “Thousand 
People against the Building of the Incinerator in Huadu District” (花都垃圾焚燒廠址遭千名市民游行反
對), OFweek.com（環保網), http://ep.ofweek.com/2013-07/ART-39007-8120-28704502.html (Accessed 
10 January 2014).  
139 Interviews in Guangzhou with Chen Xiaoyun, a PhD candidate from Sun Yet-sen University who has 
followed and advised activism since 2009.  
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flourishing civil society and an open government, which breaks the ACF assumption that there is 




































The comparison of the anti-incinerator activism in Guangzhou and Beijing in this work shows 
how environmental protests affected policy change and gradually transformed public participation 
in decision-making processes in the context of Socialist China. The cases revealed the 
complexities of the policy-making process, and confirmed that the CCP-dominant model of 
policy making does not currently apply in China.   
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, both municipal governments sought to use incineration as 
an alternative strategy for managing SWM in their cities, but the projects they proposed were 
opposed by the local residents and criticised for their potentially negative effects on human health 
and the environment. The residents also condemned the non-transparent nature of the information 
and the lack of public participation in the decision-making process. Consequently, both municipal 
governments suspended the opposed incinerator projects, choosing policy change as their 
response to the protests to maintain social order and legitimacy.  
 
In responding to activism, local governments have the following options: make concessions that 
meet the citizens’ demands, make concessions but punish the protesters, tolerate the resistance 
but neglect to meet citizens’ demands and suppression (Cai 2010:5). Guangzhou and Beijing’s 
municipal governments made concessions and met the citizens’ demands; that is, incinerator 
construction in Panyu and Liulitun was cancelled, public consultation on incinerator locations 
was re-launched and waste-sorting and recycling measures were implemented. Rather than 
suppression, the governments used project abandonment to reduce the citizens’ dissatisfaction, 
which preserved social stability and government legitimacy. Local governments can make 
concessions to minimise political (e.g. social stability and signs of weakness in local governance) 
and economic costs, but if they choose repression, they may face an escalation of resistance and 
damage the regime’s legitimacy. The central government could then intervene and punish local 
officials (Cai 2010:5-7). Thus, both Beijing and Guangzhou’s municipal governments preferred 
to make concessions that met the citizens’ demands.   
 
The case studies also revealed that two groups with different policy beliefs from each other 
shaped the policy-making process and ultimately achieved policy change. This outcome breaks 
the ACF’s assumption of a lower possibility of reaching consensus in policy change in the 
nondemocratic regimes. Hence, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first examines the use 
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of the ACF in the Chinese context to compare the case studies in terms of campaign process, 
participants, activism strategies and government responses. The conditions for policy change are 
also discussed. The second part addresses the limitations of applying the ACF in the Chinese 
context.  
 
8.1 Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework to Compare Anti-incinerator Activism in 
Beijing and Guangzhou 
As Chapter 4 pointed out, the ACF revealed the pattern of interactions among the policy actors 
within policy subsystems. It also proved to be a promising framework for identifying the factors 
that shape beliefs about policy change.  
 
8.1.1 Coalitions and policy beliefs  
 
Both protests began with opposition to incinerator construction in nearby communities. Liulitun 
and Panyu included several new-build residential complexes, and their residents were retired 
cadre members and professionals – middle class citizens who were strongly aware their rights – 
with good educations working as journalists, teachers and business executives. In both cases, the 
district governments did not publicise the incinerator construction plans, and the residents only 
discovered them by chance, which left them feeling exploited and excluded from the decision-
making process. In both cases, EIA processes were skipped, prompting the residents to protest. 
The protesters in both cases had strong social networks that they used to contact mass media, 
legal professionals, scientists and even NPC and CPPCC members for help expressing their 
grievances. In both cases, the protesters demanded that the local governments suspend the plans, 
disclose the information and allow them to participate the decision-making process. The local 
governments (at the municipal and district levels) and other governmental agencies argued that 
the proposed incinerators would facilitate solid waste reduction, and they consulted scientists who 
were expected to champion the incineration technology. As such, both the pro- and anti-
incineration coalitions were identified.  
 
Over time, the anti-incineration coalition of Guangzhou also began to pay attention to the ‘zero-
waste’ movement. After the campaign, the protesters formed a green group to argue for a zero-
waste society. In summary, two coalitions with different policy beliefs and goals emerged, with 
different policy-making perspectives. The pro-incineration coalition preferred a top-down, state-
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centred approach to social development while the members of the anti-incineration coalition 
called for great transparency in the policy-making process.  
 
8.1.2 Resource Mobilisation and Strategies of Each Coalition in the Campaigns 
An asymmetric level of power was found between the pro- and anti-incineration coalitions. The 
pro-incineration coalition seemed to have more resources than the anti-incineration coalition. 
Composed largely of bureaucrats, the pro-incineration coalition enjoyed advantages in financial 
stability, human resources and access to information and power. In contrast, the members of the 
anti-incineration coalition were mainly the residents who lived near the proposed incinerator sites, 
and they had few such advantages. Social networks are commonly used in Chinese protests and 
thus the protesters’ backgrounds in these cases allowed them to contact different aspects of 
society to express their dissatisfaction. For example, Southern Metropolis Daily, a Guangzhou-
based newspaper, widely reported the controversies surrounding incinerator construction and 
municipal waste management, in part because many of their journalists lived in Riverside Garden, 
which was one of the residential complexes affected by the Panyu incinerator proposal. The news 
attracted waste management discussions and pressured the local government to take further action. 
Despite their social networks, the activists faced certain political risks under the suppressive 
political environment, such as arrest, and thus they expressed their dissatisfaction through legal 
means. As such, the protests took place within the existing legal framework.  
 
Scientific and technological information was used by both coalitions. Apart from personal 
networks and mass media, cyberspace also played a crucial role in the activism in both cases. 
Although the Chinese government has implemented laws and policies designed to limit 
cyberspace use, it still features in activism against social injustice and governmental 
mismanagement. Cyberspace is also an important instrument for publicising information and 
mobilising protests. Activists usually use the online forum, Weibo (a micro-blog) and instant 
messengers (e.g. weixin 微訊, QQ) to organise and mobilise resources. In the case studies, the 
campaigns mainly relied on online forums to recruit volunteers and discuss their plans. These 
online forums were used as platforms for the exchange of information among the homeowners in 
the residential complexes. For example, the homeowners’ online forum in Beijing allowed 
residents to share information on home decoration. Protesters’ presence on Weibo attracts mass 
citizen support, but because online messages can be deleted or websites shut down by the 
authorities, the Internet must be used carefully and tactically as a space for citizen self-
organisation, promoting bottom-up politics and long-term change (Yang 2003:92). Liulitun’s 
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residents used the Administrative Reconsideration Law140 to uncover the fact that the incinerator 
project had violated several environmental regulations. It should be noted that it is difficult for 
individual citizens to engage in environmental litigation under the current Chinese legal system. 
The cases in this work, which involved large groups of people filing lawsuits against the polluting 
projects, are classified as environmental public interest litigation (環保公益訴訟). Under China’s 
current environmental public interest litigation procedure, citizens are hindered in using lawsuits 
against polluting projects and thus often turn to collective resistance as an alternative way of 
expressing their dissatisfaction (Interview with environmental lawyer, Xia Jun, in Beijing on 12 
January 2014). In contrast, the Chinese government also takes advantage of information 
technology to maintain its rule. For example, the Chinese government implemented measures 
increasing the degree of transparency, including publicising the governmental documents, laws 
and regulations on the Internet.   
 
Since the campaigns, the protesters have developed technical and legal knowledge with which to 
counter information from government and incinerator experts. This has made them ‘citizen 
experts’, tasked with studying the environmental costs of government decisions (Tesh 1999:40). 
Panyu’s residents organised a visit to the Likeng waste-to-energy plant to better understand 
incineration’s effects on the health of the local populace. The Liulitun activism began in 2006, 
and Panyu’s residents learned from the earlier campaign. Some protesters, such as Basuofengyun, 
visited Beijing and met Liulitun’s residents and Zhang Bojou, the Chief Executive of Friends of 
Nature, to learn their activism tactics (Interview with Basuofengyun in Guangzhou on 11 April 
2014). Both Liulitun and Panyu’s residents gained legal and technical knowledge through self-
study and by connecting with legal and scientific experts. Furthermore, the residents provided 
comprehensive documentation to gain public support and increase their opportunities to bargain 
with the government. Liulitun’s residents collected evidence of problems with incineration for 
their litigation process, and learned about the landfill and waste processes to determine whether 
the government had violated national pollution control standards. Panyu’s residents also learned 
how incineration and waste management benefits the community, and they later used that 
knowledge to form Eco-Canton and launch municipal waste education and advocacy work in 
their society. Johnson (2013) notes that the residents used a de-politicised strategy to promote a 
recycling society and ‘portray themselves as concerned citizens supportive of the public interests’ 




Involving experts such as scientists enhanced the protesters’ understanding of incinerator 
technology and waste management. Zhao Zhangyuan is a fellow in waste management at the 
Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Science and a famous ‘anti-burning’ figure. He 
provided suggestions regarding incinerator technology to the protesting groups in both Panyu and 
Liulitun. Zhao was invited to speak to Panyu’s residents about the problems of waste burning and 
possible solutions for reducing waste. He wrote to the environmental authorities and opposed the 
government’s attempts to build an incinerator 300 m away from residencies. This was a good 
opportunity for the residents to learn from an expert about collecting evidence and developing 
environmental education for the community. Finally, support from ENGOs was reported in both 
cases. Although ENGOs are constrained by the Chinese political system and thus cannot launch 
radical campaigns, the green groups found other ways to help the protesters. For instance, Friends 
of Nature provided help in both the Liulitun and Panyu cases by contacting experts, the mass 
media and government officials to obtain environmental knowledge. Friends of Nature also 
played an important role in forming Eco-Canton after the activism in Guangzhou, in terms of 
environmental education, advocacy and building networks with other green groups in the zero-
waste alliance. In summary, these external supports increased the protesting groups’ capacity to 
negotiate with governments during activism.  
 
Social movements require mobilisation to coordinate resources and actions. In China, the political 
constraints hinder any organisation from mobilising citizens against the regime; thus, collective 
activism is not highly organised or institutionalised and tends to be launched spontaneously. In 
addition, the participants may initiate action without an explicated signal (Yu 2014:155). In both 
case studies, the residents used self-mobilisation via online discussion forums to plan actions such 
as contacting experts and media, drafting the complaint letters and arranging to meet government 
officials. There was not, however, a high level of organisation despite some of the protesters 
taking a leadership role in Panyu. Cai (2010:34-35) analyses the rise of leadership in collective 
activism in China, and says that leadership depends on moral responsibility, respect and prestige 
in communities, knowledge of government policies, personalities and personal interest in the 
activism. In the Panyu activism, some of the protesters were identified as mobilisation leaders. 
‘Basuofengyun’ (real name Luo Jianmin), like the other residents of Riverside Garden, first 
expressed his opinions on the incinerator plans in the online discussion forum and later joined 
with other participants to collect signatures in the community, in addition to drafting the 
complaint letter. In October 2009, he became one of the campaign’s leaders. He invited the 
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governor of the Panyu district government to Riverside Garden to talk about the incinerator plan 
in December 2009. He was then invited to attend a session of Guangzhou Municipal People’s 
Congress in April 2010 where he shared his thoughts on promoting waste recycling. He was 
eventually elected to be a member of the Public Consultative and Supervision Committee for 
Urban Waste Management of Guangzhou City, and ultimately founded Eco-Canton. He was a 
typical leader in the Chinese collective activism context, inspiring confidence among the 
protesters and negotiating with the government on behalf of Panyu’s residents (Cai 2010:34). In 
contrast, there was no identifiable leadership in the mobilisation Liulitun’s activism. The 
residents coordinated and planned actions voluntarily through an online homeowners’ discussion 
forum, self-mobilised the petition and ‘strolled’ to the government offices. The Internet has 
changed the pattern of mobilisation in social movements, particularly with regard to leadership. 
Liulitun’s citizens posted messages in online forums for discussion, planned actions and 
disseminated information. The incinerator construction in Liulitun provided a ‘common crisis’ for 
Liulitun’s residents, who voluntarily collected information, shared it online and discussed 
possible actions. The incinerator construction became a common point of identity among the 
residents, who took action together. Thus, it is evident that not all activism requires leaders or 
organisers.  
 
The two cases also differed in their aftermath. After the anti-incinerator campaign, Panyu’s 
residents set up a volunteer group, Green Family, that evolved into the more institutionalised 
ENGO, Eco-Canton. Eco-Canton has launched various activities such as promoting a recycling 
community in Clifford Estates, forming a zero-waste coalition with other ENGOs to promote 
waste recycling across the country and policy advocacy. Liulitun’s residents, in contrast, have not 
taken further action to promote waste recycling programmes in the community. As an interviewee 
said, they just wanted the incinerator away from their space (Interview with a Liulitun resident in 
Beijing, January 2014). Friends of Nature attempted to launch a recycling programme in Liulitun 
after the campaign, but the residents were not eager to participate. The formation of Eco-Canton 
by Panyu protesters was a breakthrough in collective activism in China, and the green group not 
only opposes incinerator construction, but has also turned the waste problem into a public issue. 
A de-politicalised strategy has been used by Eco-Canton’s members to sustain their activism, and 
their advocacy has enhanced their influence over government decisions.  
Overall, both cases of activism successfully forced local government to suspend the incinerator 
projects, and they shared a similar strategy for influencing government decisions. Despite the lack 
of a highly institutionalised campaign, the protesters’ self-organisation and initiative in gaining 
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legal and technical knowledge and seeking external assistance contributed to their success. Later, 
the campaigns developed in different ways, with Panyu’s residents forming an ENGO to promote 
a zero-waste society and Liulitun’s residents satisfied with the cancellation of the incinerator 
construction. To understand how policies and policy-making have changed, it is necessary to 
assess local governments’ responses to activism.  
 
8.1.3 Policy change 
Faced with the residents’ opposition, the municipal governments in both cases suspended the 
proposed incinerator projects, suggesting that social order and legitimacy maintenance were their 
priorities. However, the conditions shaping the behaviour between the pro- and anti-incinerator 
coalitions should not be neglected. The ACF’s coalition opportunity structures help to explain the 
conditions shaping the policy change outcomes in this work. As stated, coalition opportunity 
structures borrow the concepts from ‘political opportunity structures’, indicating sets of 
parameters for providing each coalition with different constraints and opportunities in action. I 
address how constitutional structure, different sociocultural values, changes in socio-economic 
conditions and changes in public opinion affected the governments’ decisions to suspend 
incinerator construction. 
 
China’s decentralised governing structure provided the flexible environment needed to implement 
the national policies based on the locals’ situation, and this background resulted in different 
outcomes for the anti-incineration protests. Guangzhou’s municipal government not only 
suspended the proposed incinerator site, but also initiated an institutionalised participatory 
mechanism for municipal waste management in the society. Indeed, the political environment of 
Guangdong province influenced Guangzhou’s municipal government to implement this new 
participatory mechanism. First, the historical background and geographic location of the city 
provided an open political environment. As Guangdong province is located in the south-east of 
China, with a long coastline bordering the South China Sea, Guangzhou has been one of China’s 
most important trading ports since ancient times. In the First Anglo-Chinese War (or Opium War, 
1839-1842), the Qing Monarchy ceded Hong Kong Island to the British government in 1842, and 
five ports (Canton, Amoy, Shanghai, Ningbo and Fuchow) were opened to the world. Both 
Britain and France set up extra territories in Canton (now Guangzhou) in 1861 after the end of the 
Second Opium War (1856-1860). This background indicates that Guangzhou connects China to 
the world. Being under the influence of Western culture and geographically close to British 
colonial Hong Kong made Guangzhou a revolutionary place that witnessed the overthrow of the 
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Qing Monarchy and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. Guangdong province’s 
openness prevailed through the economic reforms of the People’s Republic of China in the late 
1970s. Two special economic zones were implemented in Shenzhen and Zhuhai, and 
Guangdong’s tight economic relationship with Hong Kong has allowed its economy to enjoy 
unprecedented growth in the last three decades. Guangdong province is a ‘testing place’ for 
China’s economic reforms, which has influenced the openness of its government. In terms of 
political development, Guangzhou’s municipal government has been a model of administration 
reform for other places in China seeking to reform legal systems or regulate foreign investment 
(Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences 2010).   
 
This degree of political openness supports Guangzhou’s breakthrough in implementing 
participatory mechanisms. Political opportunity theory explains the dynamics between social 
movements and state; specifically, that ‘degree of political openness’ (Lewis 2000) affects the 
development of social movements. Two types of political openness are given: open and closed 
political opportunity structures. In open political opportunity structures, ‘it [is] possible for 
organisations to participate formally in political procedures’. In closed political opportunity 
structures, there are ‘fewer institutionalised means for grievances to be heard’ (Lewis 2000:108). 
This applies to the possibility of citizens participating in the policy-making process. The open 
political opportunity structure of Guangzhou’s municipal government allowed mass citizens to 
participate in mechanisms such as the consultative committee, and to influence environmental 
decision making. Political openness also implies the possibility of a partnership between civil 
society and the government.  
 
Overall, the changes in socio-economic conditions and public opinions have shaped the behaviour 
of policy actors in incineration policy. China’s unprecedented economic growth has contributed 
to severe environmental degradation and health problems, in addition to creating a new middle 
class, the members of which are economically well-off, well-educated and interested in healthy 
lifestyles and environmental consciousness. This new middle class is also interested in 
environmental activities such as voluntary clean up, green consumption and even protests. Hence, 
the changes in socio-economic values between economic growth and sustainable development. 
The debate over incineration’s safety has changed public opinions on SWM. After the protests in 
Guangzhou, the municipal government increased the budget for waste recycling projects to meet 
the expectation of a zero-waste society.  
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The abovementioned conditions explain the municipal governments’ choice to pursue policy 
change in response to protesters’ pressure, but the differences between the innovative 
participatory mechanism in Guangzhou and the lack of any such programme in Beijing deserves 
further explication. The degree of openness exhibited by each area’s political opportunity 
structure may explain the difference. Theoretically, governments with an ‘open political 
opportunity structure’ accommodate civil society organisations participating in policy procedures. 
The relationships between institutions and state-societies must also be considered (Parsons 
1995:335). Although institutions determine policy actors’ behaviour, the constraints they bring 
should not be over-emphasised (Ibid:88). Thus, policy actors’ behaviour in relation to policy 
processes changes accordingly. Maarten Hajer (2003) further explains that the context 
surrounding policy making is changing, and that an institutional void has been filled by the 
emergence of a new civil society (Hajer 2003:175). The institutional void, he emphasises, does 
not mean that state institutions have suddenly faded and become obsolete, but that they have 
developed new norms and institutions through deliberation and negotiation (Ibid:175-176). Thus, 
state institutions are adaptive and resilient in policy-making processes, and the rise of civil 
society and the participation of non-state actors now play a crucial role in the process.  
 
The political openness of Guangzhou’s municipal government explains this unprecedented 
institutional innovation. Allowing Eco-Canton’s registration, despite its status as a former protest 
group, is a prime example of the political openness exhibited by Guangzhou’s government. 
Moreover, the introduction of participatory mechanisms has increased opportunities for the public 
to engage in public affairs and the development of civil society. Public consultative mechanisms 
are not new to the regime. Consider the urban water tariff (Zhong and Mol 2008) and water 
conservation (Enserink and Koppenjan 2007). However, in these consultative models, the citizens 
were in a passive position and thus may not have been able to express their opinions directly 
(Fishkin, He, Luskin and Siu 2010). However, in the ‘Guangzhou model’, which opened the 
channels of participation through the consultative committee, the committee’s work and the 
process of selecting members are transparent. The establishment of consultative committees is to 
be issue-based; that is, each committee is specific to one topic, such as conservation, which 
emerges in the agenda-setting process.141 The Public Consultative and Supervision Committee for 
Urban Waste Management of Guangzhou City, for example, collected mass opinions on choosing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141“China Social Development Report, 2014”, Social Sciences Academy, Available at: 
<http://www.pishu.com.cn/skwx_ps/databasedetail?contentType=literature&subLibID=&type=&SiteID=1
4&contentId=1823430&status=No> (Accessed 22 June 2014)  
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the location of the proposed incinerator in Huadu district.142 Guangzhou’s government also 
advocated the concept of ‘environmental democracy’, which emphasised public participation in 
and public supervision of all environmental issues. Later, Guangzhou’s municipal government 
advocated ‘Happiness Guangzhou’ for better living conditions and a more sustainable city. As 
such, citizens, to some extent, can directly affect governmental decision making. 
 
Active civic engagement also facilitates public involvement via the new participatory mechanism. 
As the capital city of Guangdong province, Guangzhou has been influenced by global markets, 
exhibits economic prosperity (one of the top ten richest cities in China) and enjoys intimate ties 
with Hong Kong (sharing the same dialect and culture). Furthermore, there are frequent 
exchanges and cooperation between NGOs in Hong Kong and Guangdong. Several Hong Kong-
based NGOs have developed projects in Guangdong since the early 1990s on, for example, labour 
rights issues. Voluntary groups and activists in Guangzhou are the most developed in China 
(Spires, Tao and Chan 2014:69). Thus, it is believed that social groups and civic engagement in 
Guangzhou are more open than in other cities (Zhu 2010). Guangzhou is ‘a place of social 
activism’ where people enthusiastically defend their rights. The topics of social activism there are 
similar to those found in other places in the country, including labour rights, cultural preservation, 
land acquisition and urban management. Local identity is also much-defended in Guangzhou, as 
in the Preserving Cantonese Incident. Beijing, by contrast, has a stricter mode of registration for 
social organisations (half of the Beijing NGOs are registered under business regulations, which 
provides an easier way to obtain legal status), which creates a ‘thick political atmosphere’. Spires, 
Tao and Chan (2014:76-77) note that the political caution exercised by Beijing’s municipal 
bureaucrats and its citizens does not spark changes in the relationship between local government 
and civil society organisations. This is reflected in the case study, in which the municipal 
government maintained ‘collaborative relations’ with the civil society organisations involved in 
waste management policy; that is, the municipal government welcomed the assistance of green 
groups to promote recycling in the city rather than providing a participatory mechanism for 
decision-making processes.  
 
In summary, the governments in both cases changed their incinerator policies, but none of the 
coalitions changed their fundamental policy-oriented beliefs (i.e. incineration is the most effective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Annual Report 2013, Guangzhou Municipal government 
<http://www.gzcgw.gov.cn/portal/site/site/portal/gzcgw/zwgk_nrpage.portal?contentId=NQPLZZN3RCSC
PV3Y10QR1N6P3G4FOLBX&categoryId=PU5R1EVSARTCYX4VNOXYIQJORFEIO23Z> (Accessed 
23 June 2014).  
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SWM solution versus incineration is harmful). They only adjusted their positions strategically to 
respond to rival claims. Nevertheless, the pro-incineration coalition changed its policy core belief 
(i.e. the implementation of waste recycling programmes) to minimise the political risk generated 
by the protests. Thus, consensus between the coalitions was reached.  
 
8.2 Limitations of Applying Advocacy Coalition Framework in the Chinese Context  
 
In this work, I used the ACF to analyse the policy-making processes that led to policy change in 
the anti-incinerator protests in Beijing and Guangzhou. The ACF proved useful in explaining the 
complex dynamics between the two conflicting coalitions in the incineration debates. The case 
studies facilitated the ACF’s theoretical generalisation and challenged the belief that the Chinese 
policy-making process is strictly a top-down process. However, the limitations to my use of the 
ACF in this work must be acknowledged. First, there is insufficient literature on the use of the 
ACF in authoritarian China. The literature on Chinese policy making and environmental activism 
rarely examines the policy-making process and its complexity, and there are few studies that 
systematically identify policy actors and fractional politics (Han et al. 2014:330). In this work, for 
example, in studying the changing decisions on incinerator construction among the governmental 
agencies, it was difficult to identify the exact interactions between the rival coalitions. The public 
policy-making process has been described as a ‘black box’ (Birkland 2014:27), and the 
application of the ACF is more challenging in authoritarian China than in democratic regimes. 
Nevertheless, in this work, I provide a preliminary examination under the ACF.  
 
Second, my findings herein may not be generalisable to other incinerator projects or policy 
subsystems in China. Han et al. (2014) uses the ACF to analyse an anti-dam project on the Nu 
River anti-dam project, which involved international actors because the river is part of the 
UNESCO World Heritage programme. In contrast, both of the case studies in this work focus at 
the local scale on the interactions between municipal and lower-level governments and local 
protesters on the topic of municipal SWM. Yet, the ACF crystallises the complexity of Chinese 
policy making and reveals the emergence of proto-pluralistic coalition politics in this 
authoritarian regime (Han et al. 2014:330). 
 
Overall, the ACF’s limitations in terms of generalisability and applicability in this work actually 
avoid the problems related to framework stretching.  
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8.3 How Policy Adjustments Have Changed Local Government and Civil Society Relations? 
 
The ACF clarified the scope and conditions guiding policy actors within the policy subsystems. 
The political openness of Guangzhou’s municipal government drove the measures implemented 
to encourage public involvement in environmental decision-making and other public issues. This 
participatory mechanism benefits both local government and civil society.  
 
Mass citizens’ involvement in environmental decision making is defined as individuals and social 
groups, such as ENGOs, influencing environmental policy decision(s) through designed 
consultation, deliberation and information dissemination. Citizen participation contributes a 
public-preference choice, makes policy implementation more effective, enhances governmental 
legitimacy (Stivers 1990; Beierle 1999; Thomas 1995:2) and supports solutions to social conflicts 
(Roberts 2004:315). It also allows the general public or civil society organisations to monitor the 
government while increasing civic engagement. Mass citizens’ involvement in environmental 
decision making has changed the relationship between state–civil society relations at the local 
level. In this section, I first discuss how a policy adjustment (i.e. the implementation of new 
municipal waste management measures) has changed local government and civil society 
relations, and then analyse the reasons for this change. 
 
Both Guangzhou and Beijing’s municipal governments have implemented new measures for 
managing municipal waste, and their relationships with civil society have consequently changed. 
Guangzhou’s municipal government advocates ‘Environmental Democracy’ and ‘Happiness 
Guangzhou’, both of which have encouraged more civic engagement in environmental issues. In 
addition, the establishment of public consultative committees has not only provided a platform for 
effective communication between governments and citizens, but has also facilitated the 
development of civil society and the growth of a sense of civic virtue. The emergence of Eco-
Canton has facilitated policy advocacy through a partnership with Guangzhou’s municipal 
government in promoting waste sorting and recycling programmes in the city. For example, the 
municipal government invited Eco-Canton to consult on waste sorting in the Huale community of 
the Yuexiu district, one of the model waste-sorting and recycling communities in Guangzhou 
where the residents, local students and people from other communities have been learning how to 
maintain garbage sorting and recycling on community street corners. Furthermore, the anti-
incinerator campaign and the work of Eco-Canton have encouraged the rise of new green groups 
and re-posited their role in society. Green Point has launched a new waste management project 
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and Biker Guangzhou advocates for green transportation in the city. The green groups in Beijing 
have also begun promoting waste sorting and recycling after the Liulitun activism. Famous 
Beijing-based ENGOs such as Friends of Nature, Global Village and Nature University have 
organised activities to promote zero waste in Beijing. For example, both Nature University and 
Friends of Nature have used policy advocacy to stop incinerator construction and to launch waste-
sorting programmes in residential communities. The Guangzhou case revealed that the creation of 
participatory mechanisms and the encouragement of public involvement in decision-making 
processes are effective solutions for social dispute. The roles of civil society organisations in 
monitoring government and advocating policy have also been legitimated. In the next section of 
this chapter, the conditions required to change local government and civil society relations are 
examined.  
 
The core value of civil society is civic engagement in public affairs, such as involvement in 
policy-making processes. The rise of civil society results in the accumulation of social capital, the 
promotion of civic engagement in public affairs and the acceleration of public participation in 
policy-making processes. Thus, the institutional arrangements of state and civil society are 
interdependent, and they affect public participation in policy processes. As mentioned, the 
political openness of Guangzhou’s municipal government has helped provide more innovative 
policies since the economic reform of the late 1970s. The development of civil society in 
Guangzhou also accounts for public engagement in decision making and the new participatory 
mechanism.  
 
In summary, the innovative implementation of consultative committees in Guangzhou that allow 
citizens to get involved in decision making is a breakthrough in Chinese policy-making processes. 
Decision-making processes have become more plural, and the bureaucrats are no longer dominant 
but rather share power with other actors, such as individual citizens and social groups. More 
specifically, this institutionalised organisation has, to some extent, solved some social disputes 
and enhanced the communications between the local government and citizens. In the case of 
Guangzhou, it has been shown that the municipal government not only suspended the project to 
meet protesters’ demands, but also advocated new social values for Guangzhou; namely, public 
participation and the zero-waste society. The relatively open political structure of local 
government and the active civic engagement of society explain this policy adjustment in 
Guangzhou. Such changes in public participation and decision making challenge our 
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understanding of environmental governance in China; in particular, broadening the varieties of 
environmental management used in different parts of the country.   
 
Although the above findings cannot be seen as representative of the entire country, these two 
diverse cases shed light on the variety of changes shaping environmental management in China. 
As mentioned in the Overview, China’s decentralised and fragmented governing structure 
explains the existence of the differences in environmental management methods shown above. 
Since the economic reform of the late 1970s, central government has diffused power to all levels 
of local government, such that the local governments enjoy a certain degree of autonomy in 
making public policies. Fragmented authoritarianism (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1992; Lieberthal 
1997; Lieberthal 2004) has clearly shown that the Chinese policy process is an aggregation of 
interests among the CCP political elite across national and local levels. They negotiate, bargain, 
exchange and reach consensus to achieve their political goals and influence policy decisions. 
Factional politics among the CCP leaders also affect the policy-making process. For instance, 
local governments put economic growth first, as it is highly related to their career promotion, but 
doing so makes them reluctant to implement environmental policies in their territories and results 
in local EPBs receiving inferior status. The local EPBs are responsible to local governments, 
which are responsible for declaring the financial support given to local EPB officials and for 
evaluating EPB performance. Although local EPBs also report to the higher levels of the 
environmental departments, they remain constrained by local government. In the face of rising 
environmental activism, China’s local governments are responding to the protests in different 
ways, and local bureaucrats must make changes in policy priorities. This fragmented 
environmental management has changed the operation and our understanding of China’s 
environmental regime. 
 
Most of the scholarly literature on environmental management in China in the last decade has 
focused on the rise of multi-actors playing their environmental management roles in this 
transitional regime (Mol and Carter 2006) where the ruling party is no longer the dominant actor 
(Shi and Zhang 2006:277). The strategies of new emerging actors, such as economic and green 
groups, must now be considered by this non-democratic polity (Lu 2007; Economy 2006), along 
with public participation in environmental management (Enserink and Koppenjan 2007; Zhang 
and Mol 2008). International relations and China’s environmental management – including topics 
such as the challenges of enforcing climate change targets and participation in global 
environmental conventions (Chan, Lee and Chan 2008) – are also being discussed. The literature 
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has mapped a general picture of the patterns, transformation, trends and challenges of this 
environmental regime, but the diversity of environmental management across the country is also 
visible.   
 
The levels of decentralisation and flexibility in environmental policy making, which implicate the 
effectiveness of environmental management, vary across the country. It would be dangerous to 
generalise about environmental management in China. Multiple variations between regions and 
the involvement levels of government (O’Brien and Stern 2008:14) reveal a wide range of 
environmental management practices in China. As the case studies showed, the degree of political 
openness exhibited by municipal governments and the development of social groups determine 
policy innovation and influence the relationship between local government and civil society. 
Hence, it can be difficult to gain a comprehensive understanding of the environmental regime in 
China. Although the diversity of environmental management strategies across the country 
accelerates the decrease in the central government’s control, it can also be perceived as a 
‘survival strategy’ for the ruling party in a changing political environment. They regard these 
changes as small adjustments in their ‘adaptive model’ policy-making experiments. Local 
officials are encouraged to suggest new solutions and provide feedback to help formulate national 
policy. This strategy is a good way to deal with uncertainty, to prevent the cost of failed national 
reform and to minimise the effects on other jurisdictions (Heilmann 2011:62,87; Heilmann and 
Perry 2013:23). Thus, the CCP’s legitimacy and resilience are maintained. 
 
Chapter Conclusion  
The comparison in this chapter explains the reasons behind the environmental activism in 
Guangzhou and Beijing and the municipal governments’ responses to it. The substantial 
economic growth has led to environmental degradation across the country. The Chinese 
government has put effort into tackling pollution but it has failed, which has intensified growing 
environmental activism. Increasing environmental activism definitely is a source of social 
instability and has been challenging the legitimacy of the ruling party. This study also addresses 
policy adjustment and explores to what extent the relationship between government and civil 
society at the local level has changed and what are the conditions that have enabled this change. 
This chapter reveals the significance of applying the ACF to illustrate the complexity of public 
policy making in present-day China, which challenged the conventional policy-making beliefs. 
The monistic state has changed its attitudes about policy-making processes in this authoritarian 
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regime, highlighting the diversity of environmental management across the country and revealing 
the adaptive strategies of the ruling party.  
 
The Panyu and Liulitun residents used activism to demand transparent decision-making processes 
and opportunities to participate in them. They used various strategies, some of which challenged 
social stability in the cities. In the face of the protests, both Guangzhou and Beijing’s municipal 
governments suspended the opposed incinerator projects and implemented new measures to 
promote zero-waste management. These choices and the rationale behind making concessions are 
similar to the reactions to other cases of social activism in China, with the governments focused 
on minimising the political and economic costs of activism and fearing its capacity to challenge 
the rule of local government.  
 
The case studies also provide a more in-depth view of policy adjustments in society. In the case 
of Guangzhou, the municipal government not only stopped the incinerator project and 
implemented the recycling programme, they also initiated mechanisms for public participation 
that have further changed social values by encouraging active civic engagement in decision 
making – a significant breakthrough. Unlike other participatory channels such as the EIA Law or 
public hearings, in which the citizens are passive in the decision-making process, this 
institutionalised consultative committee supports direct involvement. Local governments have 
become more responsible and accountable, paving the way for the emergence of more 
deliberative policy making. The political openness of governments and more active civil society 
organisations reflect the variations in environmental management across the country and confirm 













Chapter 9  
Conclusion  
Since the economic reforms of the late 1970s, China has experienced unprecedented economic 
prosperity and witnessed the livelihoods of most Chinese people improve enormously. Yet, this 
was accomplished in the face of formidable obstacles including urban–rural divisions, class 
inequality, a migrant workers underclass, environmental degradation, inter-ethnic unrest and 
bureaucratic corruption – all of which call into question the feasibility of sustaining high-speed 
growth in the country. Increasing social complexity has led to political contestation and social 
conflicts that have become more extensive and violent throughout Chinese society, creating a 
challenge for the ruling party (Selden and Perry 2010:2). Despite increasing stakeholder influence 
in policy making (Ma and Lin 2012:99), the number of protests has grown steadily.  
 
This work was motivated by the tremendous spread of environmental protests across China. Why 
do some protests press local governments to make changes (such as the relocation of the PX 
factory in Xiamen and the incinerators in Beijing and Guangzhou), but not others? I started 
examining environmental protests and policy change to answer this question, among others. 
Previous studies have largely focused on patterns of environmentalism and environmental 
activism, and the development of environmental policies at both the local and national levels of in 
China. The dynamics between state and non-state actors in policy-making processes and how 
protests influence governmental responses remain under-investigated. To enhance the literature, 
in this work I used the ACF to examine the complexity of environmental policy making in China. 
I used the two activism case studies in two of China’s most prominent cities as a platform for 
exploring the causal link between protest and policy change in China. My primary empirical 
research questions were: How can non-state actors influence policies on incinerator 
construction? and How did municipal governments respond? The answers to these questions fill 
an important gap in the empirical literature on the relationship between protests and 
environmental policy changes in authoritarian China. Likewise, this work examined the influence 
of political and socio-economic conditions, in the form of coalition opportunity structures, on the 
outcomes of protests to answer another research question: How do societally based 
environmental coalitions affect municipal solid waste management in Beijing and 
Guangzhou? The different protest outcomes noted here show that FA provides the structural 
variations attributed to different environmental activism outcomes across the country. My goal in 
this work was to conduct a systematic examination of the patterns and dynamics of policy actors, 
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and identify how these structural variations shape and influence the policy process. Then, I used 
the ACF to address future policy change.  
 
As this work illustrates, collective resistance has become a new phenomenon in public 
participation in Chinese politics (Cai 2010:184), challenging the CCP’s rule (Selden and Perry 
2000:3). However, suppression has not been the ruling party’s only response to activism. The 
Chinese government has also used policy change to maintain long-term social stability and 
legitimacy. A review of the scholarship on environmental activism in Post-Mao China shows that 
the focus has been on the survival of green groups, the rise of environmental protests among mass 
citizens, the limitations of environmental activism within the political constraints of authoritarian 
China and the weakness of environmental authority in the decentralised political structure (Wu 
2009; Ho 2007; Wu 2013; Shapiro 2012; Stalley and Yang 2006; Alpermann 2010; Ho 2001; 
Schwartz 2004; Johnson 2013; Sun and Zhan 2008; Sullivan and Xie 2009; Tong 2005; Xie 2009; 
Li et al.2012; Yu and Zeng 2010; Sinkule 1995; Lieberthal 1997; Tang et al.1997). There have 
been few analyses of the governments’ responses to environmental activism (such as 
environmental policy changes), the conditions in which these responses are made or their affects 
on the development of civil society and public participation in environmental policy in China. Cai 
(2010) uses a framework to analyse the relationship between protests and governmental policy 
response and concludes that Chinese local governments tend to adopt concessions as a response 
to social activism, as doing so minimises political and economic costs (Cai 2010:5-6). Based on 
this background, I examined the dynamics of policy actors and the conditions under which they 
operate to systematically reach policy change.  
 
In Chapter 4, I explored the ACF’s application to China’s environmental practices and addressed 
the role that coalition opportunity structures (COSs) play in shaping policy change. My results 
showed that the ACF is a promising tool for explaining policy change in the context of 
authoritarian China. In Chapter 5, I described the arrangements and strategies in conducting this 
work, including the rationale behind interviewee selection and data sources. The limitations of 
this work were also reported, such as the problems associated with accessing data from the 
Chinese government and the lack of a consolidated analytical framework from which to study the 
relationship between protests and environmental policy changes. Hence, this work served as a 
preliminary study of the ACF’s use in examining environmental policy change in China, and as a 
multi-dimensional discussion of the case studies.  
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In Chapters 6 and 7, I explored the complexity of the policy-making process by studying the anti-
incinerator construction protests in Beijing and Guangzhou: the emergence of organised 
opposition, the strategies and dynamics of the two rival coalitions and the final policy outcomes. 
The findings also showed strong qualitative evidence that the COSs influenced the policy change 
outcomes. In particular, I found that political systems, socio-economic and cultural values and 
changes in public opinion were more likely to drive policy change. Moreover, coalitions with 
‘open’ COSs and socio-cultural values tended to engage in additional policy innovation, as in the 
Guangzhou case. Guangzhou’s municipal government allowed the protesters to form Eco-Canton, 
implying that ‘beyond NIMBY’ strategies have changed the stereotypes of NIMBY activism, in 
which protesters mobilise for purely selfish reasons to reject an unpopular project. These findings 
have important theoretical implications for the environmental policy-making process in China. 
The fragmented and decentralised governing structure provided various COSs for shaping policy 
outcomes and the possibility of non-state actors participating in environmental policy-making 
processes.  
 
In Chapter 8, I provided more detail on how using the ACF helped systematically explain the 
dynamics between policy actors in reaching consensus on policy change. The limitations to 
applying the ACF were also mentioned, including poor generalisability to other incinerator 
projects and policy subsystems in China. The ACF’s theoretical generalisation definitely 
challenges the image of Chinese policy making as a top-down process.   
 
Finally, I noted the relationships between COSs and policy change. Four dimensions of COSs 
stood out: political openness, which appeared to be the decentralised governing structure at the 
local level; socio-cultural openness, specifically the socio-cultural developments shaping civic 
engagement in society and the relationship between government and civil society organisations; 
changes in socio-economic conditions, such as the creation of a middle class that pursues 
improved quality of life; and changes in public opinion, such as the rise of environmental 
awareness.  
 
These findings addressed the research questions stated earlier. Using the ACF, I showed how the 
non-state actors influenced incinerator construction policy, the compositions of anti-incinerator 
coalitions, their policy beliefs and their strategies for expressing their grievances. I also discussed 
how the municipal governments responded to the citizens’ concerns and activism. I clarified the 
dynamics between protesters and governments attempting to reach a consensus on incinerator 
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construction. Finally, I used the COSs and the ACF to explain the different outcomes of socially 
based environmental coalitions on municipal SWM in Beijing and Guangzhou, on the 
relationship between government and civil society and on public participation in China’s long-
term environmental policy making.  
 
In addition to these findings, the analysis in this work fills a theoretical gap in the Chinese public 
policy literature by demonstrating that the social entities involved in China’s environmental 
policy making challenge its status as a top-down process dominated by state actors (Han et al. 
2014:328). This has subsequently laid a foundation for others to systematically study policy 
change, as it not only reveals the dynamics of policy actors within public policy subsystems, but 
also outlines the COSs necessary for policy change. This work provides an example of how to 
measure and empirically explore the roles played by COSs in the policy-making process. A 
fragmented governing structure, socio-cultural values and changes in socio-economic conditions 
and public opinions all influence coalition formation, coalition strategies and policy change.  
 
Given that both state and non-state actors seek major consensus for policy change, one direction 
for future research would be to analyse the mechanisms of policy actors that lead to policy change 
in China. Theories of policy change provide a range of approaches for analysis, but the ACF 
places a strong emphasis on changes in preferences within policy adjustment. Although coalition 
opportunity structures may change over time and in the contexts of different policies, they can 
still help us understand the various interactions between structure and agency in protests and their 
outcomes. Likewise, the significance of political openness and socio-cultural structures, and their 
interaction, should not be overlooked. This work demonstrates that to some extent, the ACF’s 
expectations have been reflected in the cases analysed. Nevertheless, the different policy change 
outcomes revealed in this work have demonstrated the diverse nature of environmental 
management across the country.  
 
As discussed, the theory and findings presented herein address a number of important questions 
with implications for studying Chinese environmental policy. The findings in this work will be 
subjected to future testing and refinement in other policy areas. Coalition formation, policy 
beliefs among policy actors, resource mobilisation, the policy learning process and COSs can be 
combined to create a framework for studying other areas of public policy. Moreover, the roles of 
COSs lead to corresponding changes in coalition strategies and different policy changes in 
environmental policy subsystems, providing good measures for future studies. In summary, this 
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chapter concludes that the knowledge generated in this work and the policy implications of the 
findings suggest  future directions for studying the public policy process in China.  
 
A number of implications can be drawn from this work. First, it clearly showed that those 
attempting to examine policy changes and the dynamics behind contentious facilities in China 
should consider the political institutional arrangement and the roles of COSs. I analysed how the 
COSs can influence policy processes and the formation of rival coalitions at the local level under 
the decentralised and fragmented governing structure that shaped policy change. COS indicators 
have been addressed in this work and will serve as a reference for other similar research in China.  
Second, the COS indicators and their correlation with policy change requires further exploration. 
Just as Chapter 4 analysed the effects of COSs in a specific policy subsystem on coalition 
strategies and policy change, so shall it develop measures for subsystems that can conduct a 
large-N analysis for further ACF generalisation in studying Chinese public policy.  
 
Finally, in this work, I provided evidence from a nondemocratic country by applying the ACF in 
the Chinese context. As mentioned, few studies have used the ACF to study policy change in 
China, but the rhetoric stating the impossibility of reaching a consensus on policy change in a 
nondemocratic country has been disproven. Although the current findings remain limited, the 
empirical and theoretical understanding of policy change has increased confidence in studying the 
Chinese policy-making process in the future.  
 
The following are some reflections on the effects of introducing a participatory mechanism into 
the Chinese policy-making process. Although the introduction of a participatory mechanism in 
Guangzhou has been a breakthrough in authoritarian China, the new mechanism was embedded 
within the existing policy system without further institutional change. As discussed above, 
variations in environmental management and the existence of different degrees of political and 
social openness at the local level are a result of the communist regime’s ‘survival strategy’. These 
actions may thus be perceived as an example of ‘absorbing politics’, in which the governmental 
authority ‘absorbs’ or incorporates the people into the establishment for consultation on public 
policy as a way of  ‘pacifying’ social dissatisfaction.  
 
The ruling party adopted FA to encourage local bureaucrats to use local experience to innovate 
new policy, and to help formulate national policy. The introduction of a participatory mechanism 
has led Chinese people to believe that they have the power to influence policy (Nathan 2003:15). 
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However, the overall political structure has not been changed. As this participatory mechanism is 
consultative in nature, the municipal government is not accountable to the public consultative 
committee in implementing municipal waste management policy. The municipal government 
retains the monopoly of control over the decision-making process, and the weak institutional 
status of EPBs has not been changed in the political structure. The CCP’s power is thus 
consolidated and unchallengeable. But the CCP regime has shown resilience and a capacity for 
adaptation in the changing environment. It has learned from these experiments and found 
responses that it hopes will maintain its legitimacy.  
 
The decentralised and fragmented political structures in authoritarian China provide space for 
‘political and economic experiments’ at the local, day-to-day level to prolong the CCP’s rule 
through the provision of conditional concessions. This ensures that the central government avoids 
becoming the target of blame (Cai 2008:411,415). Protesters use power leverage, engaging with 
policymakers at higher levels and with non-institutionalised powers in pursuit of their interests 
(Cai 2014:129). Cai (2014) argues that this strategy is effective due to the Chinese regime 
maintaining legitimacy for the sake of social stability (Cai 2014:130). Thus, a ‘fragmented 
political structure’ is the CCP’s survival strategy in the changing political environment. They 
regard this arrangement as a part of the ‘adaptive model’, which includes experiments in policy 
making and small adjustments. Local officials are encouraged to create new solutions, and their 
input reflects local experience and provides feedback, which help to formulate national policy. 
This strategy allows those practicing it to deal with uncertainty, prevent the cost of failed national 
reform legislation and minimise effects on other jurisdictions (Heilmann 2011:62,87; Heilmann 
and Perry 2013:23). The CCP thus maintains its monopoly on political organisations and 
continues to suppress challenges to its status as ruling party, even as it adapts to be more inclusive 
in the changing economic and social environment (Dickson 2010:23). The momentum of mass 
citizen action has changed the monistic state’s policy-making processes in this authoritarian 
country, with the CCP choosing to shift towards a more inclusive decision-making process to 
strengthen the resilience of its regime.  
 
Above all, the widespread grievances of Chinese citizens and the growth of collective resistance 
have led to questions about conflict resolution between state and citizens. Although the Chinese 
government has implemented laws and regulations and opened more participatory channels for 
solving disputes, public participation remains limited. The findings of this work reveal that local 
governments’ efforts to build conflict resolution mechanisms have been highly significant in the 
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study of Chinese public policy. This study adopts the ACF to discuss the decision-making 
processes that led to policy change in the case of anti-incinerator protests in Guangzhou and 
Beijing. The comparison of these similar cases of anti-incinerator activism in Beijing and 
Guangzhou advances our understanding of the political interaction between local governments 
and protesting groups. It also allows us to better understand the variation in local governments’ 
commitment to municipal waste management. Exploring these cases exhibits the complexity of 
the policymaking processes within policy subsystems, the coalition opportunity structure, and the 
fundamentals of sociocultural structures, which are all significant factors that influence the 
conditions of government policy adjustments and various protest outcomes. Although coalition 
opportunity structures may change over time and vary by policy context, they can hlp us to 
understand the various interactions between structures and agencies as they relate to protests and 
their outcomes. The significance of political openness and socio-cultural structures and how they 
interweave are also examined above. This study demonstrates that the expectations under the 
ACF were reflected in the cases analysed to some extent.  
 
In short, this study examines the link between environmental protest and policy change in China, 
which has taken root in local politics, particularly at the municipal level. Two cases are 
considered to show the variation in the policy change by local governments in response to 
protests. However, the findings cannot be generalized to other places in China, as the cases 
occurred at particular times and in particular places. The findings of the case studies allow us to 
look closely at environmental management at the local level and provide valuable contributions to 
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Appendix D 
 
Timeline of anti-incinerator activism in Beijing Liulitun 	  
2006  
August  The Liulitun residents found the tender notice 
spontaneously on building incinerator was released on the 
district government’s website 
  
September The Beijing municipal government launched a one-month 




The Liulitun residents sent letters to the municipal 
government and expressed their worries about the smell 
from the landfill and the build of incinerator.  
  
November The municipal government published a urban plan for 
northern Haidian district and plan to build an incinerator 
located a landfill site with a daily disposal capacity of 
1,200 tonnes.  
  
December Two proposals about the effects of landfill on health and 
the ecosystem, and suggested solutions to the smell of 
landfill and municipal waste disposal were tabled by the 
CPPCC members in the First Plenum of the 8th Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) of 
Haidian district.  
  
	  145	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 The Haidian district government confirmed the 
construction of incinerator and completed by March 2007. 
  
23 December The residents drafted an action plan “Build a harmonious 
community, strongly oppose the building of the 
incinerator in Liulitun” (共築和諧社區共建美好家園 強
烈反對六里屯建設垃圾焚燒廠) and prepared to have 
campaign.  
  
26 December Submit a complaint letter “A complaint letter about 
opposing the building of an incinerator in Liulitun 
community” (百旺新城社區居民關於反對在六里屯建
垃圾焚燒廠的申訴信 ) to the State Environmental 
Protection Agency (the former Ministry of Environmental 
Protection) and the Beijing Municipal Environmental 
Protection Bureau.  
  
30 December  The mayor of Beijing, Mr. Wang Qishan, emphasised on 
the need of building incinerator in a current affairs 
programme Beijing Chamber (北京議事廳).  
2007   
1-3 January The residents organised an exhibition in the community to 
shown the impacts of building incinerator. And collected 
signatures for petition.  
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17 January The Haidian district government held a meeting about the 
incinerator project and invited the residents’ 
representatives to attend. In the meeting, the government 
reiterated that the safety of incinerator and the plan was 
fixed in 2004.  
  
18 January The residents launched the first protests. The submitted 
the complaint letters to the municipal level agencies: the 
Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, the 
Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning, and 
the Office of Letters and Calls of the Beijing Committee 
of the Communist Party of China.  
  
22 January  The district government held a press conference and 
emphasised the incinerator should be operated in 2008.  
  
February The residents sent a letter to the Beijing Municipal 
Environmental Protection Bureau and cited the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law and asked for 
cancelling the incinerator project. 
  
2 March  The district government held the second meeting with the 
residents and reiterated that the project should be carried 
on.  
  
3 April  The Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau 
replied the protesters and confirmed the decision of 
building incinerator, which fulfilled all legal procedures.  
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14 April  The residents launched another action against the 
incinerator project. On the same day, the Liulitun landfill 
held an open day to give a chance to learn more about the 
operation of waste management and the technology used 
in the landfill.  
  
16 April  A letter sent to State Environmental Protection 
Administration, which disagreed with the feedback given 
by the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection 
Bureau.  
  
18 April  The incinerator project was started to build.  
  
20 April  The protesters took a rally outside the Beijing Municipal 
Environmental Protection Bureau.  
10 May  The Beijing Municipal Commission of City 
Administration and Environment announced the 
postponement of the incinerator’s construction due to the 
residents’ opposition.  
  
5 June  1,000 residents took a rally on Earth Day.  
  
12 June  The State Environmental Protection Administration 
officially announced the postponement the project, and 




August  The Olympics Game commenced.  
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9 October  Newspaper reported that the Haidian District Commission 
of City Administration and Environment had chosen the 
location of the Liulitun incinerator and completed the first 
stage of the EIA.  
  
Mid-October  The residents launched a petition and sent letters to State 
Environmental Protection Administration, the Beijing 
Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, the Beijing 
Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, the 
Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning, the 
Beijing Municipal Commission of City Administration 
and Environment, and the Mayor of Beijing.  
  
November & December The protesters visited the municipal government 10 times 
to express their grievances.  
  
2009  
3 February The municipal Commission of City Administration and 
Environment held a meeting with other departments about 
the building of incinerators in Beijing city. The office 
emphasised the necessity of building incinerators for 
Beijing City (the Liulitun incinerator was one of five 
planned incinerators) and of implementing more 
comprehensive municipal waste management. More than 
20 residents gathered and discussed the problems of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 February  The residents launched a discussion forum. Dozens of 
residents attended and environmental scientists, such as 
Zhao Zhangyuan, was invited for delivering a talk and 
providing consultation about the impacts of incineration.  
  
Mid-February The residents sent petition letter with 1,000 signatures to 
the government agencies to express their dissatisfaction 
and requested the district government listen people’s 
voice. 
  
July  The deputy head of the Haidian District Commission of 
City Administration and Environment denied that the 
incinerator location had already been confirmed and 
claimed that the agency was still assessing the risks of 
building an incinerator.  
  
2011  
19 January The Haidian district government announced that a new 
location for the incinerator had been found in Sujiatuo 
town (蘇家陀) and abandoned the plan for Liulitun. And 
the end of campaign.  
  
November The municipal government implemented “Regulations on 
Municipal Waste Management for Beijing city”. 
  
2012  
January The municipal government planned to promote a trial 
waste sorting programme in 1,200 communities within 5 
years and waste charge by volume was suggested to 
implement and took effect in March 2012. 
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2013  
April The Beijing Municipal government implemented “Three 
Year Plan of Municipal Waste Facilities for Beijing City” 
(北京市生活垃圾處理設施建設三年實施方案), the 
government expects the municipal waste to be solved by 
waste burning (70%) and landfill (30%) by 2015.  ‘	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Appendix	  E	  
Timeline of anti-incinerator activism in Guangzhou Panyu 
 
2009 
February  Panyu district government posted the plans for the incinerator 
project Daishi in February 2009, in the expectation that 
construction would be completed in 2010. However, this proposal 
was not given much attention by local residents. 
 
September The Municipal Urban Management Bureau confirmed the 
incinerator project and the land was requisitioned while the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) had been launched. 
 
Residents accidentally had been learning that a waste incinerator 
power plant was going to be built from a government website and 
posted the information on a residential online discussion forum. 
 
First meeting was convened to discuss the problems of incinerator 
projects and actions to be taken on 29 September.   
 
October  The residents took to the streets of the district with a petition and 
distributed handbills about the problems associated with 
incinerators seeking public support on 13 and 14 October.  
 
Dozens of protesters wearing surgical masks and dressed in T-
shirts bearing the slogan “Refuse Toxic Air” collected signatures 
from the public at the entrance of a supermarket; some protestors 
held banners with slogans such as “Anti-burning” and “Anti-
dioxin” on 25 October. 
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November  Government representatives held a press conference. In the press 
conference, both municipal and district governments announced 
that they had not changed their positions and emphasised the 
necessity of building the incinerator in the district on 22 
November. This aroused anger among the residents.  
 
The following morning, one thousand residents “strolled” to the 
headquarters of the municipal government and Guangzhou 
Municipal Urban Management Committee on 24 November. 
 
Panyu district government suggested inviting an expert to consult 
on a comprehensive plan for the district, with residents invited to 
vote and decide on the plan. In addition, the Municipal 
Environmental Protection Bureau announced that the EIA for the 
incinerator would be assessed by the Bureau and the final decision 
shown to the public after the hearings on 25 November. 
 
December  The Panyu district government announced that construction of the 
planned incinerator would be postponed to 2011 on 10 December.  
 
The party secretary of the district was invited to attend a meeting 
with the residents of Riverside Garden on 20 December 2009. In 
the meeting, the party secretary let it be known that the project had 
been suspended as a result of the mass opposition.  
 
The Guangzhou government implemented new instruments on 
waste management, such as plans to promulgate regulation on 
waste sorting in Guangzhou city and set more pilot points for 
waste sorting, aim to promote recycling in Guangzhou. 
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2010 
February  Green Family (former Eco-Canton) was formed.  
 
March  One of the founders of Green Family, Luo Jingming (internet 
pseudonym “Basuofengyun”, 巴索風雲 ) travelled to Beijing. 
There he met Zhang Boju, the chief executive officer of Friends of 
Nature. A breakthrough for institutionalisation of Green Family 
and paved a way for forming “Eco-Canton”. 
 
June  “Eco-Canton” was set up and registered as a nongovernmental 
organisation with the Bureau of Civil Affairs of Guangzhou 
Municipality in June. 
  
November  Asian Games, 12 – 27 November  
 
2011 
January  The Guangzhou government launched a waste recycling 
programme. Under this programme the government proposed 
selecting a district to carry out a trial of the recycling scheme, 
which could later be rolled out to the wider city with the 
expectation being that the volume of waste could be reduced by 
50% after three years. 
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April  The Trial Regulation on Municipal Waste Recycling and 
Management, took effect on 1 April 2011, and the volume of waste 
for burning and landfill has been reduced by 3.09% between 2012-
2013 and further waste sorting scheme were implemented in 10 
small communities in Guangzhou. 
 
Panyu district government launched a press conference on 11 April 
2011, selected 5 locations and would choose one of them to build 
an incinerator, two-month of public consultation will be provided 
for this proposal as well.  
 
Without consultation with Fushan municipal government about the 
choices of location, the Bureau of Environment, Transportation, 
and Urban Management of Shunde district visited both Guangzhou 
and Panyu Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) for getting 
more information on the incinerator on 15 April. And later, the 
Shunde government opposed the incinerator project.  
 
Few days after the Foshan and Shunde governments expressed 
their opinion on incinerator, the Panyu government released the 
standards and process of choosing the incinerator locations in a 
press conference on 21 April and expected the EIA could be done 
at the end of 2011.  
 
Dozens of Riverside Garden and other residents visited the 
Municipal Urban Management Committee on 25 April and 
expressed their dissatisfactions and pressed the government to 
speed up waste sorting scheme in the whole city.  
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June  Nandu.com organised an online voting on the best place for 
building incinerator. On 16 June, the result of voting released: 
more than 380,000 votes and most of the people (over 57,000 
votes) opposed Daishi to be selected for building incinerator, while 
Dagang town was highly suggested to build incinerator (around 
53,000 votes). 
 
Panyu government released the result and decided Dagang town as 
the location for building incinerator on 22 June. 
 
Shunde Environmental Science Association, issued 20 thousands 
questionnaires to the Shunde citizens about the incinerator location 
and announced over 77% of respondents preferred to choose 
Dongchong town 26 June.  
 
Dagang town residents submitted 2,000 signatures to Municipal 
Urban Management Committee for opposing the incinerator on 26 
June.  
 
The municipal government maintains the incineration and expected 
to be complete by 2015. 
 
December  Party Secretary of Guangdong Province, Mr Wang Yang, 
advocated the concept of “Environmental Democracy” in response 
to the increasing level of environmental activism in the province. 
 
2012 
August  The Public Consultative and Supervision Committee for Urban 
Waste Management of Guangzhou City was established under the 
Municipal Urban Management Committee on August. 
	  156	  




(Note: Names are reduced to initials to maintain anonymity) 
 Category/Interviewee Background 
   
I. Protesters 
 
1. Mr Luo Jinming  
(Internet pseudonym ‘Basuofengyu’) 
A resident of Panyu district, an anti-
incinerator protester in Guangzhou, the 
founder of Eco-Canton (formerly Green 
Family) and a member of the Public 
Consultative and Supervision Committee for 
Urban Waste Management of Guangzhou 
City. 
   
2.  Ms A  A resident of Panyu district, an anti-
incinerator protester in Guangzhou and a 
founding member of Eco-Canton.  
   
3.  Mr B A resident of Panyu district, a retired cadre 
member and an anti-incinerator protester in 
Guangzhou. 
   
4. Ms C A resident of Panyu district, a housewife, a 
volunteer for Eco-Canton and an anti-
incinerator protester in Guangzhou. 
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5.  Mr D A resident of Panyu district, a retired cadre 
member and an anti-incinerator protester in 
Guangzhou. 
   
6. Mrs E A resident of Panyu district, a retiree and an 
anti-incinerator protester in Guangzhou. 
   
7. Mr F A resident of Liulitun district, an anti-
incinerator protester in Beijing, a retiree and 
a volunteer for Green Monitoring Group.  
   
8. Mrs G A resident of Liulitun district, an anti-
incinerator protester in Beijing, a retiree and 
a volunteer for Green Monitoring Group. 
   
9. Mrs H A resident of Liulitun district, an anti-
incinerator protester in Beijing, a retired 
cadre member and a volunteer for Green 
Monitoring Group.  
   
10. Mr I A resident of Liulitun district, an anti-
incinerator protester in Beijing, a retired 
cadre member and a volunteer for Green  
Monitoring Group.   
   
11. Mr J A resident of Liulitun district, an anti-
incinerator protester in Beijing, a retired 
cadre member and a volunteer for Green 
Monitoring Group.  
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II. ENGO Activists  
 
12. Mr Zhang Boju Chief Executive of Friends of Nature who 
provided assistance in both anti-incinerator 
protests. 
   
13. Ms Chen Liwen  A staff member for the ENGO Nature 
University (Ziran Daxue) who provided 
assistance in both anti-incinerator protests. 
   
14. Ms K A Friends of Nature staff member who was 
responsible for organising the waste-sorting 
programme in the Liulitun district. 
   
15 Mr L A Friends of Nature staff member who was 
responsible for organising the waste-sorting 
programme in the Liulitun district. 
   
16. Mr M An Eco-Canton staff member. 
   
III. Environmental Lawyer 
   
17. Mr Xia Jun  A solicitor specialising in Chinese 
environmental law who provided legal 
assistance in both anti-incinerator protests.  
   
IV. Street-level Bureaucrat 
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18. Mr N An officer in the waste-sorting programme in 
the Huale community of the Yuexie district in 
Guangzhou. 
   
V. Academics 
   
19. Dr Chen Xiaoyun A scholar from the School of Government at 
Sun Yat-sen University who participated in 
the Panyu protest and provided assistance in 
organising Eco-Canton.  
   
20. Prof Kuo Weiqing A professor from the School of Government 
at Sun Yat-sen University who provided 

























I. Interview questions for protesters: 
 
1) Why did you participate in the protests? 
2)  Do you agree with the government’s response regarding the incinerator project? 
3) What is your opinion on municipal waste management in this city? 
II. Interview questions for ENGO activists: 
1) How did your organisation participate in the anti-incinerator protest? 
2) How has your organisation participated in the launch of waste-recycling programmes? 
3) What role has your organisation played in the activism? Was it that of a mediator 
between the government and the public or was it as a representative for the public in 
expressing their concerns to the government? 
III. Interview questions for street-level bureaucrats: 
     1) How would you encourage residents to participate in this trial programme? 
     2) What are the difficulties in promoting waste-sorting programmes in this  
          community? 
IV. Interview questions for environmental lawyers:  
1) How did you get involved in activism; specifically, in helping protesters? 
2) What is your opinion of environmental impact assessments? 
V. Interview questions for academics:  
     1) How did you get involved in activism; specifically, in helping protesters? 
     2) How do you perceive the development of public participation in China’s  environmental 
policy?  
3) What is your opinion of the government’s response to the public consultative   
 committee? 
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